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Synopsis
This thesis examines the response of social democracy to the 
problems of two lesser developed countries in Europe: Spain and Turkiye.
First, the development of social democratic ideas and practice is 
examined. I argue that social democracy is best understood as a pragmatic, 
broad based movement for social justice, not as a rigid program or set of 
dogmas. Thus social democracy has not ceased to have contemporary 
relevance, but has entered a new era where it uses new methods to achieve 
its goal. In this new era social democracy differs from the 1960s due to the 
changing nature of the parties, the electorate and their relationship with 
trade unions. All of these changes have forced a revision of commitment 
to 1960s social democratic practices and policies.
Secondly, the political systems of these countries are analysed in 
terms of whether the level of development of their political systems is 
adequate for social democracy to work. Despite a common background of 
authoritarian governments, these countries, especially Spain, now have 
increasingly secure parliamentary systems. Regular elections, 'true political 
parties', a competitive party system and relatively autonomous trade union 
movements exist in these countries, although they are often still relatively 
weak.
However, both countries still have problems, such as national 
separatist movements, and no full guarantee of civil/political rights. 
Turkiye also faces problems brought about by religious fundamentalism. 
These problems are all signs of an under developed democracy.
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Thirdly, the underlying socio-economic problems of these countries 
are analysed, using a social democratic perspective. In examining their 
socio-economic development, crucial indicators of human development in 
Spain and Turkiye are compared with three developed social democratic 
countries in Europe: Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. I argue that 
Spain and Turkiye, in certain indicators, compare well with the developed 
countries Such indicators include educational participation in Spain and 
labour force participation for women in Turkiye.
Fourthly, I examine the main political tasks for social democrats in 
trying to achieve social justice in Turkiye and Spain. I argue that social 
democracy is best placed to achieve these goals because it has a broad and 
inclusive conception and approach to problems of human rights.
INTRODUCTION
The argument of this thesis is that during the 1990s social 
democracy entered a new era. The social democracy of the 1990s is very 
different to that of the 1960s. A variety of changes have occurred in all 
its main components. The formal relationship between social 
democratic parties and the trade union movement has been broken 
because of the changing structure of employment. The ratio of the 
service sector contribution to total civilian employment, especially in 
the private sector, has increased and in turn the traditional social 
democratic electorate has declined. This has resulted in a decline in the 
strength of trade unions and correspondingly their political influence; 
consequently social democratic parties have moved to the right to gain 
support from other classes. Moreover, since the early 1980s both the 
domestic and international political climate has changed, social 
democratic parties have explicitly loosened their strong commitment to 
Neo-Keynesian economics which has in turn led to a diminished 
emphasis on full employment and the welfare state. During the period 
from the early 1980s to the later half of the 1990s social democratic 
parties in a number of northern European countries have little success in 
winning elections. Because of these changes conservatives and some 
Marxists have argued that social democracy has ceased to be a force in the 
modern world.
Such an argument is too simplistic. It is unable to explain the 
nature of social democracy throughout the course of its history. Social 
democracy is a range of policies and more importantly it interacts with 
the class structure and social movements of a given society. In other 
words, it has affected changes in the class structure of society as well as 
been affected by them. As the proportion of traditional working-class 
people has declined, social democratic parties have changed their
programs to gain support among supplementary classes, such as agrarian 
and middle-classes. This has been necessary, because the traditional 
working-class no longer constitutes the majority in many electorates. In 
addition, by moving "sideways', social democracy has proved its 
progressiveness by addressing gender and environment issues. 
Although delayed for far too long, such concerns have become part of 
most programs of social democratic parties. Apart from social 
democracy's progressive character, the class basis of today's centre-left 
social democratic parties can be differentiated from centre-right parties, 
especially in developed countries like Australia and the UK. Therefore, 
it cannot be argued that social democracy no longer has relevance in the 
1990s.
In the case of Spain and Turkiye (Turkey), two of Europe's less 
developed countries, social democracy has a different role than in the 
more developed countries of Northern and Western Europe. The class 
structure of Spain and Turkiye (especially Turkiye) do not resemble the 
class structure of Europe's more developed countries. For one thing the 
service sector does not dominate the employment structure in the lesser 
developed countries. In Turkiye it is agriculture rather than the service 
sector which constitutes the major part of the employment structure. 
Moreover, unlike the trend towards an increasing private service sector 
in northern European countries, the private service sector is not 
dominant in Turkiye. In other words, the employment structure which 
gave rise to social democracy in northern European countries is still 
predominant in both countries. Furthermore, in both countries labor 
intensive sectors, such as tourism in Spain and textiles in Turkiye, 
strengthen the class structure in which social democracy would usually 
work well. These points raise considerable difficulties for those who 
would argue that social democracy would not work in developing
countries such as Spain and Turkiye and those who discount the 
activities of social democrats in the lesser developed parts of Europe.
While there are still many areas which need reform, the political 
forces in Spain and Turkiye have developed well enough to carry social 
democracy to office through parliamentary processes. The development 
of constitutional protection of essential political freedoms and a pluralist 
political system in conjunction with a viable parliamentary (or 
legislative) assembly are necessary conditions for social democracy to be 
able to come to power without a revolutionary process.
The above is not meant to imply that the political structures of 
Spain and Turkiye do not have flaws. Good enough  suggests that the 
minimal basic political conditions exist, not that all is as it ought to be. 
There are doubts among political scientists about the functioning of 
parliamentary democracy in Spain and more especially Turkiye, because 
in their recent history both countries have had authoritarian regimes. 
Spain was governed by the dictator Franco who occupied power after the 
Civil War of the 1930s until his death in 1975. The transformation of 
Spain into a democratic country occurred smoothly through the mid- 
1970s. Turkiye, on the other hand, has experienced three coup d'états 
since the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye. The last coup was in 
1980 and lasted three years. After the last takeover of office by civilian 
-politicians in both countries, the development of democratic 
institutions, such as interest groups, political parties and election 
process, has developed smoothly. It can be argued that today their 
constitutional systems function more democratically than before and the 
parliamentary system works well enough to make revolutionary means 
unattractive. Both countries, of course, still have some problems which 
deny the full establishment of democracy. These are nationalities 
questions, human rights abuses and religious fundamentalism. Such
problems require urgent solutions. However, it can still be argued that 
the political development of both countries is sufficient for social 
democracy to work. It should be remembered that the constitutional 
and political conditions which exist in Spain and Turkiye today are in 
many respects similar to the conditions which existed in Northern 
Europe before the decades of transformation which accompanied the 
long boom of post World War Two development, during the period of 
Social Democratic ascendancy.
The thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter the 
changing nature of social democracy is analysed. To understand today's 
social democracy, it is necessary to analyse social democracy from its 
birth. First, an overview is given of the development of social 
democracy as a background to understanding its transformation since 
the early 1980s. Three key theorists of social democracy are closely 
studied: Bernstein, Crosland and Holland. Bernstein and Crosland 
reflect the characteristics of social democracy in the 1900s and 1960s 
respectively. Holland, on the other hand, represents the radical policies 
of the early 1970s' British Labour programme which emphasised 
selective nationalisation and 'hard' planning in Britain. The 
characteristic components of social democracy or social democratic 
parties, such as the relationship with the trade union movement, social 
justice and full employment are also studied. The changes which have 
occurred in social democracy since the early 1980s are closely examined. 
In this chapter, I also analyse the current state of social democracy and 
discuss whether it continues to have contemporary political relevance 
after entering a new era. By examining social democracy in the 1990s 
with an historical perspective, it is possible to understand the social 
democratic perspective of the new era.
The second chapter describes contemporary politics in Spain and 
Turkiye. The role and power of democratic institutions, such as interest 
groups, the head of state and political parties are examined. As they 
have had authoritarian regimes, the role and power of the Army is also 
studied. Special attention is given to political parties, particularly to 
social democratic parties, because of their crucial role in a democratic 
society. By looking at the last general elections, the strength of major 
parties in terms of regions, social strata and rural and urban areas, and in 
turn the factors in both countries determining voting behaviour are 
examined. Through the study of democratic institutions, special 
problems of Spain and Turkiye, such as human right abuses, 
nationalities question and religious fundamentalism are also examined. 
These issues are directly related to the democratic development of a 
society, especially human rights abuses. The rise of Islamist 
fundamentalism in Turkiye and its possible effects on democracy in the 
future will be studied. As the Refah Partisi (RP- Welfare Party) is the 
representative of the Islamist movement, it will be analysed in the 
section on Parties. By examining these institutions, the question of 
whether social democracy will be able to carry out its programme in 
office through a parliamentary process can be addressed.
After studying both the political development of Spain and 
Turkiye and social democracy in the 1990s, the study of economic and 
social development of Spain and Turkiye from a social democratic 
perspective can be attempted. Successful social democratic programmes 
require a given level of socio-economic development in a country, 
especially the development of a substantial level of industrial 
infrastructure. The examination of economic and social development of 
Spain and Turkiye is, therefore, the theme of chapter three. The 
examination is made in comparison with three developed countries
in Europe: Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. The examination 
highlights a number of social democratic j concerns. First, the
contribution of major sectors, such as industry, agriculture and service, to 
total civilian employment is examined because they give a general 
indication of the level of development of a country and to ascertain the 
strength of the traditional social democratic electorate, the industrial 
working-class. Supplementary to the nature of the sectoral division of 
their economies, issues of labour market and employment structure are 
analysed through labor force participation and unemployment level 
measurements. The examination of the wealth of Spain and Turkiye 
through GDP per capita and GNP per capita and Human Development 
Indicators gives further information on their social development. The 
last section of the chapter gives special attention to the development of 
regions. Through studying regional differentiation, the nationalities 
questions which are the most serious problems before both countries are 
clarified.
The crucial indicators of human development such as health care and 
education are comparatively examined. These indicators are directly 
related to social democracy. In research on the achievement of social 
democracy, these two indicators are the most frequently used. Thus, 
indicators of health such as life expectancy, infant mortality and the 
number of health personnel, and education such as the adult literacy rate 
and school retention ratio, are closely examined.
Chapter three also examines the role of women in Turkiye and 
Spain. Gender issues, as demonstrated in chapter one have become an 
increasingly important component of social democracy since the early 
1980s, reflecting the pioneering emphasis social democrats placed on 
gender issues in the formative period of mass social democratic parties 
in the later decades of the nineteenth century. The role of women is
also a crucial indicator of social/human development. Therefore, the 
role of women in various aspects of life, such as education, politics, and 
labour force, is examined in both Chapter^three and four. Before 
concluding, a brief overview of two indexes of development constructed 
by United Nations is given: Human Development and Gender 
Development Indexes. These indexes combine the wealth of countries 
with human development, thus making them very useful indicators of 
the broader aspects of social justice critical to social democratic politics.
In Chapter four I shall analyse issues of social justice in Turkiye 
and Spain. I shall argue that any consideration of social justice has to 
take account of human rights. Social democracy has a broader approach 
to human rights than most other ideologies. Liberalism gives most 
attention to civil rights while communism emphasises social and 
economic rights with an almost exclusive concentration on economic 
rights. Civil/political and social/economic rights have equal 
importance for social democracy. If the classical goal of life is taken as 
the goal of politics social democracy is in the best position to contribute 
to the politics of lesser developed countries. Hence, I shall argue that 
not only does social democracy have considerable relevance in the 1990s 
perhaps even more so than in the 1890s or the "golden years" of the 
1960s, but also that social democracy has particular importance beyond 
the developed post-industrial countries of north Europe and 
Australasia. I shall therefore demonstrate that social democracy has in 
particular a continuing relevance for lesser developed countries of 
Europe, such Spain and Turkiye.
Unfortunately, as analysed in Chapter four, human right abuses, 
especially of dvil/political rights, still disgrace the politics of these 
countries, especially of Turkiye. Social democracy, because of its broad 
approach to human rights is best placed to bring a potentially long term
resolution. In particular a social democratic approach to human rights 
has a greater probability of resolving nationalities problems, which 
along with Gender issues constitute the main social and economic 
human rights issues facing Spain and Turkiye. I shall argue, moreover, 
that developing a broader approach to human rights will not only 
contribute to the development of democratic institutions but also to 
economic development.
It needs to be stressed that my argument is based on the 
conception that social democracy is best conceived as a movement for 
social justice not a rigid set of dogmas or as a static program. The 
success of social democracy depends on feasible programs, which are 
programatic in orientation and design. Political and economic 
development are not contradictory in combination and both are 
mutually reinforcing parts of a viable social democracy. It is clear that in 
Turkiye freedom of thought, as it is usually viewed in western 
democracies, does not exist because of the ban on communist parties and 
the existence of prisoners of conscience and other political prisoners. 
Although Spain is in considerably better position, significant violation of 
human rights is still associated with nationalities separatism.
In Chapter four I shall argue that Islamist fundamentalism in 
Turkiye presents a potential obstacle to social democracy, because it poses 
a challenge to secularism. Although the pro-Islamist movement has 
gained momentum since the 1980s the overthrow of secularism would 
be resisted by significant forces. The Army is potentially the strongest 
counter-force against Islamist fundamentalism, as it is strongly 
committed to the secular state. The followers of Alevi sect are another 
force. Alevis are separated from the pro-Islamist movement because it 
is Sunni dominated, while Alevi is influenced by Shia teaching. The
strong liberal wings within the conservative parties, the DYP and ANAP 
comprise a significant opposition to anti-secular policies.
Liberal secularism is one of the main planks of the centre-left 
parties (The CHP and DSP). The Kurdish nationalist movement is also 
another force against fundamentalism, because it has a socialist 
orientation. It always takes part in all broad Left movements in Turkiye. 
The westernisation of Turkiye has its origins in the 18th century. The 
Republic was founded on both westernisation and secularism which had 
already developed strong foundation in Turkiye. Thus westernisation 
in Turkiye established for over a century without interruption. 
Moreover, Turkiye's growing relationships with the European 
Community underlines my argument that pro-Islamist movements can 
best be considered as a potential treat, but not yet a force that can 
overthrow secularism in Turkiye.
In many ways the lengthy period of PSOE government in Spain 
has brought changes to society and politics which demonstrate the 
benefits of social democratic policies for lesser developed countries. 
Many, but certainly not all of the social indicators show how such social 
democratic policies are beneficial to the achievement of social justice. 
Indeed a comparison of such indicators between Spain and Turkiye 
demonstrates significant gaps in achievements which are not explicable 
by merely their difference in economic development. Hence, for all the 
consideration outlined above, I shall argue that social democracy has 
considerable relevance for lesser developed countries in Europe in 





In arguing that Social Democracy has a strong future potential 
role in the political, economic and social development of Spain and 
Turkiye it is necessary to examine what social democracy means in the 
contemporary world. I shall argue that Bernstein was correct in arguing 
that social democracy is a movement not a commitment to a rigid "final 
goal of socialism". This chapter will show that the common stereotype 
which equates socialism with nationalisation, command planning and a 
strong central bureaucracy has with only a few exceptions, been entirely 
inappropriate as a description of social democratic politics for over 100 
years. Much of the material which talks about a crisis of socialism is 
therefore misplaced when applied to contemporary social democracy. 
My argument is made by critically analysing the principal works of three 
theorists, Bernstein, Crosland and Holland within the context of the 
development of social democratic thought and practice. To understand 
social democracy in the 1990s' the approach of social democratic parties 
to the characteristics of the long boom post war needs discussion.
Issues such as social justice, the relationship between social 
democratic parties and trade union movement and full employment are 
analysed. By examining these issues, those arguments which state that 
social democracy no longer has relevance for public policy in the 1990s 
are called into question. Social democratic politics continues to have 
relevance not only for wage earners, trade unionists and human right 
activists - its traditional power base- but also for the new social 
movements concerned with issues of gender, culture and the 
environment.
Bernstein and the Revisionist Controversy
In the late 19th century early social democrats, such as Bernstein, 
Kautsky and Luxemburg regarded themselves as Marxists (Beilharz 
1992:110). Bernstein was the typical example of such an early social 
democrat. While he called himself a Marxist, he began to question 
many aspects of 'orthodox Marxism' and became a 'reformist' (Beilharz 
1992:110). Bernstein's reformism (or revisionism according to 'orthodox 
Marxism') was to play a very significant role in the development of 
social democracy in the 20th century. Many aspects of his program were 
to adopted by all the major social democratic parties of Europe.
According to Beilharz, by 1898, Bernstein began to question the 
viability and desirability of the so-called 'final goal' of socialism. He 
regarded the concept as "the utopia of windbags". To Bernstein, the 
socialist movement, and the process of socialism were more important. 
Bernstein’s message was encapsulated in the epithet "the movement is 
everything, the goal is nothing". He argued that socialism was "not a 
goal but a principle"- a way of doing things rather than an end point. 
(Beilharz 1992:112).
Moreover, Bernstein not only feared revolution but counselled 
strongly against it because of the chaos which he regarded would 
inevitably follow. Unlike his contemporary Parvus, Bernstein accepted 
the need for a strong state and the maintenance of state power by 
arguing that socialists could not reject capitalism as soon as socialism 
emerged unless they wanted the economy to collapse, which would 
thereby set the stage for reaction. Like Gramsci and Kautsky, Bernstein 
viewed socialism as a new form of order. As socialism was the product
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of order, not a chaotic collapse of the old order Bernstein rejected 
theories of the ’inevitable collapse of capitalism4 (Beilharz 1992:113).
Bernstein had the temerity to question many of the central 
dogmas of classical Marxism especially the belief that capital would 
become more concentrated while the proletariat would expand. He 
rejected the ’orthodox’ theories of capitalist collapse and class 
bipolarisation. Furthermore, peasants would not disappear; nor would 
the middle class; nor would crises grow ever larger; misery and reform 
would not increase. On the other hand, 'insecurity, dependence, social 
distance, the social character of production, the functional superfluity of 
property owners' would become more deep seated. In short: ’crisis was 
not the motor of socialism’ and ’capitalist collapse was not inevitable’.
To Bernstein, socialism was best conceived as the movement 
towards an order based on the principle of association. Politics could not 
be reduced to primarily a matter of class but the actions of citizens. In 
Beilharz’ view, Bernstein's ideas of democracy include many 
contemporary conceptions, especially in his notion of justice as 'an 
equality of rights for all members of the community'. Democracy, 
moreover, entailed ’the suppression of class government’, not a 
continuation and extension into proletarian state. As the aim of social 
democracy, for Bernstein, socialism was best understood as ’the heir of 
liberalism’. Civil liberties and political freedom were always to be given 
a higher place than the fulfilment of a grandiose economic program 
(Beilharz 1992:113-140).
Bernstein elevated democracy to the pre eminent principle of a 
socialist movement and regarded the formation of the political and 
social organs of democracy as ’the indispensable precondition’ for the 
construction of the new order. Hence, Bernstein reversed the usual 
causal linkage of his time, it is democracy which is the prerequisite of
socialism and not the other way around. Democracy is not merely an 
instrument of the socialist state but the substance of socialism (Beilharz 
1992:115).
While Bernstein considered himself to be a Marxist he began the 
separation of social democracy from 'orthodox Marxism'. He insisted on 
the social side of socialism, such as 'security of civil freedom' and 
democracy. The relevance of his arguments became obvious after the 
October Revolution in Russia. The separation of social democracy from 
Marxism continued until World War Two.
Bernstein's rejection of Marxist "orthodoxy" lead him to propose 
a program built on redistributing wealth within a largely capitalist 
market system rather than a fundamental concentration on 
revolutionary transformation of the entire system of capitalist 
production. In line with the substance of programs which had been 
adopted by the German Social Democratic Party at Gotha and Erfurt he 
advocated concentration on achieving equality by state taxation and 
welfare programs.
Revisionism and the rise of mass Social Democratic Parties
Social democracy, like Marxism, is the product of the capitalist 
system. The emergence of the labour movement demonstrated the need 
for political representation for labour movements. Radical anti 
capitalist trade union action gave way to the emergence of social 
democratic parties and Laborist parties. While, by the late 19th century 
the separation between mass social democratic parties and revolutionary 
Marxist communist parties had begun to develop, until World War 
One, however, it was difficult to distinguish which party was social 
democratic and which was communist. Social democrats mainly 
differed from communists in the way they sought to achieve socialism.
Social democrats rejected revolutionary means and the primacy of 
struggle in the economic sphere and argued that socialism could be 
achieved best through parliamentary democracy. The extension of 
universal suffrage to the working-class was the main basis of this 
argument (Lichtheim 1970, Berki 1975). Moreover, the oft assumed 
claim that Marx had predicted that proletarian revolution would occur 
in the most developed capitalist societies of his time was disproved. 
Shortly after Marx's death, many early social democrats, including 
Bernstein, observed that capital had not accumulated in a few hands, 
nor had the size of the proletariat increased. Furthermore, there were 
changes in the goals of social democracy. While Bernstein argued that 
'the movement is everything, the goal is nothing' (Beilharz 1992), the 
movement as characterised by mass social democratic parties became 
more diffuse and less class oriented.
Until the 1950s it, might also have been possible to define 
social democracy with reference to a distinctive pattern of 
party organisation and social composition... The social 
democratic parties were cohesive mass membership parties, 
characterised by relative social homogeneity (predominantly 
working class) and combining the principle of internal 
democracy with the practice of leader autonomy (Padget & 
Paterson 1991: 2).
The differentiation between social democracy and Marxism 
became clearer after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. After the 
October revolution social democrats began explicitly to oppose 
revolutionary means to achieve socialism, particularly after the 
formation of the Third International, Communist League. The Third 
International was formed under Soviet leadership and was 'dominated 
by Russian power-political interests' (Berki 1975: 93). In the inter-war era, 
significant changes occurred in the social-economic structure of capitalist 
societies. During the worst crisis in capitalist history, interventionist
policies were put into practice in the USA and Sweden, particularly to 
fight unemployment. These policies were theorised by J. M. Keynes. It 
was during this time social democrats came to office in Sweden with 
interventionist policies which continued until 1976. Such changes 
opened a way for social democracy to take power in almost all northern 
European countries, especially in Scandinavian countries (Berki 
1975:94). As Lichtheim argues
in these areas the half century from 1914 to 1964 did in fact 
witness a gradual transition from liberal to social 
democratic predominance in politics and from economic 
laissez-faire to the mixed economy and the welfare state 
(Lichtheim 1970: 259).
After World-War-Two the 'golden years' of social democracy 
started. With the marriage of social democracy and Keynesian 
economics, and the conditions created by the war, social democrats 
finally found a way of securing socialist aims without abolishing 
capitalism. With Keynesian economic policies, they thought they could 
not only remedy the ills of capitalism but could avoid the ills of 
authoritarian socialism which were evident in Soviet Union 
(Padget and Paterson 1991). Padget and Paterson explain this marriage 
clearly:
Keynes had outlined the political economy of modern, 
managed capitalism which was attractive to social 
democrats for a number of reasons. Firstly because it 
appeared to bring the economy under political control. Tt 
held out the prospect that the state could reconcile the 
private ownership of the means of production with 
democratic management of the economy. Democratic 
control over the level of unemployment and the 
distribution of income became the terms of the compromise 
that made democratic capitalism possible' (Przeworski 
1980:207) (Padget and Paterson 1991:22-23).
The social democratic ideology with this marriage was defined as 
Keynesian economics plus welfare state plus full employment. The 
most prominent theorist of this stage of social democracy was C.A.R. 
Crosland, whose ideas are examined below.
Social democracy once separated from Marxism quickly developed 
a rejection of Marxism rather than capitalism. The process was 
completed in the 1950s. The one time British Labour Cabinet Minister C. 
A R. Crosland was one of the most prominent figures in reorienting the 
social democracy of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s towards Neo Keynesian 
welfare and redistributive measures. Before examining the evolution of 
social democracy through its history, I shall analyse the contrasting ideas 
of the two prominent figures of the golden years of social democracy, 
Crosland and Stuart Holland. Through such examination, the relevance 
of social democracy for the two lesser developed countries, Spain and 
Turkiye, in Europe can be analysed. Furthermore, the overall relevance 
of social democracy in the 1990s can be discussed.
Crosland's social democracy
C. A. R. Crosland had a profound influence on social democracy 
in the Anglo-saxon world of the 1950s, 60s and 70s through his role as a 
social democratic thinker. As his major work is The Future o f  
Socialism, my discussion will concentrate on examining this work. In 
understanding Crosland's ideas it is necessary to reflect on the changes 
to the social and economic structure that occurred from the 'New Deal' 
in the USA in the 1930s and the adoption of a variety of Neo-Keynesian 
policies in the UK following the election of the Attlee Labour 
government at the end of WWII. The nature of the capitalist system 
had been transformed and social democratic ideology had changed as a 
consequence. Hence, I will first give an overview of the conditions
which affected his ideas then a critique of his arguments about socialism, 
the capitalist system and social democratic policies.
When Crosland wrote The Future o f Socialism, today's developed 
countries were experiencing the impact of the many changes in their 
economies wrought by war-time planning, rationing and the welfare 
reforms of the Beveridge Report. In Britain a national health service 
was introduced along with a comprehensive government education 
system. Such changes showed how the intervention of the State in the 
economy may improve the economic efficiency through low inflation, 
full employment and a higher economic growth rate. Successful 
experiences were seen in the UK, USA and Sweden. Since the later half 
of the 1930s many of the ideas J. M. Keynes proposed about the 
intervention of the State in the economy were put into practice. In 
contrast to the dominant characterisation of the beliefs of Neo-classical 
economists, Keynes argued that without state intervention the economy 
could not produce adequate growth rates and full employment. This 
was because, in the absence of state measures to promote investment or 
significant transfers to the lower paid, the level of aggregate effective 
demand would always lag behind the level of aggregate supply. These 
phenomena rested on the fact that higher paid members of the 
community had a lower marginal propensity to spend any increment to 
their income and to allocate a greater proportion of any increment to 
savings. Hence overall effective demand would reduce. And in turn 
aggregate investment would decrease as businesses reduce their 
investment in the light of shrinking demand for their products. 
Therefore, to increase effective demand and thereby in turn to increase 
the level of investment and supply there has to be another power 
outside the economy, because the invisible hand can not carry the
economy to full employment (Reglar 1983:416-417). In other words, 
Keynes rejected Say’s Law, which argues that supply creates its own 
demand (Reglar 1983:411).
Moreover, in both world wars the State had taken a strong part in 
the economy. For example, the State regulated housing, industrial 
production, food and clothing supply and the level of services during 
WWH in Britain. Such intervention had yielded, not only an economy 
capable of meeting the demands of total war, but had also substantially 
improved the nutritional levels and standards of health of the lower 
strata of society (Richardson and Travers 1993:81-116).
Besides these developments, full employment made Crosland 
optimistic. In the Future o f Socialism  full-employment and its results 
on social justice are considered very important achievements. In 
addition, he argued, that as the right to vote spread to lower income 
earners support for reducing inequality and poverty in capitalist society 
increased. Between the two World Wars and after World War Two 
social democratic political parties came to power, in previously 
unanticipated strength. This made social democrats more optimistic 
about putting their policies into practice through the parliamentary 
system. There were also signs of a reduction in the inequality between 
the rich and poor and injustice in society as a result of war-time 
rationing, the British national health scheme and the effects of 
Beveridge's welfare program. In the 1950s the rise of the welfare state 
and Keynesian economics had transformed capitalism in northern 
European countries to an unprecedented degree. All these changes led 
Crosland to argue that the capitalism of his time was radically 
transformed from that of old. Capitalism was no longer the enemy of 
social justice it once had been. After World War Two social democrats 
accepted the rule of capitalism in its interventionist guise of the 1950s.
In other words, social democrats no longer wanted to transform the 
capitalist system gradually to a socialist system.
Although at times Crosland distinguished the Marxist perspective 
of socialism from other versions of socialism, his usual stereotype of 
socialism as a generic entity is greatly at odds with the Marxist concept. 
At times he uses his generic concept to criticise the Marxist concept of 
socialism. This is one of Crosland's main confusions. It is not clear 
what Crosland regards as socialism, because his definition at times 
appears to be a form of Marxism, but at other times it appears to comply 
with what Marx called, a "utopian" perspective.
Thus if, for example, socialism is defined as the 
nationalisation of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange, we produce conclusions which are 
impossible to reconcile with what the early socialists had in 
mind when they used the word: such as, that Soviet Russia 
is a completely socialist country (much more so, for 
instance, than Sweden)- even though it denies almost all 
the values which Western socialists have normally read 
into the word (Crosland 1980:66).
From a Marxist perspective, however, socialism is not only "the 
nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange". 
Marx did not call for widespread nationalisation he called for 
"ownership by associated producers" (Marx 1974:820) in the first phase of 
transition from capitalism to be superseded by ownership losing all its 
meaning under fully developed communism. Marx thought 
nationalisation could only be effective for a short period of time and for 
industries which affected the whole nation such as railways, electrical 
power generation and supply and telecommunications (Marx and Engels 
1969:104).
Later varieties of Leninism and "Orthodox Marxism", especially 
Stalinism, (Stalin 1943:561) regarded ownership by the state, or
ownership by the proletariat as a means to achieve the goal of 
communist society in which people will work according to their 
abilities and will receive according to their need. But even this view of 
socialism involves more than Crosland allows. For in Leninist ideology 
creating a socialist country involves; apart from the ownership by the 
proletariat, all decision-making belonging to the proletariat, or to their 
representatives. Furthermore, for Leninism, nationalisation or control 
of the economy by the state is not an end but a means to achieve a 
communist society. Therefore, defining socialism in terms of merely 
ownership is invalid.
Crosland, by confusing nationalisation and centralisation with 
socialism alleged that Nazi Germany was a negative example of a 
socialist country. This argument is not persuasive.
Similarly, if socialism is defined as economic collectivism or 
state control of economic life, then Nazi Germany would 
correctly have been called a socialist country (Crosland 
1980:66).
To socialists the aim of controlling the economy is to lead the economy 
for the benefit of all citizens, not just for the benefit of a few people. 
With this point in mind, it can be seen that a country cannot be called a 
socialist country when the control of the economy is used for the benefit 
of the rich, or the capitalist class, or for one race. If for example, due to 
state control, the share of profit in the GNP were to increase a 
proportion of that increase should be redistributed to the less well off. In 
a socialist country state control must be used for the benefits of the 
proletariat, peasants, other working people and their representatives. 
Therefore, it is impossible to argue that Nazi Germany is a socialist 
country, not least because of its anti-humanitarian applications of state 
control.
Many of the features of the economic system of Nazi Germany 
were in fact examples of a grossly distorted kind of Keynesian planning 
and state intervention accompanied by corporate capitalism (Linder 
1973:248-254). The corporate structure of Nazism was of course oriented 
to goals which were anathemas to Crosland and Keynes. The problem is 
that just because a set of planning principles can be distorted and 
perverted to serve inhuman goals, this does not necessarily reflect on 
the original propositions and principles. Almost all valuable 
institutions and human initiatives can be distorted. Crosland would 
have to demonstrate a necessary connection between socialism and 
Nazism or Soviet state socialism to justify his position.
Crosland realised that class-antagonism in the developed 
countries had changed in nature as people were now more socially 
mobile. Today in developed countries a significant number of people do 
not vote according to their class orientation. However, arguing that 
some electorates do not consider at least their subjective class- 
orientation may not be of great consequence, because most electorates 
still vote according to their class orientation. The effects of class 
orientation is reflected by the class basis of political parties. Social 
democratic political parties can be differentiated from liberal political 
parties because of the class orientation of their supporters. In a sense 
universal electoral politics can be a democratic translation of the "Class 
Struggle" as Lipset claimed (Lipset 1976: 220).
A number of important points for this thesis follow from 
analysing aspects of Crosland’s key points. He raises a significant 
problems for comparing conditions between systems and estimating the 
viability of a political program. Crosland's critique of the (former) 
Soviet Union, and conditions in which workers live in the socialist
countries in comparison with the developed capitalist countries are well 
taken.
In Soviet Russia, just as much as in the United States, the 
employer and the labourer confront each other as buyer and 
seller; the control centre is separated from the workers; and 
the possibility of exploitation, and of all the other features 
of capitalism’ is present (Crosland 1980:37).
While the range of income inequalities in the USSR was markedly less 
than in the USA and there was a significant difference in the pattern of 
rewards to different categories of worker (Lane 1992:168-170) there were 
many areas of similarity between the conditions of workers, especially in 
the workers' lack of control in the production process. The workers in 
the former (state) socialist countries had to struggle in the improvement 
of their living standard as much as workers in the capitalist countries. 
Workers in the USSR had to confront a degree of privilege, lack of 
meaningful political participation, corruption, black markets and scarcity 
of essential consumer goods which is unparalleled in developed western 
countries, especially northern European social democracies (Lane 
1992:173-176; Christian 1994:341-343, 362, 378).
To make a useful comparison between the conditions for workers 
in state socialist countries and those in capitalist countries, for example 
in terms of living standards, the level of development of the countries 
has to be taken into account. The level of development has to be 
comparable to make meaningful comparisons. If for example, in the 
USA per capita income is $22,560, compared with less than $9,500 in 
Russia the viability of the socio-political systems of these countries 
cannot be usefully judged, because of the extent of difference in their 
level of development expressed as GDP per capita. A more useful 
comparison might be to compare living standards in the former USSR
with those of Spain or another country at a comparable level of 
development over time.
Second, in analysing the success of countries a static figure for a 
given moment in time is less useful than examining changes in key 
statistics over an extended period of time. If we compare the state of 
workers in developed capitalist countries with those in socialist 
countries in the present conditions without looking at the 
improvement of the conditions of workers over time, the comparison 
will be inappropriate, if the aim of comparison is to find which system is 
successful. Therefore, instead of comparing present conditions, the 
period between 1917 to 1990 must be compared. This is because in 1917 
in Russia conditions were very much poorer than in the USA and a 
worker was not only subject to degrading and poorly paid work but 
denied most political rights. The US worker was considerably better off 
in 1917 because the USA was more highly developed, politically and 
economically. The rate of improvement in conditions of workers 
between 1917 and 1990 is much higher for the USSR than for the USA 
(even if we neglect the savage impact which the Nazi invasion had on 
Soviet life) (Lane 1992:171).
Hence Crosland's arguments were at times somewhat 
disingenuous. He needed to make comparisons between societies which 
were comparable and he needed to analyse data over time, such as the 
rate of increase in wages or life expectancy etc. to draw valid conclusions.
Nevertheless, Crosland is important because his arguments 
emphasise the social-side of socialism (social democracy). Crosland 
argued that the social side of socialism and quality of life are significant 
goals of social democracy:
"the degree to which management is autocratic or
democratic, the extent of joint consultation and
participation, and the freedom of the worker to strike or 
leave his(/her) job*' are also important for social democracy 
(Crosland 1980:40-1).
Political freedom and parliamentary democracy' are important as much 
as eliminating 'exploitation', because exploitation is not a problem 
which exists by itself. If we were able to destroy poverty and inequality, 
that would not mean all problems are solved. Class exploitation is not 
the only cause of injustice. There are other causes of injustices, such as 
religious, racial and gender. Therefore, not only workers, or the 
bourgeoisie, or one race, or one religion but all people should have the 
same opportunity to affect the decision making process in national or 
local government level, or corporations.
Crosland's arguments regarding the structure of capitalism are 
also significant. Surely there was a big difference between the capitalism 
of the 1850s and that of the 1950s. Income distribution in his time 
became, as he mentioned not 'more equal', but less unequal (Crosland 
1980:31). The level of poverty reduced. The participation of low income 
earners in decision-making-processes occurred. Also the power of trade 
unions increased. It can be argued that the developed capitalist 
countries became less unequal and less undemocratic.
Despite the changes that occurred in the capitalist system, listed 
above, it still contained the major defining social relations of the 
capitalist mode of production. It is, therefore, difficult to agree with 
Crosland when he argued that "Is this (meaning Britain in the 1950s) 
still capitalism? I would answer ’No’" (Crosland 1980:42), because 
despite the changes that occurred in the British capitalist system until 
the 1950s, the country was still capitalist. It was, of course, not the 'wild 
capitalism' of the 19th century. It was just 'less unequal' and less 
undemocratic. 'The ownership of production, distribution, and
exchange’, the central features of capitalism, were there. Exploitation, 
like classes and class-antagonism, existed and so in turn its
consequences: inequality and poverty.
Equally important is the fact of capitalism’s potential to increase 
inequality and poverty. The potential is an inseparable part of 
capitalism. Although the 'invisible hand' may increase the welfare of a 
nation as a whole, if the economy is allowed to work according to 
capitalist economic rules of ’laissez-faire’, welfare is not distributed 
fairly, because of the constraints accompanying the ownership of 
production, distribution and exchange, unless a visible hand intervenes. 
The welfare state capitalism of Crosland's time had many contradictory 
features which were to bring about its downfall. Enough of capitalism 
remained for there to be the potential to turn back the clock on many 
reforms. Thus, his claim that Britain's system was not capitalist is not 
persuasive.
Crosland argued strongly that the State can reduce inequality and 
poverty by using Keynesian economic policies. However, even Left 
governments have to make accommodations with the capitalist class or 
they can provoke a ’run on capital’. Hence, such governments do not 
have adequate latitude to abolish inequality and poverty. Another fact is 
that if Left governments accept the main characteristics of capitalism, 
such as ownership and the sale of workers' labouring capacity for wages, 
the prime cause of basic inequalities remains. They can only reduce 
inequality, but not destroy it. If we look at the world we can see the huge 
and growing inequalities between the rich and poor in almost all 
developed countries, and between the developed and developing 
countries (The Guardian W eekly: August 3 1997 p 19 ). The increase in 
inequality, even under social democratic political parties, is evidence of
the inability of Left governments to tackle the basic contradictions of 
capitalism.
In the Future o f Socialism, Crosland invokes a direct link between 
profit and economic growth and taxation. But his logic is not fully 
convincing. There may be some linkage effect between high profit and 
faster economic growth due to low taxation on profit. Profit, however, is 
not saving. It is saving that is required for investment, and in turn for 
economic growth, because individuals or companies do not invest all 
their income or profit. Profits may be spent on a range of activities 
rather than investments, such as luxury consumption, speculative 
investments etc., which at best will distort the distribution of resources 
toward items of conspicuous consumption and at worst may lead to a 
squandering of capital in speculative ’bubbles’ as in the USA and 
Australia in the 1980s (Thurow 1996:221-222). Secondly, in terms of 
growth rate the important factor is how much of the GNP is being 
invested. For example, the experience of the "Asian Tiger Economies" 
show that if the country invests a high percentage of its GDP (say twenty 
per cent of its GDP) its growth rate can be very much higher than lower 
investing nations. There is, however, a limit on how high a level of 
investment should be as too much concentration on investment may 
bring distortions and barriers to growth of its own. For example Soviet 
type economies set investment levels too high and in the long run 
brought about a lowering of growth (Brus & Laski 1991:157). And it does 
not matter whose savings are used whether it be companies, 
individuals, government or social organisations. Therefore, if the 
government has higher taxes on profits and then invests it, higher taxes 
may not negatively affect economic growth rate, because the country as a 
result would spend a high percentage of its GDP an investment.
There is, however, a fact that should not be forgotten, taxes on 
profit would affect future investments. All profit, of course, cannot be 
taxed, because we have accepted a capitalist system and capitalist way of 
economic growth. A balance between high taxation and future 
investments of private enterprise has to be found. However, properly 
targeted high taxation can be used by the state to lead companies to work 
more efficiently. In the developing countries low taxation on profit 
often leads capitalists not to work efficiently, because such capitalists 
become satisfied with lower rates of profit as the mass of their profit is 
high. In such situations technological modernisation can also be 
negatively affected. .
Crosland's arguments concerning 'full-employment' and its 
results requires criticism. Undoubtedly full employment can improve 
the condition of workers, because they can easily find work. Crosland, 
however, exaggerated the effects of full-employment by arguing that 
full-employment gives power to workers. There can be full-
employment with huge inequality and poverty, because if workers do 
not act together, despite full-employment, their standard of living can 
still be very low. For example in both the USA and the UK employment 
has been bought by the creation of a large number of working poor (The 
Guardian Weekly: August 3 1997 p 19 ). If workers join together under 
trade unions, they1 will become powerful against the capitalist class. 
Thus, it can be argued that workers' power is not due to full- 
employment but due to the existence of trade unions and their votes in 
a parliamentary democracy. 1
1 In wage bargain all workers of a company should be considered as one part instead of 
each worker, just as capital. In other words, work-force and capital constitute two parts 
of wage bargain.
Crosland exaggerated the role and power of top-management and 
its ability to withstand the drive for profit:
"And top management to-day is independent not only of 
the firm’s own shareholders, but increasingly of the 
capitalist or property-owning class as a whole, including the 
financial institutions’ (Crosland 1980:15).
The question arises, whether there are differences between the 
management of a company by capitalists, or by their managers that will 
be positive for the state of workers. Are managers more positive in their 
approach to the conditions of workers? It is difficult to agree with his 
argument, because either capitalists or their managers run the company to 
maximise their long term profit. Managers run companies on behalf of 
capitalists. In terms of workers conditions there is no difference between 
the operation of companies by manager or by owners. Moreover, if 
managers are better profit maximisers than their bosses, the operation of 
companies by managers can increase inequality and poverty. It can be 
argued in the light of the rash of down-sizing in most major corporations 
during the 1980s and 1990s that the new top- management does not 
make a positive contribution to the condition of workers (Thurow 1996:26­
27)
The state of workers in terms of their liberal rights and standard 
of living was much better in the 1950s than it was in the 1930s. Crosland 
argues that
Many liberal minded people, who were instinctively 
'socialist' in the 1930s as a humanitarian protest against 
poverty and unemployment have now concluded that 
'Keynes- plus- modified- capitalism- plus-Welfare- State' 
works perfectly well; and they would be content to see the 
Labour Party become (if the Tories do not filch the role) 
essentially a Party for defence of the present position, with 
occasional minor reforms thrown is to sweeten the temper 
of the local activities (Crosland 1980:79).
Crosland considers that today social democrats in the developed 
countries should defend the present system because it is considerably 
better than that of the 1930s. However, I do not agree with this 
conclusion, because the goal of social democracy should be to promote 
social justice and the reduction of inequality and poverty. Secondly, as 
mentioned before, capitalism has the potential to increase inequality and 
poverty, and if the present state is defended, inequality and poverty may 
continue to exist. Therefore, the aim of social democracy should not be 
the defence of the present developmental level of capitalism, but should 
be the improvement of the peoples’ overall welfare.
Crosland saw Keynesian policies as a complete guide for the 
economic policies of social democracy. Holland argues that
... in Britain in the 1950s, Anthony Crosland, stayed firmly 
within both the scope and limits of Keynesian theory. This 
shows not only in his explicit endorsement of Keynes' 
économies in a technical sense, but also in his endorsement 
of Keynes' conclusion that, provided the state exercises 
central controls, there is no more reason to socialise 
economic life now than there was earlier (Holland 1975:23).
As mentioned above, and can be understood from the above quotation, 
Neo Keynesian economics are significant for Crosland's understanding 
of social democracy. Keynes' contribution to the social democratic 
economic policies is significant, especially his arguments concerning the 
role of the state in a market economy. Keynes' arguments for state 
intervention went much further than Crosland allows. Keynes called 
for the socialisation of investment and a far more thoroughgoing 
program of income redistribution than that offered by the policies 
advocated by Crosland (Reglar 1983:417,420). It can be argued, however, 
that the aim of Keynes and of social democracy are different. The aim of
Keynes was essentially social liberal; to make the market economy work 
more efficiently, while the aim of social democracy is to promote social 
justice and to reduce both inequality and poverty. Another important 
fact is that since the 1950s inequality and poverty have increased. 
Therefore, it can be argued that (Neo) Keynesian economics are not in 
themselves adequate for social democratic purposes and cannot be a 
complete guide for social democrats to remedy the negative effects of 
capitalism.
The 1960s can be defined as the politically dominant era of social 
democracy with its policies such as the welfare state, Keynesian 
economics and full employment (Lichtheim 1970:259). Padget and 
Paterson argue that:
Social democrats had found a resolution to the historical 
conundrum of how to reconcile socialism and the market, 
opening the door to a 'third way' between communism and 
capitalism. Secondly, Keynesianism legitimised the doctrine 
of equality, since it demonstrated that economic expansion 
depended on broadening the base of consumption through 
a more diffuse distribution of income and wealth. Thirdly, 
it provided a formula for a high-performance economy in 
which the claims of capital and labour could be reconciled... 
Fourthly, Keynesianism was the economic foundation for 
'welfare capitalism'. Without adversely affecting the 
economic equilibrium, the surplus from performance 
economy could be diverted into social security and welfare 
programs (Padget & Paterson 1991:22-23).
Until the mid-1970s, social democratic redistribution had worked very 
well, especially in Sweden. While, the Swedish social democrats came 
to government with these policies in 1932, it was not until the 1960s that 
this style of social democracy became generalised in Europe and 
Australia. Full employment could be pursued. The social democratic 
style welfare state (Esping-Anderson 1990) had gradually been 
established. It should be noted, however, that in this era there were
continuing debates among social democrats on the means to achieve 
socialism. Nationalisation was at the core of the debate, especially in 
Britain. In Europe social democrats gradually discarded nationalisation 
policy as a means to achieve socialism, except in Britain.
Holland's critique
The 1973 program of the British Labour Party was illustrative of 
the Party's radical shift to the Left and thereby an attack on Crosland's 
position. The Program stressed nationalisation as essential for the 
success of economic plans which would be less inclusive than the 
Soviet's but more bold than Yugoslavia’s. The Party would nationalise 
the top twenty five manufacturing companies. The leading theorist of 
this radical shift was Stuart Holland. His main work, The Socialist 
Challenge, was an enthusiastic endorsement of Labour's 1973 program. 
In The Socialist Challenge , Holland's willingness to learn from Marx 
makes him different from many social democrats. He differed from 
Crosland in that he did not just try to disprove Marx, but to go beyond 
him. Holland's criticisms of Neo Keynesian economics were based on 
Crosland's endorsement of Neo Keynesian policies rather than the 
economics of Keynes himself. Although there are many differences 
between Holland and Crosland, their arguments are not necessarily 
antagonistic. Their arguments are based on the different ends which 
they want to achieve. Their understanding of socialism is different, as is 
the way they seek to achieve socialism. Having different ends leads 
them to conceive of different ways to achieve those ends.
For countries having democratic institutions such as Britain, 
Holland, is against revolutionary transformation from capitalism to 
socialism. Nevertheless, he argued that revolutionary transformation 
can be appropriate for countries which do not have democratic
institutions. He did not, however, consider how these countries would 
build democratic institutions, or whether it is possible to build such 
institutions after revolution or not. The significance of Holland is his 
excellent understanding of the state of developing countries. He contends 
that they are caught in a vicious circle which has been negatively affected 
by multinational companies and the trading practices of developed 
countries. I will first focus on his relationship to Marx and then discuss his 
other arguments.
Holland’s analysis of Marx and Marxism made him different 
from many modem social democrats. He argues that
To neglect Marx in analysing contemporary capitalism is as 
short-sighted as neglecting Keynes would be: not only 
because Marx was the main pioneer of a socialist analysis of 
capitalism, but also because of the continuing relevance of 
Marxism in British socialist thought and socialism outside 
Britain (Holland 1975:15).
Holland gave credit to Marx, despite the disapproval of Marx by many 
social democrats, including his Party’s leadership. Social democrats 
mostly emphasised those of Marx’s arguments which appeared to be 
disproved by subsequent historical events. The first revolution occurred 
not in the most advanced capitalist countries, such as Britain, as Marx 
had often argued, but in a less developed country, ie. Russia. Another 
oft-repeated argument is the irrelevance of the modem State being 
conceived as merely the instrument of the capitalist class. However, 
anti Marxist social democrats have countered Marx's most significant 
arguments, which are mentioned below. Although some of his 
arguments regarding the state and capitalism were later found lacking, 
Marx was the first socialist political economist who attempted to explain 
the capitalist system as a socio-political whole. As Holland argued
"modem capitalism is still rent by many of the contradictions which 
Marx identified" (Holland 1975:16).
The differences between Marx and many other socialists is that
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entity. As seen from the history of capitalism, contradictions, such as
class conflict, have been, and will be present, so long as the capitalist mode
of production exists. One of the most fundamental contradictions is
class conflict between proletariat and bourgeoisie, although this 
contradiction has not led to capitalism being overthrown by the
proletariat. Due to the existence of the conflicts, the relevance of Marx's 
analysis continues. However, as Holland argued, in terms of transition 
from capitalism to socialism Marx "was notoriously more vague than 
explicit" (Holland 1975:16). Marx eschewed the promulgation of any 
detailed transitional program and emphasised his critical analysis of 
capitalism and the forces which sustained it, especially in his later 
works. While Marx argued that the proletariat is the antithesis of the 
capitalist class and he hoped it would be the class which could transform 
capitalism into communism his hopes were not borne out by 
subsequent developments (Reglar and Young 1983:278-279, 253, 259).
Holland also understood the cause of the failure of Marx's 
analysis of the State: .
Marx analysed British capitalism before the rise of the 
modern State. In key respects his emphasis on the 
organisation of production was correct and far-sighted. But, 
in others, his foresight was to be qualified by the rise of the 
capitalist state as spender, umpire, entrepreneur and 
planner" (Holland 1975:15-16).
In Marx's era the State acted more closely to his depiction of it as an 
instrument of the capitalist class than in contemporary times. Armies
were used to suppress not only strikes, but any kind of actions against 
the system, or the capitalist class.
It is, however, difficult to agree with Holland's argument that:
This trend to national and multinational clearly 
corroborates the main emphasis in Marx's analysis of 
location of power in the organisation of production. It 
supports the traditional socialist argument that without 
public ownership and control of the dominant means of 
production, distribution and exchange, the State will never 
manage the strategic features of the economy in the public 
interest (Holland 1975:15)
The validity of this argument is doubtful, because it is possible for the 
modem State to lead the economy to work in the public interest without 
’public ownership and control of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange'. As Francis Castles suggests, the Swedish example is 
clear evidence of this fact (Castles 1978:57, 83). The State has adequate 
means, such as taxation, spending, loans, and changing interest rates, to 
control the economy in the public interest. For example, the State may 
reduce taxes on new investment in less developed regions to increase 
investments there. It can also reduce taxes on expenses and increase 
taxes on profits, so that it can indirectly protect low income earners. By 
introducing free education, cheap housing and health care to low 
income earners, it may reduce social injustice in society. When these 
means are appropriately used, the State can significantly reduce 
inequality.
... the State intervenes in the economy not to introduce a 
limited form of socialism, but to permit a better functioning 
of the capitalist system itself. In Keynes' view, state 
intervention would not abolish the liberal capitalism of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but rather 
destabilise the conditions in which its principles could 
come into their own (Holland 1975:22).
It can be understood from the above quotation that Holland's 
understanding of the purposes of the Keynesian economy is stronger 
than Crosland's, because Crosland saw the Keynesian economy as the 
economy of social democracy and as a complete means to achieve an aim 
of social democracy. In other words, by using Keynesian economic policies, 
according to Crosland, social democracy would achieve its aims, such as 
reducing inequality and leading economy through the public interest. 
There is not, however, a contradiction in Crosland’s arguments, because 
he did not argue for complete equality (what ever that might mean). He 
accepted the capitalist mode of production and argued that the State had 
sufficient means to direct the economy in the public interest without 
further nationalisation.
Holland's critique of Keynesian economics, however, draws on 
Crosland's understanding of (Neo) Keynesianism. Holland argues that:
It is striking that the main exponent of social democratic 
theory in Britain in the 1950s, Anthony Crosland, stayed 
firmly within both the scope and limits of Keynesian 
theory. This shows not only in his explicit endorsement of 
Keynes' conclusion that, provided the State exercises central 
controls, there is no more reason to socialise economic life 
now than there was earlier. In particular, in Crosland's 
analysis, there was no more reason to continue with the 
expansion of the public sector pioneered by the post-war - 
. labour government (Holland 1975:23).
It can be understood from the above quotation that Holland criticised 
Crosland's understanding of Neo Keynesian economics rather than the 
economics of Keynes. He disagreed with Crosland's understanding. 
Holland asserted that unless the top key manufacturing companies were 
nationalised the state would be unable to direct the economy in the 
public interest. This is because of the power and reach of modem multi-
national or trans- national corporations. Such corporations had reached 
a size which was now beyond the control of individual nation states. 
Holland introduce the term meso economic structure to account for the 
power of modem trans -national corporations. Meso economics 
denoted a level of economic activity between the economics of the small 
local or national firms - the micro level - and macro or national level 
economic activity (Holland 1975:50). The success of economic planning 
was therefore dependent on the nationalisation of the top twenty-five 
manufacturing companies. Nationalisation was once again a significant 
means to achieve socialism. But it must be understood that Holland 
argued for a mixed economy in terms of both ownership and methods of 
integration. Holland rejected a simple minded statist program.
Such considerations underlay another difference with Crosland. 
Holland endorsed detailed economic planning on a scale similar to 
French dirigisme.
He (Crosland) was against 'too much detailed planning 
within each sector'; and claimed that/ remaining severely 
empirical, the government simply stand ready first to 
intervene negatively to stop industry from acting manifestly 
against the public interest; secondly, and of far greater 
importance, to search out the weak spots, especially in the 
basic industries, and concentrate on these with all the vigour 
at its command (Holland 1975:25).
It can be understood from the above quotation that unlike Crosland, 
Holland thought detailed economic planning necessary to achieve social 
democratic goals of social justice and equality. He argued, "the 
government... (should) ... intervene not where the productive structure 
of the economy is weak, but precisely where it is strong and where 
private strength is not harnessed effectively in the public interest" (Holland 
1975:29). What is left for the private sector? Can the market forces work 
in this situation? With this point in mind, we can ask whether there could
still be room left for the private sector to concentrate on profit seeking 
activities?
According to Holland, in the developed world the transition from 
capitalism to socialism would start by the selective nationalisation of the 
top twenty five most profitable manufacturing companies. According to 
Holland previous nationalisations in the UK have been forced by the near 
bankruptcy or imminent collapse of a major employment sector. They 
have been nationalisations brought about for the wrong reasons. He 
argues that:
Essentially, no transformation will be possible unless a 
critical minimum of leading firms in the meso-sector is 
brought into public ownership and social control... One in 
four - to one in five of these firms must be socialised 
through ... public ownership and control if we are to begin 
the critical transformation of private meso economic 
power (Holland 1975:160).
Hence, Holland placed a priority on nationalising the top twenty 
companies, if the economy were to be redirected in the public interest, 
because without nationalisation the State cannot control the meso 
economic sector. Moreover, considerations of the public interest made 
economic planning essential. By nationalisation, planning the economy 
would become possible. Accordingly, Holland claimed that the failure, of 
the 1964 Labor government in Britain was due to the fact that the State did 
not have enough public ownership to control the economy.
However, it is difficult to agree with his arguments regarding 
nationalisation policy. If we nationalise the 'critical minimum of 
leading firms', as mentioned above, where is the private sector to 
pursue profit making activities. The question arises, whether this 
nationalisation is essential to control the economy? According to 
Holland nationalisation is made necessary by the meso economic
structure’s power to subvert state sponsored (or macro) goals of 
monetary policy, progressive taxation and full employment. Regardless 
of whether such policies might have worked twenty years ago it is 
doubtful that they could in the fluid money and capital markets of today 
(Thurow 1996:217). Nationalisation, or public ownership, is not 
essential to control the economy and may even be harmful if the 
experience of the first Mitterand government is any guide (Thurow 
1996:217). The modern State has other means, such as taxation, 
spending, loans and subsidy, to lead the economy through the public 
interest. The existence of the means leads to questioning the necessity of 
the economic plans Holland supported.
Plans in the capitalist system can not be as bold as he argued. 
Viable plans need to bring suggestions to the private sector rather than 
pressure them to follow strict plans. Unless private companies act 
against the public interest, they should be allowed to pursue their 
activities, because it is difficult to argue that there is one way which is 
the best for the economy, or the public interest. This question is not so 
much an efficiency problem in the economy, as a political problem. The 
plan makers, mostly politicians or bureaucrats, would decide on the 
development of a sector, or location of factories. The private sector would 
then be led according to these decisions. But businesses respond primarily 
to the market not to the political or administrative con-siderations of 
politicians and bureaucrats. Therefore, it is doubtful that, short of the use 
of coercion or distortion inducing forms of corporatism that the private 
sector would be led by a strong form of planning?
There is no doubt that Holland endorses selective national­
isation. The question arises concerning his attitude to the abolition 
of the market economy. Holland drew strongly on the arguments 
of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. He advocates the expansion of
the public sector, but not the abolition of the market economy. He 
argued:
Neither the market economy nor planning are in 
themselves central issues. They are secondary to the nature 
of state power and the way in which it is exercised in terms 
of production relations and social relations - including the. 
extent to which working people are able to exercise control 
over the conditions and results of their own activity. The 
key question is who is served by state power, and whether it 
helps or prevents workers from transforming the society in 
which they live (Holland 1975:166-7).
If the above transformation happen there is no reason to abolish the 
private sector.
Holland followed Bernstein and Crosland in arguing against 
revolutionary transformation from capitalism to socialism in countries 
having democratic institutions. It is difficult, however, to agree with his 
argument regarding revolutionary transformation in developing 
countries which do not have democratic institutions (Holland 1975:162­
3). Revolutionary overthrow of capitalism should not be accepted as 
'the only means of progress' to achieve socialism for any country. But 
revolution may only be necessary in non democratic developing 
countries.
Unlike Bernstein, Holland argued that in the absence of 
democratic institutions, as in the former (state) socialist countries, the 
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism might be an appropriate strategy. 
In my view such a strategy may make the situation worse. After the 
revolution the development of democratic institutions may not be 
possible, or more difficult, because at that time all authority belongs to 
revolutionary committees and there is no popular control over their 
activities. As seen from the practice of the committees, they do not have 
a commitment to democratic rules and traditions such as the rule of law. 
Also some characteristics of the socialist state, such as central planning 
of the economy, may in themselves lead to authoritarian governments. 
The result will be an authoritarian regime which is completely against 
the nature of social democracy. Hence, there are considerable dangers if 
revolutionary
means are used to achieve socialism in developing countries. If we are 
against the revolutionary transformation from capitalism to socialism, 
how then can the transformation occur in countries which do not have 
democratic institutions?
In The Socialist Challenge, Holland examines the problem of 
'Socialism and Underdevelopment' (Holland 1975:363-88) and he 
explains the vicious circle of poverty in developing countries. 
Developing countries do not have enough savings for a higher 
economic growth rate. The technology they use is old and they cannot 
produce new technology. They have few skilled and experienced 
workers and poor levels of productivity, which lead to low wages and in 
turn a further cycle of low savings, low skills and virtually no means of 
remedying the situation. Developing countries are, therefore, 
dependent on developed countries for solving their problems. 
However, as Holland argues, because of the power of multinational 
companies and the dominance of the developed countries the current 
workings of the international economy does not help developing 
countries to break their vicious circle but aids their deterioration.
Holland correctly identifies multinational companies as a barrier 
to further development in under or less developed countries.
The multinational division of technology by leading 
companies gives less developed countries very little chance 
to 'break into' the circuit of a multinational market in 
developed technology products... In other words, the power 
of multinational companies extends beyond the frontier of 
the less developed countries which they dominate in 
manufacturing and modem service industries respectively. 
This fundamentally qualifies the power of less developed 
countries to plan the development of their own economies 
(Holland 1975:371).
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The investments of multinational companies in developing countries 
have negative effects on the resolution of internal and international 
inequality (Holland 1975:371), because they pay lower wages in 
developing countries than they do in the developed countries. The 
income and living standards of workers in developing countries are, 
therefore, much less than in developed countries. Consequently, 
inequality is not reduced, but reinforced, due to the dual problems of 
internal and external barriers.
It is difficult for developing countries to use high levels of 
protective taxes to support their developing sectors, because 'the United 
States and now dominant world countries' put pressure on developing 
countries to reduce tariffs. As a result tariff protection becomes useless
to break the vicious circle of less developed countries (Holland 1975:374­
5).
Holland also questions the appropriateness of Keynesian 
economics for developing countries. The problem in less developed 
countries is not the shortage of aggregate demand, but the shortage of 
savings. In other words, developing countries do not have enough 
capital to employ the whole work-force.
From Crosland to Holland
In summary it can be. said that Crosland's significance lies not 
in whether his arguments are appropriate for contemporary policies, but 
he is strongly representative of the characteristics of the 'golden years 
of post WWH social democracy. He was affected by the social and 
political conditions of his time. It is difficult to agree with his critique of 
'orthodox' socialism and portrayal of Nazi Germany as socialist. 
However, I agree with him in emphasising the pro-active elements of 
the democratic and liberating characteristics of socialism as well as the
re-active elements of combating exploitation, inequality and poverty. 
Although his arguments concerning the changes in post WWII 
capitalism have considerable validity, his position that Britain was no 
longer a capitalist country is not persuasive. He exaggerated the power 
of top-management in capitalism. Such managers have to remain loyal 
to the ethos of capitalism and the interests of the capitalist class and are 
hence unable to become a power by themselves. Furthermore, as there 
is no direct link between profit and investment, a regime of higher taxes 
can be taken on profit. The power of workers in the 1950s and 60s was 
not merely due to full employment but because of cohesive trade union 
organisations (Castles 1978:13,131; Padget and Paterson 1991:178).
Another disagreement with Crosland is that Crosland saw a 
mixture of Keynesian policies with the welfare state as a complete guide 
for social democracy. Because their aims are so different social 
democracy and Keynesianism are an incoherent mixture: social 
democracy's concern is the reduction of inequality, poverty and injustice 
in society, Keynes' concern is the long term efficiency of the market 
economy (Gough 1979:71; Beilharz, Considine and Watts 1992:33).
While Crosland’s understanding of social democracy rested on an 
endorsement of Neo Keynesian economics, Holland's was based on 
endorsing the 1973 program of the British Labour Party. Holland was 
the leading social democratic theorist of the 1970s, as Crosland was in the 
1950s. The Program and Holland's Socialist Challenge display the 
radical shift of the Labor Party to the Left. Holland's appreciation of 
Marx gives him a special position among social democrats, because 
many social democrats reject Marx in formulating their position. 
Understanding Marxist concepts is essential in understanding how the
capitalist system works as it displays the contradictions which were 
analysed by Marx.
Another disagreement between Holland and Crosland is the role of 
Neo Keynesian economics in social democracy. While Crosland strongly 
endorsed Neo Keynesianism, Holland was critical of Crosland's 
endorsement. However, while Neo Keynesian policies are not adequate 
as a means to achieve socialism due to the power of multi national 
corporations, Neo Keynesianism helped to promote the welfare state 
and to 'permit a better functioning' of capitalism. In the face of meso 
economic or multi national corporate power, Holland argues Neo 
Keynesianism is no longer viable in itself and must be accompanied by 
limited selective nationalisation to achieve socialism.
Another significant argument of Holland is his concentration on 
nationalising the top twenty five profitable manufacturing companies, 
not the nationalisation of non profitable or bankrupt companies, as in 
prior British Labour practice. Holland was writing at a time when 
manufacturing employment was in retreat and employment in the 
service and information sectors w q j growing rapidly. Hence, his policy 
prescription was outdated. To Holland the strength of the meso sector is 
such that without nationalisation, the economy can not be directed in 
the public interest and this explains the failure of earlier Labour 
governments. However, public ownership of the key manufacturing 
companies is not essential in bringing about the public interest, because 
the State can use such means as taxation enticements, spending and 
loans. Moreover, such a focus on manufacturing is anachronistic and it 
is doubtful that nationalisation would work in the new highly 
decentralised service and information sectors.
Holland is ambiguous in his attitude to the abolition of the 
market economy and its central profit making motive; advocating
prescriptive planning and selective nationalisation at one level and a 
continuation of market activities on another. If capitalism is 
maintained, however, administrative plans are likely to harm the 
remaining market forces and in turn the whole economy.
Holland's analysis of developing countries is a cogent response to 
their problems. Developing countries are in a vicious circle and 
Keynesian policies are inappropriate because they are designed to combat 
under-consumption, whereas the problems in developing countries are 
mainly low productivity, low savings, skills and capital. Multinational 
companies contribute little or nothing to the resolution of these 
problems by seeking only to exploit low wage labour. They have 
reinforced internal and international inequality by creating a dual wage 
structure between local and foreign dominated sectors. Developing 
countries have difficulty in protecting their new industries, due to 
pressure from developed countries and international institutions such as 
the OECD and World Bank. However, there are a few other solutions than 
high protective tariffs which can allow developing countries to establish 
new sectors and to protect them against multinationals.
Social Democracy in Transition
Holland's radical alternative emerged at a time when social 
democracy was in transition. The British Labour program of 1973 was 
never implemented. Such nationalisations as were undertaken by 
Wilson and Callaghan followed the old school of nationalising run 
down non profitable enterprises to save jobs. The clearest case of such 
policy was the nationalisation of British Leyland.
Throughout the mid-1970s social democratic parties were 
negatively affected by changes in the social and economic structure. 
First, there were obvious changes in the social structure as
manufacturing lost importance as an employer. These changes had 
brought social democratic parties to office in most of the northern 
European countries. The number of industrial working class people had 
decreased, while the number of service sector employees, especially 
private service sector, had increased. The growth of white-collar 
workers weakened trade unions, and in turn weakened the electoral 
chances of social democratic parties (Pontusson 1992 & 1995, Lindstrom 
1991 and Kitchelt 1994).
Secondly, the economic policies of social democracy failed to 
resolve fundamental economic problems. Unemployment and 
inflation were rising. In Neo Keynesian economic theory these were 
incompatible, but empirically they occurred at the same time. With the 
failure of Neo Keynesian economic policies coinciding with the oil 
shock in the 1970s, social democracy went into deep recession in the late 
1970s and the 1980s. It has been argued that the failure of Neo Keynesian 
economics meant the collapse of the social democratic economic model. 
Social democrats did not appear to possess any other economic policies 
to apply to a market economy. Thus the social democratic dominance in 
the western world was, and is still being, undermined by the theories of 
Friedman and the practice of M. Thatcher in Britain and R. Reagan in 
the USA. The components of social democracy came under fire. 
Capitalist countries claimed that Keynesian economics (not only Neo 
Keynesian economics) was dead and in turn so was social democracy. 
These changes have led social democratic parties to programatic 
renewal.
Since the early 1980s, the 'New World Order' has been dominated 
by New Right ideology espoused by Margaret Thatcher in Britain
and Ronald Reagan in the USA. In the 'New World Order' inequality, 
both internal and international, and poverty have increased (Thurow
1996:2, 35, 253). The total production level in the World has increased 
more rapidly than the World's population, in contrast to R. Malthus' 
argument which states that the increase of population will be faster 
than the increase of production (Matthaei 1984:83). Despite these 
improvements, inequality and poverty have increased in developed 
and in developing countries. As a result of this situation, there is still 
more to be done by social democrats in both internal and international 
politics.
While the ’Left' of the British Labour Party, stressed a selective 
nationalisation policy in the mid-1970s, this policy was not 
implemented despite a spirited defence and popularisation by Stuart 
Holland. And under Harold Wilson and more significantly James 
Callaghan the British Labour Party endorsed first a conservative Neo 
Keynesian strategy which then later degenerated into a full scale retreat 
into an IMF inspired austerity program. The proportion of the British 
GDP controlled by the state actually shrank more under Callaghan s 
Labour Government in 2 years than it did under Thatcher s 
Conservatives in a decade (Emy and Hughes 1990:156-164).
Social Democracy in a Neo Liberal Era?
Social democratic parties in the 1990s are different to those in the 
1960s. Social democrats have discarded not only nationalisation, but 
have accepted privatisation. As will be demonstrated below, none of the 
contemporary social democratic parties promote the nationalisation of 
any industry. In conformity with Crosland s thesis, most contemporary 
social democrats would be happy discarding nationalisation, because 
controlling the economy is sufficient to achieve socialist goals (Holland 
1975:23). The class basis of social democratic parties has also changed. 
They now try to win the votes of the higher educated urban
professionals, or Alvin Gouldner's humanistic intelligentsia (Gouldner 
1979:30,48-49). In addition, most of the old state centred redistributive 
programs aimed at inequality, poverty and injustice in society have 
almost disappeared. An example of the new direction in social 
democracy is shown by the preference for small government and market 
based programs or social market policies that the Australian Labor Party 
government used to reduce inequality and poverty in Australia during 
their terms in office during the 80s and 90s. Such policies are now 
regarded as models for the 'New Labour' government of Tony Blair in 
the UK. Therefore, it can be argued that 1990s' social democracy is 
different from that of the 19508'.
In the 'New World Order', however, social democrats still need to 
find new policies to reduce inequality, poverty and injustice. Inequality 
and poverty have worsened in many countries. But targeted market 
based or social market programs can achieve considerable successes. In 
Australia, during the Hawke and Keating years income inequalities 
before the effects of taxation policies and government transfer payments 
have widened considerably; largely in-line with developments in 
comparable countries. However, when the effects of transfer payments, 
targeted social security payments, universal health care and rent relief 
policies are taken into account Australia ranked just below Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark for egalitarianism at the end of the last Keating 
government (Richardson and Travers 1993:217; Withers (EPAC Report) 
1995:51; Saunders 1994:46-48, 170-171). This ranking will have been 
significantly worsened by conservative programs adopted since (Castles 
and Shirley 1996:106). Social democracy in Australia has broken away 
from its Laborist past (Beilharz 1994:215-216) and now has considerable 
similarities to that of northern European countries. The ALP still has
close links with trade unions and its traditional commitment to a form 
of targeted welfare for those who need a safety net.
The 1980s became a transitional era for social democratic parties, 
principally due to consecutive election losses in many of the former 
social democratic heartlands. Social democratic parties began loosening 
their commitments to the key components of the 1960s, such as full 
employment, the welfare state and Keynesian economic policies (Padget 
& Paterson 1991: 56)2.
Therefore, arguing that social democracy died in the 1990s is 
disingenuous. Rather the nature of social democracy has changed over 
three decades as have liberalism and conservatism. Since Crosland’s 
thesis became generally accepted, instead of combating market forces and 
private capital, social democrats have used regulations and social market 
policies to attempt to direct market capitalism to meet considerations of 
social justice and equity. The changes in the 1990s represent a 
continuation of the policy directions initiated by Bernstein and Crosland 
toward social market strategies-. In themselves social market policies 
were not new. They were the product of post war reconstruction policies 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and to a lesser degree a number of 
policies adopted in Sweden. Nonetheless, many of the lessons of
2 Padget and Paterson explain these changes: "following these setbacks, many of the 
parties embarked upon a Programmatic reappraisal designed to find purposeful political 
formulas for social democracy in a post-Keynesian age. A number of common themes can be 
identified. Generally, the parties sought a 'middle way' between the 'socialist 
alternative' and deflationary crisis management as practiced by conservative and 
Christian democratic governments. New programs contained a residue of Keynesianism, 
being geared to interventionist strategies for state-led economic recovery, with an urgent 
priority on reducing unemployment. It was, however, recognised that there are financial 
restraints cn state expenditure, and that its impact cm unemployment level would be 
limited. Other common themes were industrial and economic democracy, the  
safeguarding of acquired social citizenship rights and the even distribution of the  
burdens imposed by economic recovery programs. Programmatic reappraisal also took 
account of new issues -environment and personal fulfilment, nuclear energy and 
disarmament -oriented around concern for the quality of life rather than purely 
quantitative consideration of economic growth"(Padget & Paterson, 1991: 56).
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Germany's post war success were not absorbed into social democratic 
practice until the 1980s.
Despite claims of a conservative or Neo-liberal ascendancy in the 
1980s social democracy had a number of successes. First because of the 
strong electoral performance of social democratic parties in Australia 
and southern European countries, such as Spain, France, Greece, Italy 
and Portugal. The socialist president Francois Mitterand dominated 
French politics for over a decade. In Spain and Australia, social 
democrats won many consecutive elections and stayed in office for 
fourteen and thirteen years respectively. The literature clearly shows 
that social democracy in Mediterranean countries varies in many ways 
from that in northern European countries. It differs in the relationships 
between labour movements and the commitment to social democratic 
principles, such as full employment (Padget and Paterson 1991:3). For 
many contemporary social democrats, modem social democracy should 
focus on trying to find ways of containing the worst effects of capitalist 
markets, while still relying on social market strategies.
One of the most important characteristics of social democracy in 
the new era is the dissociation of organisational links between social 
democratic parties and trade unions. As discussed below, the 
relationship between the parties and trade unions had a significant 
impact on social democracy in many ways, ie. as a financial contributor 
and in providing an electoral base. The alliance has been affected by 
changes which have occurred over five decades since World War Two, 
but especially by the changes that social democratic parties adopted 
through the 1980s. Social democratic parties in northern European 
countries have broken their formal ties with trade unions. As Tony 
Blair recently announced the British Labour Party becomes everybody's 
party.
The shortcomings of social democratic political parties in recent 
years are due to changes in class structure, the failures of Neo Keynesian 
economics, rapid internationalisation of the World economy and 
attempts to deal with newly emerging issues, such as gender and the 
environment. Traditionalist dominated social democratic parties often 
failed to address these changes until they were confronted by crisis. 
Changes have affected the class structure which gave rise to social 
democracy. The proportion of the electorate from blue-collar working- 
class backgrounds, the traditional electoral base of social democratic 
parties has declined; while the proportion of white-collar-working-class 
has increased. This change along with an increasing number of white- 
collar-workers has negatively affected the trade union movement 
(Mahon and Maidner 1994:66).
Pontusson argues that the decline of European social democracy is 
because of 'the growth of private industrial employment* (Pontusson 
1995:498). Private service employment is dependent on small units of 
production and union density in small units of production is low. This 
has resulted in the fragmentation of the labour movement, which was 
the main contributor to the success of social democracy in the 1960s and 
1970s . The growth of the welfare state was strengthened by solidarity of 
the labour movement and challenged as that solidarity waned. 
Employees in the service sector, especially in the private sector have 
traditionally tended not to vote for social democratic parties (Pontusson 
1995:498). Thus as the traditional social democratic electorate has 
eroded, this also has weakened its alliance with trade unions, which take 
their strength from the same structure.
From the discussion above, it should be evident that because of 
the constantly evolving nature of social democracy there is no simple 
formula which can encapsulate its diversity. Hence, the usual
conservative formula equating social democracy with statism, and 
nationalisation is inappropriate. Padget and Paterson agree that social 
democracy is characterised by diversity. They argue that:
ideologically social democracy has changed markedly over 
the course of the hundred years or more of its history. 
Moreover, the social democratic parties have exhibited quite 
wide variations of ideology. It is, however, possible to 
identify some common developments... social democracy is 
a hybrid political tradition composed of socialism and 
liberalism (Padget and Paterson 1991:1)3
Berki argues that social democracy (like socialism) is not a thing or a 
unitary entity. While most social democrats agree on the primacy of 
social justice, there are few other goals which are commonly accepted. 
Furthermore, the movement has a broad range of positions*1 at one end 
of the spectrum many social democrats and Labour party members have 
a liberal perspective; at the other end social democracy is virtually 
indistinguishable from radical egalitarian socialism (Berki 1975: 95).
Padget and Paterson also suggest that
Defining social democracy in relation to a 'family' of social 
democratic parties is problematical, since there is no 
common nomenclature. The parties adopted titles 
incorporating a variety of terms: labour, worker, social 
democratic and socialist...However, social democratic and 
socialist parties share a common tradition and common 
characteristics, although there are differences of emphasis. 
Moreover, in the last decade there has been a definite 
convergence of social democratic and socialist parties with 
the 'social démocratisation' of the latter (Padget & Paterson 
1991:2-3).
3 They continue that "it is the product of a division in the socialist tradition between 
those who seek to realise socialist ideals within the institutions of liberal capitalist 
society (social democrats) and those who remain outside those institutions with the  
objective of superseding them through revolutionary force (communists). In particular, 
social democrats are fully committed to participation in the electoral process and in 
parliamentary democracy" (Padget and Paterson 1991:1).
It can be understood that social democracy is a complex and diverse set 
of movements/ goals and ideals. Social democracy has always exhibited 
such trends. The preceding analysis of the development of social 
democracy has created a basis on which we can now discuss its main 
components. I have established that the main components include full 
employment, state centred economic redistribution, the welfare state, 
egalitarianism, social justice and the social democratic parties' ties with 
trade unions. Such goals are inextricably linked to the social democratic 
commitment to basic civil and political rights and to broader social- 
economic rights. These political components are very significant in 
southern European countries, which have experienced prolonged 
periods of authoritarian government, especially Turkiye, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece. Therefore, special attention will be given to social democracy's 
approach to human right issues.
The most important and indeed fundamental goal of social 
democracy is social justice. At one level it might be argued that because 
the above components serve social justice, which social democracy 
shares with socialism (Berki 1975), social justice does not deserve 
separate attention. Social justice, viewed as a goal or telos, however, is a 
concept which involves more than discrete attention to the above 
mentioned concepts because it is essentially indivisible. Concern for 
social justice involves a whole set of ideas about human nature, human 
understanding, relations between genders, cultural identity, 
relationships between human beings and the environment and inter 
generational equity considered not as a ’shopping list’ with priority to 
this or that concern but as a complex unity. While gender and 
environmental issues have become more prominent since the mid- 
1970s, they have always been part of the social justice goals of social
democracy (Berki 1975:94). The breadth of the goal of social justice is 
both a strength and a weakness for social democratic parties electorally.
Although the concerns of trade unions regarding employment 
conditions are still critical, modem trade unions have gradually adopted 
a broader social democratic ideology, instead of a laborist agenda 
(Beilharz 1994:48, 127, 137). This has at times weakened social 
democratic parties in their traditional heartlands. Because the electoral 
interests of social democratic parties are more sensitive to labour issues 
than those of right-wing parties, such interests retain a high priority 
which is sometimes in considerable tension with issues associated with 
new social movements. But the rise of new social movements and their 
newly emerged political parties, based on environmental issues, for 
example, often threaten social democratic political parties more than 
right-wing or conservative parties.
In summary, in this section I have analysed social democracy in 
the course of its history, since the 1990s. I have argued that the social 
democracy of the 1960s has not died, but has been transformed into a 
new phase in the 1990s of programmatic renewal. It is not, however, 
the same as social democracy in the 1960s. From this basis I am now able 
to analyse organisational issues of contemporary social democracy, such 
as the relationships of social democratic parties with trade unions and the 
new social movements particularly those organised around questions of 
gender and the environment. Main issues of contemporary social 
democracy include their commitment to welfare provision, full 
employment and social justice. Two new issues, gender and the 
environment, which began to develop in social democracy in the 1980s, 
are also analysed. Special attention is given to human rights not only 
because such issues are central to new social movement programs but
also due to continuing human rights abuses in Spain and Turkiye and 
social democratic responses to them.
The Components of Social Democracy
The social justice principle, as mentioned earlier, is the most 
important component of social democracy. It is also a common 
characteristic between social democracy and socialism (Berki 1975:94-95). 
However, while socialism takes social justice as egalitarian distribution, 
there is now a contemporary social democratic willingness to tolerate 
inequality between individuals, if such is not biased on privilege. 
Furthermore, Berki argues that
social justice is not -in the context- a revolutionary ideal, 
but one which expresses (and strengthens) moderate 
aspirations; it is here that the close connection between 
social democracy and working-class organisations bears 
immediate ideological fruits (Berki 1975:94).
Berki also argues that the content of social justice4 has changed not only 
in time, but has a different meaning in differing cultures and social 
democratic traditions: "by 'equality', for example, some socialists have 
meant 'equality of opportunity' while others have meant 'equality of 
remuneration' -the two are very different, of course" (Berki 1975:10).
The question that arises here is: how does social democracy secure 
social justice within capitalism? For the fulfilment of social justice,
4 Padget and Paterson argue that "Social democrats often conceived of the welfare state 
in terms of a broad egalitarian philosophy, but it has been observed that the precise 
meaning of equality in this context was rarely specified. The pursuit of equality would 
have meant challenging the allocative or distributive mechanism of the market across a 
wide area of social policy, and would have required a level of state penetration into the  
economic and social order which most social democrats were unprepared to countenance. 
Their efforts were therefore directed at the concept of equality of opportunity which i t 
was possible to reconcile with market capitalism" (Padget and Paterson 1991:38).
public welfare provision, full employment and high levels of economic 
growth are crucial. Padget and Paterson argue that
the third pillar of working-class socialism in the immediate 
postwar years was the ideology of the welfare or social 
citizenship state. It represented the extension of the liberal 
doctrine of political equality into the social and economic 
spheres (Padget & Paterson 1991:18).
Concern with social citizenship means that the political agenda of social 
democracy has to be broader than a liberal or conservative agenda. But 
social citizenship does not necessarily mean endorsement of a 
'Beveridge' style welfare state. In the literature, social democracy has 
often been seen as synonymous with a welfare state, despite the fact that 
in recent years Sweden has moved to a social insurance strategy, with 
bodies such as trade unions managing contributors* funds. Hence:
research on 'social démocratisation' usually focuses on 
welfare state characteristics (its size, egalitarianism, 
comprehensiveness, and the quality of social rights), or on 
economic performance (full employment and economic 
growth) (Esping-Anderson 1992: 189).
While such research is extremely valuable in analysing many aspects of 
public policy it is less valuable in analysing crucial aspects of social 
justice such as 'quality of life' or 'living decently'.
Nevertheless, the success of social democratic parties has largely 
been examined through analyses of cross-national comparisons as well 
as time series performances. Francis Castles' research in these areas has 
highlighted the positive effects of the welfare state services when combined 
with the Keynesian policies, on social justice:
Social Democratic welfare reforms -in the field of health 
provision, unemployment insurance, pensions, family 
maintenance, etc.- have contributed to the alleviation of
the human misery that was once accepted as the inevitable 
concomitant of life in a capitalist society. Full employment 
policies combined with progressive taxation and the wage 
leveling efforts of the trade unions have ensured that all 
wage earners have a real share in economic prosperity. 
Education is no longer the prerogative of a privileged 
minority, but is available to all who can and will benefit 
from it (Castles 1978:47-48).
Castles also argues that the education and health provisions of the 
welfare state have positive effects on social justice, such that;
Educational financing may have a net impact on current 
income distribution, but the extent of repressiveness must 
partly depend on the rates of working-class enrolment in 
various types of post-primary education. Finally, there are 
reasons to believe that, although the expansion of 
educational opportunity may have little impact on social 
mobility, it may have long-term implication for income 
equalisation between those are different levels in the class 
hierarchy. If the increase in the supply of human capital 
produced by education can lead to an equalisation of income 
distribution, it becomes a crucial element in the democratic 
social argument, since it implies that education is not merely 
an increment to welfare, but also an instrument of egalitarian 
transformation of the reward structure of capitalism (Castles 
1978: 62).
Hence, using Castles’ empiricist methodology, it can be argued 
that the welfare state, especially a social democratic one, has positive 
effects on social justice. In addition, it may also affect economic growth 
positively. In the debate over the effects of social democratic economic 
policies, such as welfare provision, on economic growth, social 
democrats argue against Neo liberal and conservative claims that the 
effects are negative. Development is positively affected by policies such 
as the welfare sate and public education (Esping-Anderson 1992: 200)5.
5 Esping-Anderson argues that "Both Korpi (1985) and Friedland & Sanders (1985) claim  
that, if anything, welfare states have a positive effect cn growth rates. However, like 
Jackman earlier, Saunders (1985, 1986) also casts some doubt cn the robustness of this  
finding and suggests that we need to desegregate expenditure categories. This is w hat
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In the 1980s, however, social democracy's commitment to the 
welfare state has changed to a concentration on joint state and private 
welfare schemes, Australian superannuation policies are an example, 
and the use of public funding to private or community provided 
programs, such as in child care or job training. The failure of Neo 
Keynesian economics contributed to this change. Under Neo liberal 
minimal state agendas it is argued that the State has to reduce its 
expenditure, high state expenditure lead to high inflation and 'crowds 
out' private sector investment. Despite the lack of empirical proof for 
these claims (Trevithick 1994:78; Chan & Gustafson 1991:310) social 
democratic political parties in office in the 1980s were forced to restrict 
growth of the welfare state by financial markets and maintain very 
strong budget discipline.
These changes resulted in social democratic parties paying 
minimal attention to equality. Padget and Paterson6 argue that:
Just as public ownership played little part in the new 
political economy of social democracy, the principle of 
equality suffered a similar obscurity in the sphere of social 
policy... Equality was now redefined in liberal humanist 
terms. The parties' basic program generally omitted any 
explicit reference to economic inequality (Padget & Paterson 
1991:38).
makes the Friedland-Sanders study particularly interesting, because it differentiates 
the growth impact by expenditure types, and suggests that social transfers have a 
positive effect on growth (presumably the Keynesian demand effect), while collective 
services and transfers to business have negative growth consciences. In later study, 
Castles & Dowrick (1990) find no evidence of a negative relationship between social 
expenditure and economic performance" (Esping-Anderson 1992:200).
6 Padget and Paterson also argue that "attacking the 'new individualism' of conservative 
and Christian democratic parties, social democrats re-emphasised their traditional 
values of collectivism and social solidarity. Their defence of the social or welfare state 
was based on these principles, but it was combined with a recognition of the limits of 
welfare finance in low-growth economies. Characteristically, social democrats have  
amended the old orthodoxies of their political philosophy in piecemeal fashion. The 
basic value system expressed in the liberal socialist trinity of principles -freedom, 
justice, equality- has remained intact. However, in the new circumstances of the 1980s, 
the parties have experienced some difficulty in giving Programmatic form to these 
principles" (Padget & Paterson 1991:60).
The re-definition of equality has often taken the form of conceiving of 
equality as synonymous with equity. Equity in this guise usually means 
eliminating ’distortions' from markets, or creating a 'level playing field’ 
by introducing 'user pays' philosophies. Such policies have profoundly
inegalitarian results. For example, government regulations are changed
so that pensioners, the poorly paid and job seekers are forced to 
pay high relative bank charges on their deposits while the highly paid 
are given generous concessions. This type of policy supposedly is an 
equity provision because there is no cross subsidisation for the service 
provider to pay, even though it is manifestly in-egalitarian. Hence, the 
commitment of social democracy to social justice has been loosened by 
its weakening commitment to the characteristic components of social 
justice, such as full employment and the welfare state.
Esping-Anderson argues that "welfare state and full employment 
growth policies are unified in the social democratic model" (Esping- 
Anderson 1992:195). In the fulfilment of social justice, or reduction of 
inequality, full employment is as important as the welfare state. Glyn 
argues that
the fundamental claim of social-democratic economics was 
that economic inequality and insecurity in capitalist 
economies could be radically reduced by government 
intervention without impairing economic performance. 
With unemployment a major source of economic 
inequality and insecurity... the guarantee of full 
employment represented 'the first marriage of equity and 
efficiency' (Glyn 1995: 34).
It can be argued that from a social democratic perspective the pursuit of 
full employment positively contributes to social justice and to economic 
efficiency.
It is worthy of note that full employment and economic growth 
are considered as inter-dependent by social democrats. They cannot be 
separated in the social democratic theory, because, as Padget and 
Paterson argue "for social democrats the elimination of poverty was 
inextricably bound up with economic growth" (Padget & Paterson 
1991:36)7. "In sum, it was assumed that a democratic economy would 
evolve via a full employment growth strategy that was backed by an 
egalitarian welfare state apparatus (Esping-Anderson 1992:196).
Because of the importance of full employment to social 
democracy, their approach to full employment requires examination. In 
analysing full employment, Scharpf argues that
registered unemployment is a problematic indicator of the 
success of the social democratic goal of full employment. 
Unlike the rate of growth or the rate of inflation, official 
unemployment figures do not measure a single- 
dimensioned variable but reflect changes on the supply side 
as well as on the demand side of the labor market...(T)he 
best measures of the success of full employment programs 
across countries are thus the labor force participation rates, 
that is, the proportion of 15-to-64-year-olds that is gainfully 
employed and the changes in that figure over time 
(corrected, of course, for immigration and emigration by 
foreigners) (Scharpf 1991:45-48).
Some countries, such as Germany, use early retirement, measures 
discouraging women from employment, or sending back foreign workers 
to their countries, to fight unemployment. Thus, the unemployment 
figures become meaningless, especially with low labour force participation. 
For example, the unemployment rate in 1993 was 12.2 per cent in 
Denmark, 8.9 percent in Germany and 6.5 per cent in the Netherlands. 
However, labour force participation rates in 1993 in those countries are 81.3
7 They continue that "in short, growth was vital, not simply for its own sake, but for the 
completion of the social citizenship state which was a central element in the new 
conception of social democracy" (Padget & Paterson, 36).
per cent, 69.7 per cent and 60.4 per cent respectively (OECD Outlook 1996). 
How then can we compare Denmark with the Netherlands? The difference 
in their labour force participation is 20.9 per cent, while the difference in 
unemployment is 5.7 per cent. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the 
Netherlands is more successful in the fulfilment of social justice than 
Denmark due to the high labour force participation in Denmark, which 
means more people are able to work in Denmark than in the Netherlands.
Organisational Questions of Social Democracy and the Labour 
M ovem ent
Social justice, the welfare state and full employment constitute 
the programatic goals of social democracy, the relationship between 
social democratic political parties, new social movements and the trade 
union movement constitute its organisational component. The link 
between social democratic parties and trade unions has been one of the 
most important components of social democracy (Taylor 1993:133). They 
both constitute the labour movement by representing the working-class 
on different platforms. In northern Europe there has been a very close 
relationship between trade unions and social democratic parties. In 
some countries, such as Britain, trade unions were represented at every 
level of party organisation and as Padget and Paterson argue "the 
parliamentary leadership had less control over decision-making organs 
than their continental counterparts with more rigidly centralised party 
structures" (Padget and Paterson 1991:31). In Sweden it was the 
solidarity movement of trade unions that backed the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party (SAP) in the creation of the 'social democratic welfare 
state'. In other words, in Sweden the cohesive centralised organisation 
of the labour movement, with its unique high membership ratio8, has
8 Padget and Paterson argue that "the organisational density of the Swedish trade unions 
in the labour force is quite unique. With membership at around 90 percent of all manual
been one of the most important components of the SAP (Padget and 
Paterson 1991:179)8.
It should be mentioned that the existence of trade unions is not in 
itself sufficient for the success of social democracy. In all northern 
European countries trade unions have had their central organisations. 
However, the strength of the trade union movement varies between 
countries, and this often coincides with the comparative success of social 
democratic political parties. In other words, the centralised structure of 
trade unions, which can show solidarity, plays a significant role in the 
success of social democracy (Castles9 1978:13). Where social democratic 
parties succeeded in the establishment of the 'social democratic welfare 
state' and the pursuit of full employment policies, as in Scandinavian 
countries, the labour movement maintained significant solidarity. They 
could act cohesively. Furthermore, the trade union movement of 
Austria is a similar kind of organisation to those of Scandinavian 
countries, with similar long periods of electoral success. On the other
8 Padget and Paterson suggest that "many of its (LO-Sweden) constituent unions are 
affiliated at branch level of the party, with affiliated members making up some 60 per 
cent of total party membership. In addition, a large part of party finance comes from 
union sources. At leadership level there is an overlap between party and unions, and most 
union officials identify with the SAP. Amongst the membership, too, there is a 
considerable overlap, and in the electorate at large between 60 and 75 percent of LO 
members vote for the social democrats (Padget and Paterson 1991:179).
9 Another causes of the success of social democratic parties, as Castles argues, is the 
weakness of the Right. In the Scandinavian countries, the right wing parties could not 
present cohesiveness against social democratic parties. They have been fragmented. In 
Castles' words,
the fragmentation of the opposition into at least three bourgeois parties 
plus, on occasions, a number of even smaller parties of Right and Left, has 
made it very difficult to find the necessary cohesion to offer credible 
alternative to social democratic rule (Castles 1978:23).
This argument is valid for the success of the socialists in Spain in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
Spain after the transformation to democracy the right-wing presented very fragmented 
opposition against the PSOE. As the analysis in Chapter two reveals the number of votes 
the PSOE garnered has not reduced in the consecutive elections. Only after the merge of 
right-wing political parties under the PP, the right-wing was able to take first place a t 
national elections and in turn office with support of regional parties. Therefore, it can be 
argued that Castles' argument, the weakness of the right-wing, is valid for the  
explanation of the success of social democracy (Share 1989:104).
hand, the British movement represents one of the more fragmented 
labour movements in comparison with northern European countries 
and has a relatively poor level of electoral success* for social democratic 
parties. Padget and Paterson argue that "the British trade union 
movement is highly fragmented and politically diverse. In order to 
accommodate this diversity, its peak organisation is an exceedingly 
loose-jointed confederation" (Padget & Paterson, 1991:182-183). 
Therefore, the British labour movement has not become as successful as 
the Swedish movement.
Labour movements in Mediterranean Europe are completely 
different from those in northern Europe. The labour movements in 
southern countries, such as Spain* 10, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
Turkiye, have always been fragmented organisations. Padget and 
Paterson argue that
The regimentation of the northern labour movements was 
alien to the individualistic and spontaneous outlook of 
labour in these countries, and the merger between 
socialism and labour, characteristic of northern Europe, 
failed to take place. Lacking the ballast of organised labour, 
socialism remained dominated by intellectuals and prone 
to factionalism and fragmentation... Labour movements 
here tended towards fragmentation along the lines of the 
diverse strands in the socialist tradition. Social democracy 
had to compete with anarcho-syndicalism, revolutionary 
socialism, and after First World War, communism, gaining 
only a weak foothold in the trade union movement. 
Organisationally weak and politically divided, the labour 
movement in these countries was headed by a multiplicity 
of confederations each with its own social and ideological 
characteristics (Padget and Paterson 1991:178).
* By ‘success’, I refer to either having majority in parliament or forming government.
10 Padget and Paterson argue that "The hesitant and uneven growth of industrial 
capitalism in southern Europe deprived socialism of its driving force. The growth of the 
industrial working-class was slow, and labour movements correspondingly small... The 
Spanish labour movement was even smaller, and dominated by a form of anarcho- 
syndicalism even more highly charged and virulent than in France, particularly so in the 
Catalan region. The inability of Spanish socialism to penetrate the industrial heartland 
of Catalonia crippled the movement from its infancy" (Padget & Paterson 1991:5).
It can be understood that mainly because of the lack of cohesion of the 
trade union movement in Mediterranean Europe, the trade union 
movement is far from being able to perform the role played by those in 
Scandinavian countries.
The Spanish labour movement reflects typical characteristics of 
the southern European labour movement. The Spanish Socialist 
Workers Party (1879) was established long before trade unions. The 
PSOE (Socialists) established the trade union called "the Union General 
des Trabajo (UGT, 1888), to back itself..." (Padget and Paterson 1991:6). 
Moreover, just as in the past the trade, union movement in Spain is 
today factionalised and fragmented. Today there are three major union 
confederations: the UGT, CCOO, and USO. The CCOO has been 
dominated by communists, the IU (United Left). The UGT has been 
close to the PSOE (socialists) but lately it supported the IU. In Turkiye11, 
on the other hand, there are three major national union confederations: 
Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Syndicate (DISK), the 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) and Hak-Is. The DISK 
has close relationships with the Solidarity and Freedom Party (ODP), 
communists, while the Turk-Is has had relationships with center-right 
political parties instead of the political parties claiming to be social 
democratic. The Hak-Is is a pro-Islamist trade union and is close to the 
Refah Partisi (RP), pro-Islamist. As seen in those countries, the trade 
union movement is fragmented and is not able to show a cohesive 
movement. Therefore, it can be argued that trade union movements in 
southern countries are far from able to perform the role played by the 
trade union movement in Scandinavian countries through the 
establishment of the social democratic welfare state. 1
11 It should be emphasised that in Turkiye formal relationship between political parties 
and trade unions is banned. Trade unions cannot support parties in anyway.
In the 1990s the formal ties between trade unions and the social 
democratic political parties were broken, even in the Scandinavian 
countries. The dissociation of social democratic parties from trade 
unions, does not necessarily mean that the relationship is no longer a 
component of social democracy. Rather, social change, the 
corresponding electoral priorities, and the rise of new social movements 
have meant that organisational ties have been replaced by looser 
relationships based on programs instead of organisational structures.
Moreover, in southern European countries, such as Spain, Greece 
and Portugal socialists (social democrats) have secured office without the 
backing of a cohesive trade union movement (Share 1989:110-111). 
Because of the decline in the proportion of blue-collar workers, trade 
unions cannot be expected to mobilise a huge number of the working 
class in the electorate. Therefore, it can be argued that the absence of a 
relationship between the social democratic political parties and trade 
unions has not negatively affect the success of the political parties.
Social Democracy and New Social Movements
In the 1980s, social democracy moved 'sideways' in electoral 
appeal throughout its Programmatic renewal. Through moving 
'sideways' two issues, gender and the environment which were always 
part of social democratic ideology have come to the foreground. The 
new priority given to gender and environmental issues has not been 
without difficulty for social democrats. In the past, while social 
democratic (and socialist) recognition of these issues was considerably in 
advance of other political movements, full scale commitment to 
problems of gender and the environment was often lacking. Labourist 
agendas of full
employment, modernising working conditions and economic growth 
often meant that gender and environmental issues were considered 
’soft’. The labour, issues were the 'real' or ’strong' issues and protection 
of male workers meant broader commitments were not taken seriously 
(Beilharz 1994:36-37)
In social democratic literature it is relatively difficult to find 
extensive debates on gender issues, despite as Taylor says, the fact that 
the "labour movement has long established structures for women, and 
the enhancement of women's rights is a central objective of trade 
unionism and social democracy" (Taylor 1993:146). There is also a 
relative paucity of feminist literature which debates the organisational 
and theoretical issues raised by social democracy and gender. Many 
feminist writings are devoted to liberal politics, radical feminism, 
Marxian feminism and eco-feminism and general questions about 
relations between gender and the modern state. The approach of social 
democracy to the gender issue has been relatively neglected both 
theoretically and empirically. The writings of social democrats on the 
gender issue, on the other hand, focus on the implications of welfare 
policies on women, such as maternity leave and child care. As these are 
significant for the emancipation of women (Beneria 1989:328), the very 
extension of these services should be added to the success side of social 
democracy. Beneria argues that
it might be very difficult to implement long-lasting changes 
toward equality between the sexes without structural 
changes to build a more egalitarian society... emphasis on 
the ideological only is likely to be ineffective unless it is 
accompanied by economic change. Campaigns challenging 
the traditional division of labour within the household are 
not likely to be very effective unless women have 
opportunity for employment in the paid labor market... 
Similarly campaigns against male violence are likely to be 
more effective if accompanied by policies that increase
women's economic autonomy and self-esteem (Beneria 
1989:328-329).
As understood from the above quotation, changing social structure is 
essential for the emancipation of women. In other words, as seen in 
Sweden, the resolution of many significant public policy gender issues 
lies in the improvement of welfare policies and increasing the number of 
women in education and the labour force (Cass 1983:XI). In all of these 
areas social democratic countries have had a strong record (Castles 
1990:21; Esping-Anderson 1990:50-52).
The implications of welfare policies for women are clearly 
demonstrated by the Swedish social democratic welfare state. In 
Sweden, social democrats have been relatively successful in the 
emancipation of women, especially by opening the work place to both 
genders. The proportion of women in the labour force has increased 
greatly during the SAP's term in office. Between 1973 and 1979, the labor 
participation of Swedish women increased 11 per cent (Scharpf 1991:51). 
The main factor in increasing labour force participation of Swedish 
women is its social democratic welfare state. The extension of child care 
and maternity benefits is necessary to "increase women's labour force 
participation" (Beneria 1989: 328). It can be argued that the 'social 
democratic welfare state' provides a wide range of services for women, 
and in turn contributes to the emancipation of women.
There has also been some effort by social democratic parties to 
encourage women further into the decision-making process, which is 
important for the elimination of inequality that exists between sexes. A 
number of social democratic parties, such as the SAP and the SDP, have 
regulations allocating quotas to women to overcome organisational bias. 
Such might include a requirement for 40 per cent representation to 
women in the Party's apparatus. It is worth noting, on the other hand,
that the approach of the labour movement is still in considerable flux. 
First, as discussed above, while the extension of labour force 
participation by women requires maternity benefits and child care, the 
commitment of social democracy to the welfare state has been loosened. 
It is not clear how social democrats will settle this conflict (Taylor 
1993:147). Taylor argues that "the desire for more flexible working 
practices to enable women to combine family and career excited 
the suspicion of male trade unionists who feared that flexibility would 
worsen their pay and working conditions" (Taylor 1993:147). Despite 
these debates, it should be noted that "there is within Western European 
social democracy and trade unionism a general tendency towards 
organisational and policy changes favourable to women" (Taylor 
1993:147).
The issue of the environment, like gender issues, has become part 
of the social democratic agenda. From the early 1980s it has become a 
critical part of the programmatic renewal and provided important 
organisational and electoral support. Social democratic parties have not 
been able to incorporate the environmental movement into their 
system of party organisation. In part this is due to the diverse 
ideological range of the various environmental groups and the potential 
conflict between employment and the conservation of the environment. 
Social democratic parties have often lagged behind the environmental 
movement in promoting conservation and environmental policies. In 
a number of countries, such as Germany, environmental groups formed 
their own parties, ie. Die Grünen. In Germany these Green Parties have 
enjoyed some electoral success in their own right and gained 
representation at every level of government, federal, state and local.
Throughout the 1970s social democrats regarded change in the 
socio-economic structure as the long-term solution to the environment
issue. Hugh Stretton argued that "... a program of environmental 
reform has to be part of a program of more general social change" 
(Stretton 1976:4), because he continued "... conflicts about inequality 
and scarce resources are parts of one central problem of demo­
cratic distribution" (Stretton 1976:1). Foster agrees with Stretton's 
argument.
Behind every environmental struggle of today there is a 
struggle over expansion of the global treadmill -a case of 
landless workers or villagers who are compelled to destroy 
nature in order to survive, or of large corporations that seek 
to expand profits with little concern for the natural and social 
devastation that leaves in their wake. Ecological 
development is possible, but only if the economic as well as 
environmental injustice associated with the treadmill are 
addressed (Foster 1995:8).
It can be seen that the long term resolution of environment issues is 
only possible with a change iri the current socio-economic structure, 
because the cause of the environmental problems are structural. The 
conservation of the environment may have considerable implications 
for the current inequalities between classes, those between developed 
and developing countries and those between generations. The question 
that arises is how will the costs of the conservation of the environment 
be financed? Social democrats argue that the costs of conservation 
should be distributed equally. Similarly, in distributing the benefits of 
environment conservation the equality principle should be pursued 
(Stretton 1976:10). With the equality principle of conservation of the 
environment in mind, Foster argues that:
given the nature of the society in which we live, one must 
therefore be wary of solutions to environmental problems 
that place too much emphasis on the role of individuals, or 
too little emphasis on the treadmill of production and 
higher immorality that it engenders. To be sure, it is
necessary for individuals to struggle to organise their lives 
so that in their consumption they live more simply and 
ecologically. But to lay too much stress on this alone is to 
place too much onus on the individual, while ignoring 
institutional facts... It also ignores the fact that the treadmill 
of production is rooted not in consumption but in 
production. Within the context of this system it is therefore 
economically naive to think that the problem can be solved 
simply by getting consumers to refrain from consumption 
and instead to save and invest their income (Foster 1995:6).
It can be understood from Foster's argument that in the conservation of 
the environment the regulation of production is more important than 
that of consumption.
The employment consequences of environmental policies cause 
the greatest problems for social democrats, especially between trade 
unions and green movements. For example, in Sweden "LO 
representatives insisted that the maintenance of full employment be 
accorded equal status with environmentalism" (Taylor 1993:144). In 
Norway LO warned the Labour Party that 'environmentalism should 
not be pursued at the expense of employment' (Taylor 1993:145). The 
same concerns caused disquiet in 'Germany between the SDP and the 
trade unions, especially the Chemical Workers' (Taylor 1993:145), while 
in 'Denmark environmental issues have caused relatively few 
problems' for social democrats (Taylor 1993:146).
Social democrats have had to revise their economic and social 
policies, such as high economic growth targets due to the criticisms from 
environmental groups. Padget and Paterson argue that
... the SPD (Germany) developed the concept of 'qualitative 
growth' in which humanist and ideological concerns 
counterbalanced a purely quantitative appraisal of 
economic performance. The conception involved the 
stimulation of research and the direction of investment 
into a new technology of environmental protection. The 
'ecological modernisation of the economy' would
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simultaneously create a dynamic growth sector with a job 
creating potential, and serve social and environmental 
needs (Padget and Paterson 1991:59).
Qualitative economic growth encapsulates much of the approach of 
northern European social democratic parties to resolving 
environmental issues, an approach incorporated in the Programatic 
renewal of the 1980s.
Lastly, it should be emphasised that the relationship between 
environmental groups and social democratic political parties have been 
better than that with Right-wing parties. In Australia, for example, 
environmental groups mostly give their second preferences to the 
Australian Labour Party at Federal and State elections (Warhurst 
1988:40-41; Christoff 1994:132; McAllister 1994:36). In the late 1980s in 
Germany a 'Red-Green7 coalition was established between the SDP and 
Die Grünen (Johnstone 1989:12).
Social Democracy and Human Rights
The approach of social democracy to human rights issues, as 
mentioned above, requires examination. The concept of human rights 
which is accepted by social democracy is very broad, in that it includes 
social, economic and cultural rights as well as political and civil rights. 
In other words, social democracy's approach13 to human rights is 
different from that of liberal's and of collectivists . In Stammer s words
^ Howard argues that ""the only social system that can actually protect the full range of 
human rights is social democracy. Social Democracy takes both civil /political, and 
economic rights seriously. It promotes the economic rights of underprivileged groups 
while protecting universality: it does not undermine civil and political rights in the 
interests of making compensatory amends to previously subordinated groups... It does not 
mean "equality of condition", the socialist alternative to equality of opportunity: it does 
mean government policies designed to provide basic material security for all citizens. 
Such a system can exist only where there is a societal ethic of equal concern and respect 
(as proposed by Dworkin, 1978) by all citizens for all citizens"" (Howard 1995:1-2).
... the social democratic approach broadly accepts the 
validity of what has been usually termed civil and political 
rights. This contrasts sharply with the liberal approach 
which tends either to deny the validity of economic and 
social rights or else gives clear primacy to civil and political 
rights. It also contrasts with those 'collectivist' traditions 
which tend to emphasise collective rather than individual 
rights and to see human rights in terms of benefits granted 
by the state, prioritising economic and social rights if 
necessary, at the expense of civil and political rights 
(Stammer 1995: 490-491).
This is the result of social democracy's background, which, in terms of 
equality, is traced to socialism and its acceptance of liberal democracy, 
which in turn prioritises civil and political rights. For social democracy, 
giving primacy to civil and political while maintaining a commitment 
to social and economic rights is not compatible. Rights have to be 
understood broadly because civil and political rights in the absence of 
social, economic and cultural rights is likely to result in the nullification 
of the former.
The approach of social democracy to human rights also differs in 
terms of the source of human rights. "The source of human rights is 
'man's moral nature' and rights themselves 'are a special class of rights, 
the rights one has simply because one is a human being. They are thus 
moral rights of the highest order" (Stammer 1995:492). The approach of 
social democracy to the individual is also different. Stammer argues 
that
Instead of seeing individuals as having rights that are 
'natural' or that originate from the strength of an abstract 
sovereignty that predates the institutionalisation of any 
particular social order, social democratic approaches premise 
the idea of rights on the vulnerability of individuals in the 
social world. In other words, people require human rights to 
protect them from potential violation arising from social 
contexts in which they find themselves (Stammer 1995:491).
It can be argued that the understanding of human rights in social 
democracy is more accountable than those of the other major ideologies, 
because social democracy takes both political and economic rights into 
account. In other words, the protection of individual is more realistic 
through the social democratic approach to human rights, which insists 
on both social, economic and cultural rights and civil and political 
rights.
The social democratic approach to human rights issues is more 
necessary in some countries, such as Turkiye. At the moment in 
Turkiye, as will be analysed in the last chapter, even the existence of 
civil and political rights is not fully guaranteed. As understood from the 
latest worldwide campaign of Amnesty International regarding human 
rights abuses in Turkiye, basic human rights, such as freedom of speech, 
freedom of thought and fair trial, are still not fully guaranteed. There 
are many prisoners of conscience, torture and deaths while under 
custody. Between 1990 and 1996 there have been 376 'disappearances of 
political activists' while under custody (Conference notes, 1996). 
Specifically, there are bans, such as on the formation of political parties 
that might be considered threatening to the status quo, which seriously 
damage the freedom of thought. These bans show that civil and 
political rights are not fully guaranteed in Turkiye. These bans seriously 
damage not only the democratic structure of the party system, but also 
freedom of thought and action. The establishment of communist and 
Islamist13 political parties14 is prohibited. Another critique of human 
rights abuses in Turkiye can be made from the point of the nationalities 
question or issues of cultural rights. Until the 1990s not only was 
Kurdish identity denied but the public usage of Kurdish and Kurdish
13 The Islamist social system is called Seri'a, which is based on the Quran and the 
Prophet's behaviour.
14 The pro-Islamist political parties, such as the RP, do not openly argue for the Ser i 
order. If they claim they will overthrow secularism, they will be banned.
language, such as the prohibition of Kurdish in broadcasting and 
education. From a social democratic perspective, as Howard would 
agree, to establish peace in Turkiye, a 'full range of human rights' should 
be first guaranteed. In his words "the more a society respects the full 
range of all citizens' human rights, the more likely that its social ethic 
will also pertain to non-nationals, so that war becomes more and more 
unthinkable as a means of solving interstate disputes" (Howard 1995:7).
Since basic civil and political rights are not fully guaranteed, it is 
often very difficult for social democrats to focus on social and economic 
rights. Nevertheless, a social democratic view of human rights requires 
a commitment to both forms over time. Such a commitment is 
reflected in the programs and election promises of the Left wing 
political parties in Turkiye and Spain. However, in Turkiye for the 
immediate term, the social democratic political parties emphasise civil and 
political rights rather than social and economic rights. This is 
understandable because of the abuse of civil and political rights in 
Turkiye. As understood from the approach of social democracy to human 
rights, however, it is imperative that both forms of rights should be 
emphasised together. In other words, Turkish social democrats should 
focus on both civil and political rights and social, cultural and economic 
rights. -
Conclusion
I have argued that social democracy has been subject to constant 
change and programmatic renewal both in theory and as a movement 
throughout the course of its history. I have rejected simplistic formulas 
which associated social democracy with statism, bureaucracy and 
widespread nationalisation. This sort of view of social democracy has 
been criticised since the last decade of the 19th century. Nevertheless,
there have been considerable changes during this century. The social 
democracy of the 1990s is quite distinct from that of the 1960s and 1950s, 
just as 1960s social democracy differed strongly from that of the 1900s. In 
the 1900s social democracy abandoned its revolutionary character by 
adopting a parliamentary road to socialism. Despite their common 
heritage social democracy also differentiated itself from Marxist 
movements. With the changes that took place in the capitalist system 
between the two world wars, social democracy adapted itself to 
overcoming the worst injustices of capitalism rather than more 
ambitious change.
After World War Two social democracy became identified with 
the welfare state, Neo Keynesian economics and full employment. The 
1980s witnessed the loosening of the commitments of social democratic 
political parties to the characteristic components of social democracy in 
the 1960s. Social justice was refocussed from class based concerns to 
individual concerns and those of the New Social Movements. Such 
reorientation meant not only discarding the further development of 
welfare state services, but also accepting tight budgetary restraints on 
welfare policies and loosening commitment to full employment.
In the course of its history, social democracy has also witnessed a 
change in its electorate: from "working class to the working class cum 
the middle class to the working-class cum public employees and clients" 
(Lindstrom 1991: 165). During the first of these transitions its relations 
with the trade union movement did not change. In the early 1990s, 
however, the organisational relationship between these two parts of the 
labour movement was broken and organised labour s privileged 
representation in social democratic parties was challenged. Hence, social 
democratic political parties now claim that they represent broader interests 
than ever before.
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The changing nature of social democracy, brought by its 
commitment to progressiveness, makes any precise definition difficult. 
Bernstein was correct in his identification of social democracy as a 
movement not a commitment to fixed "final goals". As a movement 
social democracy is fluid. It is more about orientations and convictions 
than a specific policy objective. Hence, it has always been difficult to 
define social democracy. This problem has become more complicated in 
the 1990s, because far reaching changes have changed the face of most 
social democratic parties and particularly the electorally successful ones. 
Due to its progressiveness and fluidity, it cannot be argued that social 
democracy has ceased. Instead, it has entered a new era and the 
relevance of social democracy continues with new challenges and in part 
a new constituency.
In the new era, the existence of social democracy can be seen by 
comparing social democratic political parties with right-wing16 parties. 
Numerous traditional elements still remain, however. Wage earners 
still constitute a higher proportion of the electorate of the social 
democratic parties although their electorate basis has widened. 
Furthermore, although formal ties between trade unions and social 
democratic political parties have been broken, trade unions are generally 
closer to social democratic political parties than to right-wing political 
parties. In other words, trade unions still make a considerable impact on 
social democratic parties. Nevertheless, an organisational tie with trade 
unions is not necessarily a prerequisite for electoral success. Social 
democratic movements in southern Europe, especially the Spanish 
social democrats, are examples of electoral success without relying on a 
Scandinavian style trade union movement. Therefore, despite the 
claims of some post-industrialists, it cannot be argued that social
16 By Right-wing I refer to all right-wing political parties, including centre-right-wing 
political parties.
democracy has ceased to have relevance. But it has moved to embrace 
new political prospects. In the new era the social democratic ideology 
has widened to become more inclusive than ever before.
In the 1990s, by moving sideways, social democracy has broadened 
its scope. It now covers cultural, gender and environmental issues. It 
cannot be claimed, however, that the adoption of these issues is un­
problematic. All of such issues raise potential conflicts with long standing 
concerns for full employment and budgetary restraints on welfare state 
services. Despite the continuation of debates on these issues, there were 
attempts to face them in the programmatic renewals starting in the 1980s. 
Such issues have become important components of social democracy in 
the 1990s. Because it has adopted itself to the new issues of the time, it 
can be argued that social democracy has considerable relevance for the 
1990s.
The superiority of social democracy to the other political positions 
can be seen in its approach to human rights. The approach of social 
democracy to human rights is wider than that of '’liberals” and 
"collectivists”. It protects both civil and political rights and social, 
cultural and economic rights. Such an approach is particularly 
significant in developing countries, including Turkiye and Spain, 
because both ranges of human rights need protection and development. 
In these countries social democrats currently fight for civil and political 
rights as an immediate goal. However, because the social democratic 
conception of social justice is inclusive and inter-dependent, social 
democrats in developing countries need to struggle for the whole range 
of human rights.
The three theorists of social democracy studied represent the 
social democracy of their time. Their arguments and concerns differ 
considerably. Bernstein, the most influential theorist of social
democracy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, focused on updating 
the socialist programmes influenced by Marx and Marxism. While still 
considering himself as a Marxist, Bernstein approached social democracy 
as a movement rather than as a final goal. Bernstein’s "post-Marxism" 
was critical in reorienting social democracy toward redistributive 
reformist rather than revolutionary policies. Crosland, the prominent 
theorist of the golden years of social democracy, took redistribution a
stage further by arguing for the welfare state, Neo- Keynesian economics 
and full employment. He also questioned whether further national­
isation would contribute to realising social democratic goals. Holland, 
on the other hand, reflected on the limitations of Neo Keynesianism in 
a world dominated by giant multi -national corporations. He stressed 
limited nationalisation and economic planning as ways to resolve 
the situation. Holland's programme is implausible in a world domi­
nated by powerful and volatile financial markets which can ruin a 
currency of a major country in a few days and by fluid capital 
transfers wrought by new technologies. While Holland's program is 
not able to be implemented against the forces of Globalism his analysis 
of the basic problems of developing countries is still valuable. The 
problems identified by Holland are particularly apposite for Turkiye and 
Spain.
However, Esping-Anderson's argument that "the issue of 
whether social democracy will produce a transition from capitalism to 
socialism may soon lose its relevance" (Esping-Anderson 1992: 204) 
needs to be taken seriously. Social democracy now finds itself in the 
position of at best defending the current level of the welfare state or in 
some countries finding alternatives rather than achieving socialism.
It cannot be argued, however, that social democracy has ceased to 
have relevance. It can be argued that it has entered a new era in the
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1990s. In the new era the key components of the social democracy of the 
1960s have been replaced by concerns which are broader and more diffuse 
in the affluent countries of Scandinavia, northern Europe and Australia. 
These developments reflect the influence of New Social Movements, 
new technologies and the pressures of globalism. The relevance of 
social democracy in the 1990s, for less developed countries, such as Spain 
and Turkiye, is perhaps more significant, because these countries have a 
social division of labour, electoral constituencies and an economic basis 
in older manufacturing industries which are similar to the conditions of 
the 1950s and 1960s in other parts of Europe. In its approach to human 
rights, social democracy focuses on both social and economic 
developments of these countries. However, to achieve a parliamentary 
road to reforming the social and economic structure of a country, there 
needs to be a democratic political system which is developed to a degree 
which is "good enough" to allow for comprehensive reform. In other 
words, Spain and Turkiye should have a democratic state which will 
allow social democracy to come to power through the parliamentary 
process. My analysis of the parliamentary systems of Spain and Turkiye 
is the theme of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN SPAIN AND TURKIYE
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Introduction
Spain and Turkiye have experienced authoritarian regimes in 
their recent history. Their parliamentary systems may, therefore, be 
questioned as to whether they have developed well enough for social 
democracy to work. In this chapter, I argue that the parliamentary 
systems in both countries have developed since the last takeover of 
office by civilian politicians to a level which can sustain social 
democratic politics. The role and power of important institutions, such
as head of state, trade unions, elections and armed forces are analysed. 
Special attention is also given to the nature of political parties, especially 
social democratic parties, and the structure of the party system. I shall 
argue that social democratic parties are crucial components of democratic 
regimes, no less so in Spain and Turkiye than in northern or western 
Europe.
Political Institutions in Spain and Turkiye
Politics in Spain and Turkiye, two of the lesser developed 
countries in Europe, has changed rapidly in recent years. In the last two 
decades, they have experienced and rejected authoritarian governments 
and made new constitutions to defend representative democracy. In the 
aftermath of the authoritarian regimes in both countries, Spain's 
constitution appears to be stable, while Turkiye has not yet developed a 
level of constitutionalism and constitution which can provide a fully 
convincing framework for democracy. In Turkiye basic disputes remain 
over the essential characteristics of the State, such as its constitutional 
guarantees of political and civil rights, the meaning of secularism, the 
electoral system and role of the President of Republic.
The Spanish head of the State is the King who performs the role 
of the head of state in the Spanish parliamentary system. The role and
83
power of the Turkish President suits many of the requirements of the 
parliamentary system, even though (s)he has more power than many 
counterparts, but less than the French President. The Turkish head of 
state, the President of Republic (Cumhurbaskani), is empowered by the 
1982 Constitution.
The Turkish electoral system is subject to constant change and 
almost always changes before every national election1 and I shall discuss 
below whether electoral systems have effects on the nature of the Party 
system. It is a salient fact, however, that the party systems in Spain and 
Turkiye are unstable to some degree. While both countries have a 
multi-party system, the party system of Turkiye is more fragmented than 
that of Spain, which often means that a governing coalition has to be 
formed. In Turkiye all the major parties attract around 20 per cent of 
votes cast in general elections at the national level. In contrast, in Spain 
two major political parties dominate national elections. I shall argue 
that the party system of Turkiye is a typical example of a multi-party 
system, with no party , able to win majority in the TBMM. In contrast 
the Spanish system is basically a two party system in the way it functions.
One of the successes of civilian politics in both countries has been 
the containment and the stability in the role and power of the army in 
the everyday government and politics of these countries. In Spain the 
army was controlled by the 1981 demonstrations against army 
intervention. While in Turkiye the army has a presence in the political 
arena by means of Milli Guvenlik Kurulu (MGK/ National Security 
Council), the army has avoided peremptory action. On the other hand, 
trade unions in both countries do not have as much power as the 
respective armies, although they have gained strength in recent years.
1 After I wrote this chapter, the Turkish electoral system changed again before the 
December 1995 General elections. Changes have been added to the essay.
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In terms of organisation and financial support, trade unions in both 
countries are weak. And there have been restrictions on trade union 
activities, some of which still remain.
Head of State
The Spanish State, as indicated in the Constitution Article 1.3, is 
described as a parliamentary monarchy' (Donaghy & Newton 1987:27). 
As Newton and Donaghy argue, however, "it is not correct to talk of a 
monarchical state". This is because "national sovereignty resides in the 
Spanish people from whom all powers of the State derive (A.1.2)" 
(Donaghy & Newton 1987: 27). Therefore, the Spanish state is "a social 
and democratic state based on the rule of law (A. 1.1)" (Donaghy & 
Newton 1987:27).
If it is not "correct" to regard Spain as a monarchical state, the 
question arises as to 'what is the role and functions of the monarch, ...(at 
present) ... the King?' The role and power of the Spanish King is largely 
symbolic, like those of other parliamentary monarchies, because "the 
monarch has no power outside the Constitution" (Donaghy & Newton 
1987:28; Arango 1985:126). The Constitution grants the monarch no 
functions which confer any independent decision-making powers 
within the judicial, executive or legislative institutions of the State. A 
significant constitutional device which limits the monarchy is "the use 
of endorsement (refrendo)." Under this mechanism "no official 
document is issued solely with the signature of the King." All 
documents need to be countersigned either by the Prime Minister or a 
relevant minister Recommending and appointing the premier or the 
dissolution of the Cortes, requires "an endorsement by the president of 
the Cortes" (A. 64a). Hence:
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.. In a sense it is the King who is countersigning or endorsing 
the document and the others referred to who exercise the real 
power... In fact the referendum is a kind of monarchical 
privilege as well as a limitation on his power. Since the 
Constitution states that 'those who endorse the acts of the King 
are responsible for them' the King is absolved of all 
responsibility for them (Donaghy & Newton 1987:31-32).
As indicated in the first article of the 1982 Constitution, Turkiye is 
a Republic. The head of state and the nation is the Cumhurbaskani2 (the 
President of the Republic). The Cumhurbaskani is elected by the Turkiye 
Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM/ the Turkish Grand National Assembly) 
for a seven year term. He is the "representative of the Turkish Republic 
and of the unity of Turkish nation (A.104)" (Ozbudun 1988:37). When 
the role and power of the executive was increased, "the Constitution 
transformed the Presidency from a largely symbolic and ceremonial 
office, as it was under the 1961 Constitution, into an active and powerful 
one, with important political and appointive functions" (Ozbudun 
1988:37).
If we compare the Cumhurbaskani with the Spanish King, the 
Cumhurbaskani is more powerful than the monarch. The Turkish 
President has legislative power to summon a session of the TBMM if he 
considers it necessary and can "return laws to the Assembly for 
reconsideration." The President is empowered to submit prospective 
constitutional amendments "to popular referenda". Moreover, he can 
seek the "annulment of laws, law-amending ordinances, and the 
Standing Orders of the Assembly" by appeal to the Constitutional Court 
on "grounds of unconstitutionally".
As executive functions, the Cumhurbaskani can call the 
meeting of the MGK and preside over it, can proclaim martial
2 In Turkish 'Cumhur' is shortened of 'Cumhuriyet' which means republic; T>askan 
means president. " c • ' .
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law or a state of emergency in collaboration with the Council 
of Ministers, can appoint the chairman and the members of 
the State Supervisory Council and instruct it to carry out 
investigations and inspections, can appoint the members of 
the Board of Higher Education and can appoint university 
rectors. As judicial functions, the Cumhurbaskani can appoint 
the members of the Constitutional Court and the other high 
courts (Ozbudun 1988:39).
As Ozbudun has argued, while such powers seem formidable they are 
really "more formal than substantive". The Cumhurbaskani may use 
them only after they have been proposed or another body has taken 
"prior action". A significant number of such powers require the Prime 
Minister and concerned ministers to act. The ministers thereby assume 
political responsibility for such actions. In some areas, as mentioned above, 
however, the Cumhurbaskani is able to act independently, with-out 
concurrence from the PM or cabinet ministers (Ozbudun 1988:39-40).
As a cardinal principle of the parliamentary system of 
government, the Cumhurbaskani is not, as a rule, authorised 
to act alone in executive matters (A.105) (Ozbudun 1988:38).
Hence, all presidential decrees require countersigning by the PM and 
concerned ministers , who therefore take political responsibility for their 
actions. The President is thus constrained by considerations of 
legitimacy as the Cumhurbaskani bears no political responsibility for 
actions connected with his office (Ozbudun 1988:40).
Electoral System
Although the election systems in Spain and especially Turkiye 
have changed frequently, their systems contain the basic characteristics 
of a representative democratic electoral system. As with other 
democratic countries, changes in the elections system have been made to
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favour major parties. There are no restrictions to universal suffrage in 
both countries. The value of votes is equal.
In Spain between 300 and 400 deputies are envisaged by the 
Constitution. They are elected by "universal, free, equal* , direct and 
secret suffrage" or the "traditional principles" of a democratic system. 
The Spanish system maintains an electoral system based on corrected 
proportional voting. The system favours the party with the most votes 
in each constituency. Constituencies are based on administrative 
provincec (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986:44-53). Thus:
It is a system of closed, blocked lists which in practice 
contradicts the intention of free suffrage, although doctrine 
also presents arguments against open lists. In order to 
prevent political atomisation and favour parliamentary 
rationalisation, parties or coalitions which do not reach the 
threshold of 3 % of the votes lack parliamentary
representation. (Powel 1991:132-3).
There are two types of senators who represent regional and 
provincial constituencies. Regional Senators are elected by an Assembly 
of each region "on the basis of one per region and one per million 
inhabitants or fraction over 500,000". Provincial Senators are elected on
the basis of four per province" (Powel 1991:133) -
In Turkiye after the 1982 Constitution, the electoral system 
changed to favour major parties by reducing the number of parties and 
thereby prevent coalition governments. The number of parties, 
however, has not reduced, on the contrary it has increased. In addition 
to proportional representation, country-wide and electoral district quotas 
have been added to the system. The national quota is 10 per cent of the 
total valid votes cast in general elections. To win seats in the 
parliament, a party needs to garner at least 10 per cent of the country­
* By I equal vote I meant that each citizen has one vote at every election.
88
wide votes cast. If a party is unable to gain 10 per cent of the national 
vote, even if it were to gain 100 per cent of votes cast in a constituency, it 
could be disqualified.
The second quota was the constituency quota. It required at least 
20 per cent of the votes cast in the constituency. The second quota 
(found by dividing the total votes by the total number of seats plus one) 
was applied in each constituency. The quota never dropped under 20 per 
cent. To win seats in a constituency, a party had first to pass the country­
wide quota and then the constituency quota. If only one party passed the 
constituency quota, it automatically won all seats in that constituency. 
Independent candidates must also pass the constituency quota (Finkel 
1990). The constituency quota was abrogated before the December 1995 
general elections. There is now only the country-wide quota in Turkiye 
Each electoral constituency in Turkiye is based on the administrative 
provinces. Before the changes of 1995, if a constituency contained more 
than seven seats, it was divided into appropriate constituencies. For 
example, Istanbul was divided into 7 constituencies. In the 
constituencies which contain 7 seats, one seat was made a 'contingent 
member' which was won by the party which garnered the most votes in 
that constituency. Now each administrative province is also an electoral 
constituency, except Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. They are divided into 
2, 3 and 2 electoral constituencies respectively.
Regular elections have been held both in Spain and Turkiye, since 
the takeover of power by civilian politicians. More importantly, as a 
result of these elections a change of office has occurred in both countries. 
In Spain, the 1977 and 1979 general elections were won by Union de 
Centro Democratico (UCD/ Union of the Democratic Centre Party) 
which originated from the Franco regime. The winner of the 1982 
general elections was Partido Socialista Obraro Espanol (PSOE/ Spanish
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Socialist Workers' Party) the social democrats, and they formed 
government after the elections.
Table-II/1
Parties in government, aftermath of authoritarian regimes
Spain Turkiye
elections parties elections parties
1977 UCD 1983 ANAP
1979 UCD 1987 ANAP
1982 PSOE 1991 SHP/CHP +
DYP




The social democrats then won four consecutive elections, 1986, 1989 
and 1989 and remained in government until the March 1996 general 
election. In 1996 Partido Popular (PP/ Popular Party or People's Party), 
the right-wing, formed a coalition government with Catalan and Basque 
nationalists after taking first place in the 1996 general elections.
Regular elections have been held in Turkiye as well. After the 
Coup d'etat of 1980, the first general election was held in 1983. Anavatan 
Partisi (ANAP/ Motherland Party), the conservative party, won a 
majority, despite the Army3/s explicit endorsement of the Milliyetci 
Demokrat Partisi (MDP/ Nationalist Democratic Party), which was 
headed by a retired-general, Turgut Sunalp. The ANAP also won a 
majority in the next general elections held in 1987. No party could win a 
majority in the 1991 general election, thus the era of coalition 
governments returned to Turkiye despite the efforts made to stop this 
from happening. Such efforts were based on the argument that 
coalitions cause instability in the decision making process. In 1991 3
3 Despite the open support of the high ranking generals for the MDP, the loss of the 
MDP at the 1983 general election can be considered as the refusal of the Army.
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Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP/ True Path Party), conservative party, and Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkci Parti/Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (SHP/ Social 
Democratic Populist Party; CHP4/ Republican People's Party), centre-Left, 
formed a coalition government. In 1995 again no party could win a 
majority and a coalition government5 was formed by Refah Partisi (RP/ 
Welfare Party/ WP), pro-Islamists, and the DYP. It is now evident that 
since the last military regime the operation of electoral system works 
well. The change of governments occurs according to election results, as 
regular elections have been held according to the constitution. The 
success of the electoral system has broader implications for the 
development of the parliamentary system and electoral politics.
Party System
The Spanish Party system has a unique feature in that regional 
parties are important and influential in determining which one of the 
national parties will govern Spain. The Spanish party system is a multi­
party system, even though two parties, PSOE and PP, can gain the 
majority or become the first party. Graphs from the latest election show 
that minor parties are in the position to exercise considerable power in 
the Cortes by holding 58 of 350 seats. In the future Spain may be 
governed by coalition governments which will be dominated by regional 
parties, such as Convergencia i Union (CiU/ the Convergence and 
Union Party) and Partido Nacionalista Vasca (PNV/ Basque Nationalist 
Party) (Camera, 1991:138). After the March 1996 General election, the PP
4 The heirs of these two parties, DYP and SHP, were major parties, AP and RPP, before 
the 1980 Coup d'etat. The DYP is the heir of the JP, Justice Party. The leader of the  
DYP, Suleyman Demirel -currently President of the Republic, had been the leader of the 
JP as well. The SHP is the heir of the CHP, but the SH Fs leader was Erdal Inonu, who 
is son of Ismet Inonu who was colleague of Ataturk and who served until early 1970s as 
the leader of the CHP. The CHP's leader before the Coup d'etat of 1980 was Bulent 
Ecevit who is currently the leader of the DSP.
5 Before the coalition government formed by DYP and RP, the two conservative parties, 
the ANAP and DYP, formed a coalition government, but it had lasted in three moths.
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which is a conservative party established government with the Catalans 
and Basques.
Table-II/2
Total Poll of Left and Right Wing Political Parties






(Compiled from El Pais March 5 1996, p.25)
In the Spanish party system after the democratic transition it is 
seen on a national level that Left wing parties have dominated politics; 
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE/ Spanish Socialist Workers' 
Party) and Izguierda Unida (IU/ United Left Party).
The Turkish party system changed after the 1980 Army 
intervention. Since the 1983 general election, while new parties 
emerged, such as the ANAP, the strength of the old parties was reduced. 
Electoral support for parties was volatile, however, and the total support 
for Left parties decreased. As indicated in the above graphs and latest 
opinion surveys, the Turkish party system is dominated by the centre- 
right parties; even the main opposition party is another centre-right 
party, the ANAP.
There is no doubt that the Turkish party system is a multi-party 
system. In the December 1995 General election, (shown in table 11/10 
below) no party could gain a majority in the TBMM. Despite a very high 
national quota, there are five parties in the TBMM. Among the parties 
which were unable to pass the national quota in the 1995 General 
Election, the Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP/ Nationalist Action Party) 
polled 8.18 per cent and the Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP/ People s
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Democracy Party) polled 4.17 per cent. However, the combined seats of 
the two main parties did not give them a majority in parliament. As the 
two parties fell short of the required seats to establish coalition 
government, a minority government was established by the two centre- 
conservative parties, the ANAP and DYP; after a period of negotiation 
which took two months (for further details of the December 1995 
General election see table 11/10).
Since the 1980 military intervention Turkish politics has been 
dominated by Right wing parties. Among the parties, Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi (CHP) and Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) are centre-left parties, 
Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP) is Kurdish nationalist but also 
socialist. Their total support was 29.56 per cent in 1995. On the other 
hand, all other parties are Right wing parties. While Dogru Yol Partisi 
(DYP) led by Tansu Ciller, the first woman prime minister of Turkiye, 
and Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) led by Mesut Yilmaz is center­
conservative parties, Refah Partisi (RP) is a religious party and the 
Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP) is a nationalist party. The Right wing 
gained 68.35 per cent of the total vote in 1995. As indicated in the above 
graphs, current parliamentary politics in Turkiye is strongly dominated 
by Right wing parties. -
The Military and Politics
Both Spain and Turkiye have had authoritarian regimes in their 
recent histories. In Turkiye it lasted three years to 1983, while in Spain 
authoritarianism lasted from the end of the Spanish Civil War in the 
1930s until it gradually ended in 1977.
Turkiye has experienced armed forces intervention three times 
after the establishment of the Republic (Pevsner 1984:26-84). The first 
was carried out by the young lieutenants in 1960. After a new
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constitution was written in 1961, general elections were held and they 
returned to their barracks. The 1980 intervention was carried out by the 
high ranking generals. They dissolved both parliament and the political 
parties. A new constitution was written in 1982 and once more they 
returned to their barracks. These two were direct interventions. There 
was also an indirect intervention in 1971. The Army forced the 
parliament to make amendments to the Constitution and establish a 
cabinet comprised of people from both inside and outside of the 
Parliament.
The return of the armed forces to their barracks after the 1980 
intervention does not mean the Army completely left politics to civilian 
politicians. The Generals made Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (MGK/the 
National Security Council) a constitutional institution that can affect 
governments. The MGK is a significant force in politics which plays an 
important role in making crucial decisions, especially decisions 
regarding security.
In Spain after the death of Franco, the Army gradually retreated 
from politics to a certain degree (Carr 1987:9). Donaghy and Newton 
argue that, between 1976 and 1978, with the constant threat of political 
instability and economic crisis, Spain was able to make considerable 
progress in establishing new democratic institutions "based on the twin 
principles of modernisation and decentralisation" (Donaghy & Newton 
1987:5). They argue that the Moncloa Pact (pactos de la Moncloa) of 1978 
was an important sign of co-operation in economic matters by the major 
political parties who were "all signatories to the agreement". With both 
inflation and unemployment reaching over 20 per cent, the economic 
situation deteriorated badly between 1976 and 1981. Instability was made 
worse by escalating Basque-inspired terrorism. The "euphoria which 
accompanied the restoration of democracy dissipated into disillusion.
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Reactionary generals thus gained ammunition to indulge in sabre- 
rattling and more importantly the attempted coup of 23 February 1981. 
The coup brought matters to a head and the disillusionment 
characteristic of the years 1978-81 dissipated rapidly. Broad based sectors 
of the population demonstrated in favour of democracy and the new 
Constitution. Moreover:
A further healthy sign was the level of moderation and 
willingness to compromise shown by the major political 
parties and the trade unions, the members of which showed 
considerable restraint in sacrificing personal and sectoral 
advancement in the interests of the consolidation of 
democracy (Donaghy & Newton 1987:6).
It can thus be argued that due to the 1981 demonstrations against the 
coup attempt (Carr 1987:7), the military threat to democracy disappeared 
in Spain (Graham 1984:206-209).
In the Republic of Turkiye the armed forces not only have 
considerable power due to the constitution but, as explained below, it is 
unlikely that the people would resist in any coordinated or organised 
fashion. The Army has the strength of the MGK which is "composed of 
the chief of general staff and the force commanders meeting with the PM 
and ministers of defence, the interior, and foreign affairs under the 
chairmanship of the President of Republic" (Harris 1988:183). The MGK 
can affect civil governments, because "decisions of the MGK are to be 
given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers" (Harris 
1988:194) as a constitutional obligation.
The most significant question is whether the Army in Turkiye 
will intervene in the future? It is most likely that any military 
intervention would be dependent on what conditions might arise. If 
there is a deadlock in the decision making bodies the armed forces are
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likely to intervene. Although some people and organisations, such as 
trade unions and human rights groups, would be against the 
intervention, broad based resistance against possible military 
intervention on the scale which happened in Spain in 1981 is unlikely. 
There were no public demonstrations against the interventions in 1961, 
1971-3 or 1980. In contrast, if we look at the referendum for the 1982 
Constitution, we can argue that the armed forces found support with the 
people. The question arises as to why the people in Turkiye have been 
unwilling to resist interventions from the armed forces? To answer 
this question the role of the armed forces in the history of modern 
Turkiye requires special examination.
The armed forces had a significant role in the development of the 
current political system. The constitutional movement in the Ottoman 
Empire was started by a group of soldiers. Both the declaration of the 
1878 Constitution, its re- declaration in 1908 and amendments in 1909 as 
a parliamentary monarchy were made by the modernisers in the 
military. Moreover, the establishment of the modern-secular Turkiye 
was a product of the Army corps commanders, such as M.K. Ataturk and 
I. Inonu.
Analysis of the 1960 intervention by young officers shows that it 
maintained the progressive characteristics of the Army by further 
developing parliamentary democracy in Turkiye. The 1961 Constitution 
contributed to the development of democracy (Pevsner 1984:31-34), by 
protecting human rights and the development of the trade union 
movement. However, both the 1971 and 1980 interventions reversed 
the progressive characteristic of the Army, because the 1971 amendments 
to the 1961 Constitution and the 1982 Constitution brought 
comprehensive restrictions on both democratic institutions and cultural 
and political rights.
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Another characteristic of the Army in Turkiye is that despite the 
three interventions in recent history they have never intended to 
establish a dictatorship. The longest intervention lasted three years. 
Furthermore, the removal of the Army from office did not happen as a 
result of a decision by civilian forces. After each intervention the military 
returned to their barracks of their own will. When the military took 
Government they claimed that after public life had been put in order 
they would leave the government to the civilians. And they did 
(Pevsner 1984:85). This may be one of the main reason why there were 
no public demonstrations against army interventions in the past.
The question arises whether there will be another coup d'etat in 
Turkiye in the future? It can be argued that there will not be another 
Junta as the conditions which led to the interventions in I960, 1971 and 
1980 are no longer present: because the three coup d'etats were due to 
the underdevelopment of democratic institutions. The institutions 
could not overcome the problems that occurred before the 
interventions. Turkiye now has more developed democratic 
institutions and the institutions may overcome the problems that have 
led to interventions in the. past (Mango 1994:30). There is no longer a 
strong ideological division between major political parties that may lead 
to a deadlock in the decision-making process. Since the general elections 
in 1991 Turkiye has been run by coalition governments without major 
ideological disputes between coalition partners. The two coalition 
partners of the 1991-1995 office term had been the major rivals before the 
1980 Junta: the DYP (conservative) and SHP/CHP (center-left) formed a 
coalition. The DYP and RP (pro-Islamists) formed a coalition after the 
1995 general elections.
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While it cannot be argued that intervention from the armed 
forces and the subsequent constitutional reforms have brought political 
stability to Turkiye, they have brought about a political "stand off." 
Military intervention has brought further fragmentation6 in the party 
system and in turn coalition governments. The democratic institutions 
and a number of aspects of civil society are more developed and stronger 
than before, especially the mass media. With around 20 country-wide 
TV channels and 10 newspapers the Media are incomparably more 
influential than before. The process of integration of Turkiye to the 
European Union is another reason to expect a declining possibility of 
future interventions.
The most likely cause for a future intervention would be any 
challenge to secularism. The main threats to secularism are analysed 
below. These threats are mainly constituted by forces, such as the Alevi 
sect followers. On the other hand left and liberal movements and other 
civilian organisation, such as lawyers7 and doctors' organisations, have 
the capacity to stop the overthrow of secularism through parliamentary 
process. More importantly, the RP (the pro-Islamist) and the party 
currently in government has chosen parliamentary means to establish 
an Islamic order. It is difficult for the RP to win a majority without 
making a concession to secularism. Turkiye has also expressed its 
ambition to join the European Union, an ambition which can only be 
realised if it remains secular. With such forces in mind there are
6- This point is put clearly later in the political parties part of this chapter.
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considerable reasons to be optimistic that there will not be another junta 
in Turkiye, as long as there is not a revolution for Ser'i Order1.
Trade Unions
In Spain laws relating to trade unions changed in 1977. Since then 
the right to strike and collective bargaining has become free. The 1978 
Constitution guaranteed the rights of trade unions and Employers' 
associations under Article 7. The Article recognises the rights of unions 
and employers' organisations to defend their legitimate interests within 
the boundaries laid down by the Constitution and the law, provided that 
they are democratically constituted and run.
The right to join a union is granted to all citizens other than 
members of the armed forces (A.28.1) and members of the 
judiciary (A. 127.1), and there is an equal right not to join a 
union (A.28.1) (Donaghy & Newton 1987:180).
The major national trade union confederations are Union 
General de Trabajadora (UGT/ the General Workers' Union), 
Comisiones Obreras (CCOO /Workers Commissions) and Workers' 
Syndicalist Union (USO). The first two are entitled to be called 'the most 
representative unions7 8’ which have obtained 10 per cent or more of the 
total number of delegates or members of works' committees.
Perez-Diaz argues that trade unions in Spain took a very 
significant part in the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s 
(Perez-Diaz 1993:209). Donaghy and Newton argue that
7 Ser'i Order is the system which is run according to Islamic rules.
8 "These unions are automatically entitled to become part of negotiating committee£for 
collective agreements above the level of the single company and to nominate 
representatives to the boards of public bodies" (Donaghy & Newton 1987:184).
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Despite the lack of formal consultative machinery and lack of 
cohesion in the trade union movement, it has been possible 
for the government, management and labour to come 
together and agree programs of joint action. This degree of 
partnership has doubtless been encouraged by severe 
economic problems faced by Spain and by awareness of the 
political danger inherent in disrupting Spain's new 
democracy. In general the attitude of the unions has made a 
positive contribution towards overcoming some of these 
difficulties and towards preparing the Spanish economy for 
harmonisation with the EEC (Donaghy & Newton 1987:193).
In Turkiye the establishment of trade unions goes back to the 
1950s. After World War Two with the establishment of a multi-party 
system, the formation of trade unions was made free. The golden years 
of the trade union movement, however, were in the late 1960s and 
1970s. The unions were very active in this period of politics. But the 
1971 intervention saw the influence of unions reduced. The process of 
curbing union powers was completed in the 1980 military intervention. 
Devrimci Isci Sendikalari (DISK/ Confederation of Revolutionary 
Workers Syndicate) was banned and the trade union movement went 
into deep recession. Under the restored democratic and parliamentary 
structures of the 1980s there are now three trade union confederations. 
Turkiye Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (TURK-IS/ Confederation of 
Turkish Workers' Syndicate) is the biggest trade union confederation. 
The ban on the DISK (socialist) was removed. HAK-IS is a right wing 
trade union.
The 1990s has become a new era for the trade union movement in 
Turkiye. Despite legal restrictions on the establishment of trade unions 
many have emerged. However, they do not have a bargaining rights. In 
Turkiye formal links between unions and political parties have been 
strictly banned. It is, however, difficult to argue that the trade unions
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may affect the national policies. They have always been kept out of the 
decision making process.
In summary it can be seen from above that the political system of 
Spain has been stable since the democratic transformation of the mid- 
1970s. The Spanish King has the role of parliamentary monarch. He 
does not have political responsibility for his duties as head of state. 
Political responsibility is taken by elected politicians who must 
countersign any action by the Head of State. The basis of power in the 
Spanish state is the Spanish people, not the Spanish monarch. 
Although the Turkish President is empowered independently, the 
President is still a parliamentary head of state. He is very much 
involved in daily politics, especially in the appointment of members of 
the high courts and in times of emergency.
The election systems of both Spain and Turkiye contain universal 
democratic principles. Both countries use a proportional representation 
system which favours major parties. Despite attempts to limit minority 
parties in Turkiye, the election system still does not satisfy the major 
parties. Before almost every general election in Turkiye, the electoral 
system has been amended. The expectation that the election system may 
affect the party system by enhancing the power of major parties has not 
been fulfilled. In contrast the number of parties has increased. As 
exlplained below, this may be because of the régionalisation of political 
parties. The Turkish party system has become a typical example of a 
multi-party system. On present trends, it looks as if none of the present 
parties will be able to gain a majority in parliamentary elections. The 
centre-right and far right-wing political parties dominate politics. The 
performances of Left wing political parties since the 1980 intervention 
have decreased. The centre-left parties, the CHP and DSP share the 
traditional 35 per cent gained by the left in most polls.
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The Spanish party system is a multi-party system as well. As in 
Turkiye, new parties have emerged in Spain and old parties joined 
together. After the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s regional 
parties have become effective in national politics. The party system is 
divided between the right and left wing. The left wing political parties, 
PSOE and IU, dominate Spanish politics.
The electoral systems and party systems in both countries are still 
in a period of transition. As a result in Spain and especially Turkiye the 
stability of the party system is open to question.
Intervention by the armed forces is now very unlikely in Spain 
and the power of the army in daily politics has significantly reduced. In 
Turkiye although intervention in the future is possible, the democratic 
institutions have developed enough to hinder possible future 
intervention, making further major interventions less likely. In 
Turkiye there has been no substantive formal restructuring to reduce the 
power of the Army and to prevent possible future intervention. No 
government has yet been able to curtail the power of the Army which 
retains significant power through the MGK which may even affect the 
council of ministers.
As might be expected after a prolonged period of authoritarian 
government, trade unions in Spain and Turkiye are still weak; their 
organisations are loose. In Turkiye the suppression of trade unions has 
been continued by civilian administrations. They are not allowed to 
affiliate with other institutions, such as political parties and 
international labour organisations, like the ILO. The last two military 
interventions have greatly affected trade unions. Despite increased 
militancy in the 1990s they still have not reached the power they had 
before the 1980 military intervention. In Spain, despite having weak 
organisations, trade unions have an effect on the stabilisation of Spanish
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politics, as in forming the 1978 Constitution. In contrast to Turkiye there 
have always been close links between the Spanish political parties and 
the trade unions.
THE STRENGTH OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES9
In this section the strength of the major parties through both 
regions and provinces will be analysed. I shall argue that in Spain the 
strength of the PSOE has remained relatively constant especially in 
relation to the PP. The source of the improved performance of the PP in 
the last election is a transfer of votes from "other10 parties. I also find 
that both regional identification and tradition play a very important 
role in the determination of voting behaviour.
In Turkiye, on the other hand, the fragmentation of the party 
system continued in the 1995 general election. In the last general 
election it became clearer that a régionalisation of politics occurred. This 
is very obvious for the case of the Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP). 
Refah Partisi (RP/ Welfare Party) is not merely a phenomenon of the 
1990s, but its roots go back to the rapidly changing socio-economic 
conditions of the mid-1960s and concurrently the very strong 
propagation of Islam. With the intensification of these socio-economic 
conditions in the 1990s, the RP has become the major party, despite 
Turkiye's strong and lengthy commitment to the West. The RP s 
strength differs between the periphery and centre, and between urban 
and rural areas: it is very strong in the rural sector and the periphery, 
while it is still weak in the centre and urban areas, except in the shanty
9 There is another chapter called "Regions: Formation and Inequality" in aChapter three. In 
that section I looked at the causes of division between regions, such as cultural, historical 
and geographical; development process and development level of regions.
10 The category 'others' here is used to refer to all other parties both regional and 
independent candidates. In the proceeding essay, I also use it as other than the three 
country wide parties.
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towns in Istanbul and Ankara. I also argue that the performances of the 
centre-left parties, the Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) and Sosyal Demokrat 
Halkci Party/Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (SHP/CHP), differ according to 
region: while the DSP is stronger in the West and urban areas it is non­
existent in the East and therefore I argue that it is not a country-wide 
party; the SHP /CHP is strong in the provinces where the followers of 
Alevi sect constitute a large number of left-wing voters. Internal party 
problems include the lack of a charismatic leader, leadership contests 
and its incapability to meet its election promises and satisfy supporters, 
during its term in office. These issues have contributed to the failure of 
the SHP /CHP in the 1990s.
Party strength for the purposes of this chapter is determined by the 
number of votes that each party wins in recent national elections. 
Therefore, as an indicator of strength, in Spain the ranking of parties in 
each constituency is considered, while in Turkiye both ranking and the 
performances of parties are considered. Analysis will be based on the 
recent elections. For Spain I examine three elections: the 1993 and 1996 
general elections and the last regional elections. For Turkiye only the 
1995 general election will be used. However, before starting my analysis 
of the strength of the major parties, I want to give an overview on the 
state of major parties in the last decade.
Spain
In Spain the performances of the country-wide parties, the PSOE, 
the IU and the PP, have improved significantly in the last decade. Their 
share of total votes increased from 83.48 per cent in 1989 to 84.92 per cent 
in 1993 and to 86.91 per cent in 1996. The performance of some regional 
parties, such as CiU, PNV and HB, has been steady. As seen from table- 
H/3, the votes garnered by the category 'others' hayidramatically dropped.
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The decrease between 1989 and 1993 was 8.93 per cent and in the 1996 
general election the decline was 4.74 per cent.
The disappearance of the CDS (centre-right party) was one of the 
main reasons for the decrease in the performance of the category 'others'. 
In 1989 the CDS polled 7.95 per cent of country-wide votes cast. After the 
resignation of its charismatic leader Adolfo Suarez11, a former Prime 
Minister, the party did not recover support. It polled 1.76 per cent in 
1993 and in 1996 it totally disappeared. The disappearance of the CDS 
benefited the PP with its young leader, Mario Anzar. The PP became the 
only country wide centre-right party.
The disappearance of the CDS does not fully explain the increase 
in votes for the PP, because that increase was more than the total votes 
for the CDS. In the 1993 general elections the PP garnered 34.82 per cent 
of country wide votes cast. The increase was 8.99 per cent in comparison 
with the 1989 poll. In 1996 it garnered a further 4.03 per cent of votes and 
became the major party in Spain. In other words, it gathered a further 
2,915,491 votes in 1993 and a further 1,457,056 votes in 1996. Thus the 
number of votes the PP garnered was more than the those of the CDS. 
We must ask the question where do these votes come from? Has there 
been a swing from the PSOE to the PP?
An examination of the number of votes of the PSOE in this period 
shows that while the performance of the PSOE declined, such was 
considerably less than the improved performance of the PP. Although 
the percentage of votes gained by the PSOE in the poll decreased, as seen 
from table-II/4, it significantly increased the total number of votes it 
won. In 1993 its proportion decreased 0.81 per cent, while the number of 
its votes increased 1,035,515. The same trend occurred in 1996 as well; it
11 Adolfo Suarez was Prime Minister and the leader of the UCD during the 
transformation to democracy.
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garnered a further 168,427 votes but its proportion decreased 1.20 per 
cent. It can not be argued that there was a swing from the PSOE to the PP 
because the number of its votes did not decrease, but rather increased. 
The question arises why the PSOE lost 16 seats in 1993 and 18 seats in 
1996. Close examination of each constituency shows that the PSOE lost a 
few thousands of votes in those constituencies where it lost seats. 
However, even in these constituencies the loss of the PSOE was 
significantly less than the gain of the PP. It therefore can not be argued 
that there was a swing from the PSOE to the PP*. There was an expected 
swing from the PSOE to Izguierda Unida (IU/ the United Left Party) 




Party 1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996
Turnout 78.£ 77.29 78.06
N a tio n a l
PSOE 29.27 30.49 48.4C 44.06 39.55 38.68 37.48
PCE-IU 9.38 10.74 4.12 4.61 9.05 9.57 10.58
AP/PP 8.33 5.96 26.18 26.00 25.83 34.82 38.85
R eg ion al
CiU 3.70 2.50 3.65 5.02 5.04 4.95 4.61
cc 0.88 0.89
PNV 1.70 1.50 1.8S 1.53 1.24 1.24 1.28
HB 0.96 1.0} 1.15 1.06 0.88 0.73
BNG 0.13 0.20 0.50 0.88
Others 18.05 18.03 8.78 4.74
(El Pais March 5 996, p.25 & Arango 1985:173)
As the PP, the Communists (the IU) recovered and improved 
their performance. They polled as well as they did in the 1979 general 
elections. After the unification of communists under the IU they 
doubled their votes and polled 9.05 per cent of country wide votes in 
1989, In the same general election, as seen from table-II/3, the votes of 
socialists decreased almost in the same proportion as the increase in the
* The PP may have also benefited from the increase of the turnout, which is 0.77 per cent.
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poll of the IU. However, this can not be inferred as a swing from 
socialists to communists because of the increase in the number of 
socialist votes. In 1993 the IU garnered a further 395,134 votes and 
increased its proportion to 9.60 per cent. In 1996 it polled a further 
395,124 votes. The Communists, therefore, have 21 seats in the Cortes.
Table-II/4
The Votes of Major Parties in the Consecutive Elections
1989 1993 1996
votes % votes % votes %
The
PSOE
8,115,568 39.60 9,150,083 38.79 9,318,510 37.48
The PP 5,285,972 25.80 8,201,463 34.77 9,658,519 38.85
The IU 1,858,588 9.13 2,253,722 9.60 2,629,846 10.58
The 1,617,716 7.95 414,740 1.76
CDS
Total 83.48 84.92 86.91
(El Pais March 5 1996, p.25)
The gains of both the PP and IU were not made at the expense of 
the PSOE. The most likely source of their gain was the category 'others', 
constituted by the CDS and regional parties. There was also an increase 
in the turnout12. In 1996 the turnout was 78.06 per cent, while it was 
77.29 per cent in 1993.
The improvement in the performances of country-wide political 
parties cemented their growing dominance in the Spanish general 
elections. It will be very difficult, however, for either the PP or PSOE to 
win an absolute majority in the Cortes in the short term, unless the IU 
or regional parties, such as the CiU and PNV and CC, lose votes. Due to 
the steady performances of regional parties in the last decade this is not 
likely to happen at least in the short term. Therefore, each of the major 
parties will have to enter a coalition with some of these regional parties 
to have a majority in the Cortes.
12 As we do not know the number of new voters, new voters are disregarded in this examination.
Map-1 jq7
THE STRENGTH of MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, 1993 GENERAL ELECTIONS 






THE STRENGTH of MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, 1996 GENERAL ELECTIONS
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The performances of the major parties, the PSOE, the PP and the 
IU, differ between regional elections and general elections. In the 1995
• * 1 3regional elections , the total poll of the major parties was 77.8 per cent, 
while it was 86.91 per cent in the 1996 general election.
Map-3
THE STRENGTH of MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, 1995 REGIONAL ELECTIONS 13
13 It has to be mentioned that the 1995 regional elections did not include the regional 
elections of Catalonia, Galicia, Euskadi and Andalucia. In Catalonia and the Euskadi 
the regional parties dominate politics while in Andalucia and Galicia the PSOE and PP 
dominate politics.
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The PSOE polled 31.10 per cent, in the 1995 regional elections, while its 
share was 37.48 per cent in the 1996 general elections. The PP garnered 
34.57 per cent in the regional elections, which was less than its poll in 
the 1996 general elections. The proportion of seats won by the regional 
parties was 9.14 per cent in the 1996 general elections, while it was 22.82 
per cent in the 1995 regional elections. It is evident, therefore, that the 
kind of election, whether regional or general, affects the electorate's 
choice of political parties. In other words, voters are more likely to 
support regional parties in regional elections.
Although the performance of the country-wide parties has 
improved, the importance of regional political parties has continued in 
Spanish politics. Regional parties are needed as coalition partners by the 
major parties. In 1993 and in 1996 neither of the country-wide parties 
could win a majority in the Cortes. In the 1993 parliamentary term, the 
PSOE established a minority government which was supported by the 
CiU and PNV. The two regional parties had 17 and 5 seats respectively. 
In 1996, they won 16 and 5 seats respectively and the PP relied on their 
support to form a government. The strength of these regional parties 
along with the CC and BNG shows considerable stability. Therefore, in 
Spain in forthcoming elections these regional parties will be needed -by 
the two major parties as coalition partners.
The 1996 General Elections
Despite the loss of office, considering the poor economic 
circumstances of Spain in the 1990s, the performance of the PSOE in the 
1996 general election was much better than many expectations. Because 
of the difficulties confronting the PSOE, Ignacio Sotelo argued that a
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share of 25 per cent of votes in the next elections would be a "loss 
honourably gained (Prevost 1995:106). There were a number of reasons 
for this argument, such as bad economic performance in early 1995, 
corruption and a significant number of scandals, such as GAL (Anti­
Terrorist Liberation Group). GAL was one of the most important reasons 
for the Socialists defeat arising from the revelation that the government 
had organised the assassination of suspected Basque terrorists in the 
mid-1980s. This is known as the GAL affair. Some police officials were 
imprisoned in December 1994 (Prevost 1995:100). Although the Socialist 
leader Gonzalez continually denied that he had any information about 
these assassinations, the image of the PSOE was badly damaged. More 
importantly, as Prevost argues, corruption continued:
In Fall 1993 the Madrid based El Mundo newspaper published 
a long list of property inside and outside of Spain allegedly 
owned by Luis Roldan, the general director of the Civil 
Guard. Mario Ruhio, head of the government run Bank of 
Spain, was accused of having 'kickbacks in a scheme that 
favoured the operation of Ibercop, another major Spanish 
bank' (Prevost 1995:99)
Although the Socialists were in office for 14 years the unemployment 
rate consistently stayed at the highest level for OECD countries. 
Furthermore, when "in January 1995 Spanish peseta and the Madrid 
Stock Market went into crisis", the PSOE's situation worsened (Prevost 
1995:107). Because of these problems, it was expected that the PSOE 
would have polled less than 30 per cent which means that it would have 
only won 120-130 seats in the Cortes in the 1996 general election. Due to 
these expectations, it can be argued that the performance of the PSOE was 
very good in the circumstances.
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The strength of major political parties in regional areas (see map-1 
and map-2) shows that the effects of regions on the electorate for the 
selection of political parties is significant. For example, the PSOE is 
stronger than the PP in Andalucia and Extremadura. This is not because 
these regions are industrialised regions in Spain. As will be analysed 
below, in Andalucia, the contribution of industry to total civilian 
employment of the region is 15.6 per cent, while in Extremadura it is 10.8 
per cent. In other words, in both regions the number of industrial 
workers is less than those in the other regions. These regions are also 
amongst the poorest regions in the country. One hypothesis for the 
support for socialists in these regions is that it is because of a lengthy 
socialist tradition. Gillespie suggests that:
Andalucia, which together with Catalonia was a traditional 
fiefdom of the anarcho-syndicalist^ and anarchists, then began 
to gain greater representation in the party (PSOE). Andalucia 
and Extremadura grew from 36 per cent of PSOE membership 
in 1930 to 45 per cent in 1932, as rural workers joined the 
UGT's new National Federation Land Workers (FNTT), 
encouraged by improvements decreed by Largo Caballero as 
Labour Minister in 1931-2. The FNTT increased in size from 
36,639 members in June 1930 to 392,953 by June 1932, amidst 
growing agrarian unrest (Gillespie 1989:32).
It can be inferred, therefore, that these two regions have traditionally 
been socialist strongholds. The usual reliance on industrial workers has 
been replaced by reliance on agrarian workers on whose strength these 
regions became socialist strongholds .
Despite the strong presence of the PSOE in Andalucia, it lost votes 
and in turn 5 seats. Although the PP improved its performance in the 
1996 general elections, Andalucia is still a socialist stronghold. As can be 
understood from the graphs below, the gain of the PP was considerably 
more than the loss of the PSOE. While the PSOE lost 44,745 votes, the PP
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won a further 330,526 votes. In 1993, for example, in Almeria the PSOE 
polled 10.6 per cent higher than the PP. The gap between their polls was 
30 per cent in Sevilla, 17 per cent in Malaga and 15 per cent in Granada. 
In the 1996 general election, on the other hand, the PP won further votes 
and the gap between them dramatically decreased. The gap decreased to 3 
per cent in Malaga, 6.21 per cent in Almeria. The PSOE still leads the PP 
in Sevilla by 18.5 per cent, in Huelva by 19.0 per cent and in Cordoba by 
11 per cent.
______________________ _ ________Graph- II/l___________________
The performances of parties, Andalucía, 
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.29)
An examination of the distribution of seats between political 
parties shows that in the 1996 general election the greatest loss for the 
PSOE was in Andalucia. It lost 5 seats, one of these was won by the IU 
and the others were won by the PP. The PSOE has 32 of 62 seats of the 
Autonomous Community of Andalucia in the Cortes, while the PP has
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24 seats and the IU has 6 seats. In regional elections, the PSOE again 
leads the PP. In the last regional election in 1994 the PSOE gained a 
majority in the parliament of Andalucia. Despite these losses for the 
PSOE it can still be argued that Andalucia is a socialist stronghold and 
that its strength is based on tradition.
In Extremadura, like in Andalucia, the performance of the PSOE 
has been very good. It can be inferred from Gillespie's research that it is a 
traditional socialist stronghold. This tradition is also based on agrarian 
workers rather than industrial workers. The contribution of industry to 
total civilian employment of the region in 1991 was 10.8 per cent, while 
the contribution of agriculture was 21.7 per cent. The average 
contributions in 1991 were 22.9 per cent and 10.7 per cent respectively. 
Although it is one of the least industrialised regions in Spain, it can be 
seen from electoral maps that the performance of the PSOE was higher 
than that of the PP in Extremadura. However, the PSOE's poll dropped 
from 51.45 per cent in 1993 to 48.38 per cent in 1996 and it lost one seat. 
The PP's poll, on the other hand, increased from 35.73 per cent in 1993 to 
40.34 per cent in 1996. The PP has 5 of the 11 seats of the Autonomous 
community of Extremadura in the Cortes.
An examination of each constituency makes it clear that the PSOE 
still leads the PP in Extremadura. In the 1993 general elections the PSOE 
led the PP in Caceres by 14 per cent, in Badajoz by 16 per cent. The gap 
between them in the 1996 general election decreased to 5.63 per cent and 
9.58 per cent respectively. On the other hand, examination of the 
changes in the number of votes garnered by them shows that the loss for 
the PSOE was considerably less than the gains for the PP. The loss of the 
PSOE was 1,422 votes in Caceres and 3,862 votes in Badajoz, while the PP 
gained 19,422 votes and 23,987 votes respectively. In these
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constituencies the IU garnered a further 5,747 votes in Badajoz and 4,294 
votes in Caceres.
Graph-H/2
The Performances of Major Parties, EXTREMADURA 
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.34)
Therefore, it cannot be argued that the improved performance of both 
the PP and IU was due to the poor performance of the PSOE. The poll 
for the category 'others', however, reduced from 4.91 per cent in 1993 to 
2.36 per cent in 1996. From the graphs above, it can be seen that there 
was also an increase in the number of votes cast in 1996 which may be 
because of new voters combined with higher turnouts.
In contrast to the strong presence of the PSOE in the two less 
industrialised regions, Andalucia and Extremadura, in another less 
industrialised region, Galicia, the PP is traditionally strong, as it is in 
Castilla Y Leon. In the civil war both regions supported nationalists. 
Franco himself was a Galician. Gillespie suggests strong historical 
reasons for this. Support for the Left as a whole has traditionally been 
weak in the north-west, especially in Galicia and Leon which had been
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strong areas of support for Franco from 1936. The socialist presence in 
the region in the early 1940s was constituted mainly by guerrillas, a 
number of Asturian origin. The rebels attempted to rally support for 
their parties in the north-west, but were forced to withdraw in 1947. 
Galicia has at times displayed a Socialist orientation but it has always 
occurred as a result of outside initiatives. Galicia has sent no 
representatives to national party meetings and no cadres were sent to 
work there. "Even as late as 1973, when Francisco Bustelo went there to 
take up a post at the University of Santiago, the PSOE in the north-west 
was Virtually non-existent" (Gillespie 1989:198-199). It can thus be 
inferred that Galicia and Castilla Y Leon are traditionally right wing 
strongholds. The strength of tradition can be seen from the fact that the 
class structures of both regions are not different from those of 
Andalucia and Extremadura. With 30.2 per cent of the labour force 
employed in agriculture in 1991, Galicia is one of the least industrialised 
regions in Spain. It is also amongst the poorer regions.
Castilla Y Leon is a middle-ranking region. The contribution of 
agriculture to total civilian employment of Castilla Y Leon is 18.3 per 
cent, the third highest rate in Spain. It can, therefore, be argued that the 
strength of major parties depends on traditional cultural factors rather 
than on the class structure* of these regions.
Despite the improved performance of the PP in Galicia, from 
47.07 per cent in 1993 to 48.52 per cent in 1996, it lost one seat. The 
performance of socialists in the last two general elections was less than 
their country-wide average. In 1993 the PSOE polled 35.91 per cent of 
votes cast in the region, while in 1996 it polled 32.97 per cent. Unlike in 
other regions, the performance of the communists declined. In Galicia 
the IU's poll decreased from 5.26 per cent in 1993 to 3.71 per cent in 1996.



















(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.33)
An examination of the performances of each party in 
constituencies shows that the gap between the PSOE and PP doubled in 
1996. In 1993 the smallest gap between them was 7 per cent in La 
Coruna, but it doubled in 1996. Although the PSOE garnered a further 
2,107 votes, the gap between them increased to 21 per cent in the Lugo 
province. In 1996 the gap was 16 per cent in Pontevedra and 14 per cent 
in Orense. However, the PP lost one of its 15 seats that it won in 1993. 
The PSOE lost one seat as well. These two seats were won by the BNG, a 
regional party. Unlike the other regions, in Galicia the regional party 
increased its votes and won two seats from the major parties.
As argued above, Castilla Y Leon, like Galicia, is a traditional 
Right wing stronghold. The PP garnered a further 102,697 votes cast in 
the region in 1996 and its proportion rose to 52.40 per cent. Its 
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.30)
The PSOE, on the other hand, lost 16,040 votes and its proportion 
decreased to 34.87 per cent which was less than its country-wide average. 
Examination of their strength in constituencies shows the strength of 
the PP in Castilla Y Leon. In Avilla, for example, the gap between the PSOE 
and the PP was 20 per cent in 1993 and it increased to 28 per cent in 1996. 
The smallest gap in 1993 was 4 per cent in the Leon province, but it 
increased to 11 per cent in 1996. Although the PSOE won a further 4,846 
votes in Valladolid and 815 votes in Segovia, the gap increased from 9 
per cent to 13 per cent and from 16 per cent to 22 per cent respectively. 
The PP also won further seats and has 22 of the 33 seats of Castilla Y Leon 
in the Cortes. The PSOE, on the other hand, lost two seats and its seats 
declined to 11. As in the general election, the PP also dominates regional
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elections. In both regions, it has absolute majorities in the regional 
parliaments.
Unlike the above mentioned regions, in the last general election, 
the ranking between major parties changed in Castilla-La Mancha, 
Aragon and Asturias. As Gillespie argues, Aragon used to be a socialist 
stronghold: "In Aragon there was virtually no organised body of 
Socialists outside Zaragoza, but in that city the PSOE had a relatively 
durable organisation" (Gillespie 1989:199-200). Here class structure 
appears to be a significant factor. The class structure of Aragon has 
changed in the last decade. The contribution of the service sector to 
civilian employment of the region increased from 41.3 per cent in 1980 
to 53.3 per cent in 1991. The proportion of industrial workers, on the 
other hand, declined, but at 25.5 per cent, is still higher than Spain's 
average of 22.9 per cent. Despite an increase in its wealth in the 1990s, it 
is not among the top five richest regions.
Although the PSOE lost two seats and first place in all three 
constituencies of Aragon, there was no swing from the PSOE to the PP. 
The PSOE slightly improved its performance in Aragon from 34.31 per 
cent in 1993 to 34.50 per cent in 1996. The improvement in the 
performance of the PP is due to its coalition with the PAR, a regional 
party, which polled 18.99 per cent in 1993 (El Pais March 5 1996, p. 29). 
The performance of the coalition in 1996, 48.04 per cent, was less than 
their total performance in 1993, 51.86 per cent, but this coalition cost the 
PSOE two seats. The IU lost its seat as well. Therefore, in Aragon the PP 
won a further 4 seats; one of these was PAR'S seat. The PSOE has 5 seats, 
while the PP has 8 of the 13 seats of Aragon in the Cortes. It can not, 
however, be argued that there was a swing to the PP. It was in fact due to 
the coalition of the minor and regional parties of the Right. The 
performance of the PP in Aragon depends on its coalition with the PAR.
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If the coalition is not able to continue it will be possible for the PSOE to 
win its seats back in the succeeding elections.
Graph-H/5
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Aragon PP PSOE total
Year seat votes seat votes seats votes cast
1993 4 250,105 7 261,108 13 760,840
1996 8 369,805 5 265,662 13 769,841
(Compilée from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.29)
However, notwithstanding these factors the performance of the PSOE in 
Aragon was under its country-wide average.
Examination of the performances of major parties in provinces 
supports my argument that there was no swing from the PSOE to the PP. 
The PP led the PSOE by 8.37 per cent in Teruel, by 4.9 per cent in Huesca 
and by 16.5 per cent in Zaragoza. On the other hand, examination of the 
number of votes won by each political party shows that the PSOE lost 820 
votes in Zaragoza, while it garnered a further 4,313 votes in Huesca and 
1,061 votes in Teruel. As happened in Andalucia and Extremadura, the 
increase of the poll of the PP was not due to the loss of the PSOE.
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Asturias has been a traditional socialist stronghold. As Gillespie 
argues, however, "as was traditional in Asturias, the PSOE failed to 
attract intellectuals. The organised Socialists were pre-eminently 
miners, and occasionally attempts were made from here to launch a 
national mineworkers' union" (Gillespie 1989:195). Asturias is a mining 
area and socialists found roots among mining workers. Unlike in 
Andalucia and Extremadura, in Asturias the strength of the PSOE is 
based on industrial workers. The strength of the economy in the region 
has not changed in the last decade, but the structure of employment has 
changed. In the last decade, the contribution of the service sector to 
civilian employment of the region increased from 36.6 per cent to 51.0 
per cent in 1991. The decline of the contribution of industry was faster 
than that of the average in Spain. .
Graph-n/6
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.30)
In Asturias although the PP took first place in the 1996 general 
elections, the improved performance of the PP was not due to a
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declining performance from the PSOE. Both parties, especially the PP, 
improved their performance. The PP garnered a further 36,456 votes, 
while the PSOE a further 10,460 votes. Both parties exceeded their 
country-wide averages. Their polls were 41.25 per cent and 39.51 per 
cent respectively. The IU garnered a further 5,017 votes, but its overall 
proportion remained the same. The distribution of seats between parties 
remained the same as in 1993. In 1996 8 seats of the Autonomous 
Community of Asturias were shared between the PSOE and PP. The PP 
won 21 of the total 45 seats, while the PSOE won 17 seats in the regional 
parliament in the last regional election.
As in Aragon and Asturias, in Castilla-La Mancha the ranking of 
parties changed in the 1996 general election. It is a bridge region between 
the strongholds of the PSOE, Andalucia and Extremadura, and those of 
the PP, Castilla Y Leon and Galicia. The performance of the PP was 
higher than that of the PSOE in the provinces which are close to Castilla 
Y Leon, Guadalajara and Cuenca. In the 1996 general election, the PSOE 
lost votes in all these provinces, except in Guadalajara. Like the above 
regions, Castilla La Mancha is a less developed region in Spain. Unlike 
in Andalucia and Extremadura, in Castilla La Mancha the GDP per capita 
increased in the second half of the 1980s. The gap between Castilla La 
Mancha and rich regions has reduced, but it still remains amongst the 
poor regions. The contribution of the service sector to civilian 
employment of the region, 46.8 per cent, is the lowest in Spain. The 
contribution of the agriculture, 16.3 per cent, is above the average of 10.7 
per cent. As in the above mentioned regions, therefore, it can be argued 
that the strength of political parties in Castilla Mancha depends on 
tradition rather than the class structure of the region.
In Castilla la Mancha, as in other regions, the loss of the PSOE 
cannot explain the gain of the PP.
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Castilla La Mancha PP PSOE total
Year seat votes seat votes seats votes cast
1993 10 463,295 10 487,810 20 1,077,287
1996 11 534,190 9 480,773 20 1,130,107
(Compiled from E Pais Marc 5 1996, p.31)
Against the loss of a few thousand votes by the PSOE the PP won a 
further ten thousand votes. The PP garnered a further 70,895 votes and 
its proportion increased from 43.00 per cent in 1993 to 47.25 per cent in 
1996, while the PSOE lost 7,037 votes and its share decreased to 42.54 per 
cent in 1996 from 45.20 per cent in 1993. The IU garnered a further 34,193 
votes and its proportion increased to 8.39 per cent in 1996; it was 5.63 per 
cent in 1993. In 1993 the PP led the PSOE in two provinces, by 12.2 per 
cent in Guadalajara and by 3.4 per cent in Cuenca. In 1996 the gap 
between the PSOE and the PP increased 17.08 per cent and 7.2 per cent 
respectively. On the other hand, the PSOE in 1996 could only hold its 
first place in Ciudad Real by leading the PP by 0.9 per cent. In Castilla La 
Mancha the PSOE lost one of its seats in Toledo. In 1996 of the total seats 
of Castilla La Mancha in the Cortes, 9 were won by the PSOE, while 11
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were won by the PP. The PSOE holds the majority in the regional 
parliament by having 24 of the 45 seats.
In two of the richest regions in Spain, Madrid and Baleares, the 
performance of the PP is better than that of the PSOE. The employment 
structures of both regions are similar to those in developed countries. 
The service sector dominates the employment structure of the two 
regions. The contribution of the service sector to civilian employment 
in 1991 in Madrid is 70.3 per cent and in Baleares it was 67.2 per cent. The 
contribution of industry to employment is 19.9 per cent and 15.9 per cent 
respectively.
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.34)
In the last decade, the number of industrial workers in Madrid declined 
6.8 per cent, while the Spanish average declined 4 per cent.
In the last two general elections in Madrid, the performance of the 
PP improved, while that of the PSOE decreased. The PSOE polled 35.00
124
per cent in 1993 and 31.27 per cent in 1996 in the capital region. The 
performance of the PP was higher than its country-wide average. It 
polled 43.90 per cent in 1993 and 49.29 per cent in 1996. As in other 
regions, in Madrid the loss of the PSOE was considerably less than the 
gain of the PP. In 1996 while the PSOE lost 58,471 votes, the PP garnered 
a further 257,849 votes. The PSOE lost two seats in 1996. One of them 
was won by the PP, while the other was won by the IU. In Madrid, of the 
34 seats the PP won 17, the IU won 6 in 1996.
In Baleares, on the other hand, as seen from table-II/5, the PSOE 
improved its performance. It won a further 15,098 votes in 1996 and 
in turn its proportion rose to 36.03 per cent, but it is still less than its 
country-wide average. Although it garnered a further 2,740 votes, unlike 
its country-wide performance, the performance of the PP in Baleares 
declined. It is, however, still above its country-wide average. The IU 
improved its performance by gamering a further 8,595 votes.
Table- II/5










4 194,201 45.07 
4 191,461 46.40
seat votes %
3 155,243 36.03 
3 140,145 34.00
seat votes %
0 33,169 7.70 
0 24,574 5.90
(El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.32)
The number of seats won by the PP and PSOE in Baleares did not change 
in 1996. In both regions the PP also dominates regional parliaments.
The Autonomous Community of Valencia is another region 
where the performance of the PP was higher than that of the PSOE. As I 
will demonstrate below in discussing economic development, the 
employment structure of Communidad Valencia dramatically changed 
in the last decade. The contribution of industry to total civilian
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employment of the region dropped from 34.6 per cent in 1980 to 27.7 per 
cent in 1991. The proportion of the labour force employed in the service 
sector rose from 42.6 per cent to 54.3 per cent in the same period.
While the performance of the socialists in the region was closer to 
their country-wide average, that of the PP was above its country-wide 
average. The PSOE garnered a further 49,039 votes, but its proportion 
decreased from 38.39 per cent in 1993 to 37.60 per cent in 1996. The PP 
polled 43.10 per cent by gamering a further 141,237 votes. The results of 
the examination of their performances in constituencies coincides with 
this trend.
Graph-n/9
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(Compilée from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.32)
For example, in Alicante the PSOE garnered a further 19,655 votes, but 
the gap between them increased from 3.6 per cent in 1993 to 5.89 per cent 
in 1996, because the PP increased its votes from 340,312 in 1993, 43.5 per 
cent, to 381,510 in 1996, and a share of 45.77 per cent. It therefore cannot 
be argued that there was a swing from the socialists in 1996. The
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distribution of seats between them did not change in the Autonomous 
Community of Valencia. The PP won 15 of the 32 seats of the 
Communidad Valencia in the Cortes, while the PSOE won 13 seats, the 
IU won 3 seats and the UV (a regional party) won 1 seat.
Politics in Catalonia and the Basque Country are more 
complicated than in the other regions. This complexity is due to the 
issue of nationality in these regions. The weakness of the Madrid based 
Right wing political parties has been due to both the 'ethnicity question' 
and long opposition by the region to Madrid's centralism. As Gillespie 
argues, the socialists benefited from the question: "The 'national 
question' proved a good deal less problem some to socialists in the 
Basque Country than it did in Catalonia" (Gillespie 1989:84). In other 
words, the strong opposition of the Right wing parties to the demands of 
these regions, and on the contrary the socialists' more favourable 
approach to regional issues has led to these regions becoming socialist 
strongholds. Gillespie argues that during the Franco period Vizcaya (and
particularly Bilbao) had an important role in the socialists' survival and 
recovery. While there were periods when Asturian organisations were 
held as the example for other provincial federations to follow, Vizcaya 
had its tradition and "proletarian concentration to fall back upon. 
Moreover, due to Basque Nationalist Party support for the republic, the 
region "lacked a vengeful civilian right bent upon the vanquished or 
collaborating in repression ordered by Madrid". Gillespie argues that the 
region had considerable organisational significance as well:
Moreover, given the party's strength in the north and the 
existence of the emigre concentration in southern France, 
Bilbao occupied a key strategic location for the purpose of the 
PSOE. It was an obvious distribution center for propaganda, 
correspondence, and money smuggled in from France,
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especially during the years 1954-72 when the leadership was
based in Toulouse (Gillespie 1989:174).
It is significant that in these regions because of nationalities issues there 
emerged left wing political parties with ethnic identities. These are the 
EA, EE and HB in Basque Country, and ERC in Catalonia. Socialists in 
contrast with the Madrid-based-right wing parties have traditionally 
been very strong in these regions.
The strong presence of socialists in the two regions in respect to 
other country-wide parties is also a result of the early industrialisation of 
the regions. The very large number of activists among industrial 
workers made it possible for socialists to gain roots in these areas. Today 
the social structures of these regions favour socialists. The Basque 
Country along with Catalonia are two of the most industrialised regions 
in Spain. In 1991 the two regions took the first two places in terms of the 
contribution of industry to civilian employment of the regions; 34.3 per 
cent and 33.3 per cent respectively. These two regions are also amongst 
the rich regions in Spain.
Despite the very long presence of the socialist movement in the 
Basque country, the performance of the PSOE was considerably worse 
than its country-wide average. While it garnered a further 2,043 votes, 
its proportion decreased from 24.48 per cent in 1993 to 23.55 per cent and 
it lost two seats. The PP, on the other hand, garnered a further 54,139 
votes and increased its proportion from 14.66 per cent in 1993 to 18.32 per 
cent in 1996. Despite the considerable gap between their performances, 
the number of seats each party won was the same ie. 5 each. The IU 
polled 9.23 per cent by garnering a further 40,233 votes. It also won a seat 
in Vizcaya. Although the performance of the country-wide political 
parties improved in the Basque Country, their total poll still only
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constituted half of the votes cast in the region, because the regional 
parties are dominant in Euskadi.
Graph-II/10
The Performances of Major Parties, THE BASQUE COUNTRY 
1993 & 1996 General Elections
B Basque! 993 
B Spain'! 993 
B Basque! 996 
H Spain'! 996
PSOE IU-EB Others
The Basque Country PP PSOE total
Year seat votes seat votes seats votes cast
1993 4 175,758 7 293,442 19 1,198,736
1996 5 229,897 5 295,485 19 1,254,466
(Compiled from E Pais Marc 5 1996, p.33)
In one of the three provinces, Vizcaya, the PNV (a regional party) leads 
all other parties. In Guipúzcoa the PSOE is the strongest party and the 
HB, the ETA's legal wing, comes second. In Alava, on the other hand, 
the balance of strength shifted to the PP in the 1996 general elections. 
The PSOE lost two seats in the Basque Country. One of these was won by 
the PP in Alava, the other was won by the IU-EB in Vizcaya. The PP 
now has 5 of the 19 seats of the Basque Country in the Cortes, while the 
IU-EB has 1 seat, the PNV 5 seats, the HB 2 seats and the EA 1 seat. On 
the other hand, in the regional elections of 1994 no party could win a 
majority. Four regional parties, the PNV, the HB, the EA and the UA, 
have 46 of the 75 seats in the parliament. The PSOE won 12 seats, while
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the PP won 11 seats. It is clear that regional parties are dominant in the 
Basque Country because of the nationalities question.
In Catalonia, as in the Basque Country, the regional parties are 
dominant. The regional parties poll half of the votes in the regions. For 
example, the regional parties of Catalonia polled 43.79 per cent in 1993 
and 35.08 per cent in 1996. The success of the regional parties in the 
Basque Country is more significant. They polled 54.56 per cent in 1993 
and 48.90 per cent in 1996. The performance of regional parties, such as 
the CiU and the PNV was higher than those of the major parties in 
Vizcaya, in the Basque14 Country and in Lleida and Girona, in 
Catalonia15. In the two other provinces of Catalonia, Barcelona and 
Tarragona, the PSOE took first place. The regional parties have also 
become coalition partners for the two major parties, because none of the 
major parties could win a majority in the Cortes.
The performance of the PSOE in Catalonia was considerably better 
than that of the PP. Unlike the decline of its country-wide proportion the 
PSOE's performance in Catalonia improved. It polled 39.30 per cent in 1996 
by garnering a further 242,161 votes. Its share was 34.88 per cent in 1993. 
The PP, on the other hand, garnered a further 70,487 votes and its 
proportion increased from 17.04 per cent in 1993 to 17.97 per cent in 1996.
Examination of the performances of each party in the 
constituencies displays the strength of the PSOE in Catalonia. In the two 
largest provinces, Barcelona (the second largest city in Spain) and 
Tarragona, the PSOE led all other political parties, including the regional 
parties. In Barcelona the PSOE led the PP by 19.40 per cent in 1993 and by 
21.88 per cent in 1996. In other provinces, Girona and Lleida, the CiU led
14 Basque country = Euskadi = Pais Vasca
15 Catalonia = Cataluna
130
all political parties. The performance of IU improved slightly, but less 
than its country-wide average. It polled only 7.65 per cent.
____________ Graph-11/11____________
The Performances of Major Parfi éW ALONIA, 
1993 & 1996 General Elections
PP PSOE IC-EV Others
Catalonia PP PSOE total
Year seat votes seat votes seats votes cast
1993 8 624,493 18 • 1,277,838 46 3,363,079
1996 8 694,190 19 1,519,999 46 3,866,940
(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.31)
Of the 47 seats of Catalonia in the Cortes, 19 were won by the PSOE with 
one increase in 1996, 8 were won by the PP and 17 were won by regional 
parties. The regional parties dominate the regional elections as well. 
They won 84 seats of the 135 seats of the Catalan parliament. Although 
the CiU lost its majority in 1995, it won 60 of the 135 seats. The PSOE 
won 34 seats, while the PP won 17 seats in 1995 (Keesing's Record of 
World Event, May 1995: 40561).
in the Canary Islands, as in baleares and Madrid, the service sector 
dominates the employment structure because of the tourist sector. The 
service sector is the main contributor to civilian employment in the 
region, which at 73.2 per cent is the highest in Spain. The contribution 
of industry to civilian employment is 9.4 per cent, the second lowest
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after the Balearic Islands, while the contribution of agriculture is only 7.6 
per cent.
Country-wide parties have improved their performance in the 
Canary Islands. In the 1996 general election the PSOE garnered a further 
18,883 votes, but its proportion remained the same as in 1993. The PP, 
on the other hand, polled 37.72 per cent by gaining a further 55,769 votes. 
Its share was 33.90 per cent in 1993. The performance of both parties 
declined to below their country-wide averages. The IU also increased its 
vote. After the merging of regional parties into the CC in 1991 they 
became very strong in the region. The CC polled 24 per cent in Tenerife 
and 26 per cent in Las Palmas.
Graph-II/12
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1993 5 274,666 5 241,648 14 810,410
1996 5 329,900 5 260,531 14 874,570
(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.32)
In Tenerife the PSOE led the PP by 34.21 per cent and 32.52 per cent in 
1996. In Las Palmas, on the other hand, the PP led the PSOE by 42.43 per
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cent to 25.77 per cent in 1996. The number of seats each won in 1996 
remained the same as in 1993. The CC won 4 seats in 1996, as in 1993. It 
won 22 of the 60 seats in the regional parliament. The PP has 18 seats, 
while the PSOE has 16 seats. When both the regional elections and 
general elections are considered together, the Canary Islands is 
another region where there are strong regional political parties, like in 
Euskadi and Cataluna.
In La Rioja, Murcia and Navarra, the performance of the PP was 
better than that of the PSOE. Murcia reflects the Spanish average in 
terms of both GDP per capita income and the contribution of each sector 
to civilian employment, while Navarra and La Rioja are amongst the 
more industrialised regions. In La Rioja, the contribution of industry to 
the GDP of the region dropped sharply in the last decade. The 
contribution of industry to civilian employment of the region, however, 
did not decrease greatly. It stayed 4 per cent below the 1980 ratio. The 
contribution of agriculture to civilian employment rose from 2.6 per 
cent in 1980 to 12.0 per cent in 1991. Navarra is amongst the richer 
regions of Spain. It is also an industrialised region. In 1991 the 
contribution of industry to civilian employment of the region was 32.2 
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(El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.30,32,34)
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In La Rioja despite the improved performance of the PP, the 
distribution of seats between country wide political parties remained the 
same as in 1993. The PSOE's vote decreased from 37.6 per cent in 1993 to 
36.58 per cent in 1996, although it won a further 720 votes. The IU polled 
8.75 per cent by garnering a further 3,635 votes.
In Murcia the performance of the PP was considerably better than 
its country wide average. It polled 50.04 per cent in 1996 by garnering a 
further 39,225 votes. The PSOE garnered a further 11,125 votes, but its 
percentage decreased to 37.82 per cent. The IU polled 10.55 per cent of 
regional votes cast. The PSOE lost one of the 4 seats it won in 1993 in 
Murcia. It has 3 seats, while the PP has 5 seats and the IU has 1 seat In 
both La Rioja and Murcia, the PP is also present in regional 
governments. The PP has 17 of the 33 seats in the regional parliament of 
La Rioja and 26 of the 45 seats of Murcia's parliament.
Navarra was rewarded by the Franco regime by being able to have 
economic and political privileges, such as collecting taxes, because there 
had been no hostility towards Franco during the civil war in the 1930s. 
The support for the Right wing in Navarra, therefore, continued after 
Franco.
Table-II/7
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(El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.33)
Unlike in the Basque Country, the performance of the PP is higher than 
those of the other political parties in the region. It polled 36.10 per cent 
of votes cast in 1993 and 36.85 per cent in 1996. Despite improving its
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performance, it lost one seat in 1996. It has to be mentioned that the 
Basque Country based regional parties, such as the HB, EA and the PNV 
have supporters in Navarra, because people in Navarra are Basques as 
well. The HB polls an average of 10 per cent, while the EA polls below 4 
per cent. In Navarra the PSOE has 2 seats, while the PP has 2 and the IU- 
EBN 1 seat. The Basque country based HB has 5 seats in Navarra's 
regional parliament, while the EA has 2 seats.
Ceuta and Meilla are the provinces on the African continent and 
they are not regarded as regions. Each one is a province and represented 
by one seat in the Cortes.
Table-H/8
CEUTA pp PSOE IU
Total votes seat N. of votes % seat N. of votes % seat N. of votes % Others
1996 32,171 1 17192 53.44 0 11,439 35.56 0 701 2.18 8.82%
1993 30,012 1 15276 50.90 0 12,170 40.60 0 0 0.00 8.50%
MELILLA
1996 26,924 1 13,691 50.85 0 11,599 43.08 0 935 3.47 2.60%
1993 26,425 0 11,865 44.90 1 12,885 48.80 0 687 2.60
(El Pais Marc 5 L996, p.34)
In both provinces the performance of the PSOE in 1996 declined and it 
also lost its seat in Melilla. In Melilla in 1993 the PSOE led the PP by 48.8 
per cent to 44.9 per cent. The PP polled 50.85 per cent of votes in 1996. In 
Ceuta the performance of the PP exceeded that of the PSOE. On the other 
hand, the PSOE remains in office at the local level in coalition with the 




The instability in the party system in Turkiye has continued in the 
1990s. The results of the elections between 1983 and 1995 and the 
performance of political parties have been volatile. The number of parties 
that won seats in the TBMM has increased, see tableTI/9. Despite a very 
high country wide quota16, 10 per cent, in the 1983 and 1987 general elections 
three parties managed to win seats in the Meclis17, while in the 1991 and 1995 
general elections five parties managed to win seats. In 1995 the votes of the 
two other parties, the MHP and HADEP, were also very high. They could 
not win any seats, however, because of their disqualification by the country 
wide quota. Nevertheless, their performance, especially that of the HADEP, 
requires examination. As indicated in graph 13, the performance of the 
political parties is also volatile. Swings have occurred between the Left and 
Right wing political parties: between competing left wing parties: and 
between right wing parties.
Table-II/9
1983 1987 1991 1995
ANAP ANAP DYP RP
HP18 19 SHP ANAP DYP




After the 1987 general elections, the total performance of the centre-left 
parties, the CHP and the DSP, declined. Their total share was 33.5 per cent
16 The parties that can not exceed this quota are automatically disqualified, even if they 
won 100 per cent of the votes cast in a constituency.
17 Meclis means parliament.
18 The HP merged with the SDDP in 1985 to established the SHP.
19 MDP merged with the DYP in 1985.
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cent in 1987, 30.5 per cent in 1991 and 25.38 per cent in 1995. However, 
while the performance of the DSP has improved by 4 per cent between 
1991 and 1995, that of the CHP decreased after 198720.
The fragmentation in the party system is most obvious on both 
sides of the centre. Fragmentation occurred immediately following the 
1980 Coup d'etat. There are two centre right wing political parties, the 
ANAP and the DYP.
(Compiled from http://www.cc.utk.edu/~basoglu/secim.html)
The ANAP, a right wing conservative party, was the only political party 
which was allowed to join in the 1983 general elections by the Coup 
leaders.21 And it has been able to survive. It was in government 
between 1983 and 1991. Its performance has gradually declined since the 
1983 general election. The decrease was 9 per cent between 1983 and 
1987, 12 per cent in 1991, and another 4.65 per cent in 1995. The 
performance of the DYP has also been unstable. The DYP was in office in
20 Actually the fail of the SHP/CHP has started after the 1989 municipal elections.
21 Before the 1983 election, the MGK (National Security Council) had the right to veto the 
parties which had members who had been among executive of the political parties before the 
1980 coup intervention.
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coalition with the SHP/CHP between 1991 and 1995. Its performance 
increased by 8 per cent between 1987 and 1991, but decreased 7.8 per cent in 
1995. In the 1995 general elections their polls were very close to each other. 
The DYP polled 19.2 per cent, while the ANAP polled 19.7 per 
cent. As will be analysed later, their performance differs between 
regions.
In the center-left, as in the center right, fragmentation occurred 
after the 1980 Coup d'etat. There are two center left political parties, 
Demokratik Sol Parti (the DSP) and Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti/ 
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (the SHP/CHP). The DSP was established in 
1985 by Rashan Ecevit, wife of Bulent Ecevit22, former leader of the 
Republican People's Party (RPP/ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) and its 
performance has gradually improved. It polled 8.5 per cent in the 1987 
general elections, 10.5 per cent in 1991 and 14.6 per cent in 1995. It is 
now the biggest party23 of the left-wing. On the other hand, the 
performance of the SHP /CHP, which pursues a similar line to the RPP24, 
had improved until the 1989 local elections, but has since declined. Like 
that of the center right parties, the performance of the centre-left parties 
varies between regions. This will be analysed further below.
Many new parties emerged after the 1980 Coup d'etat, but one of 
them, the HADEP, is particularly worth analysing in some detail. The 
emergence of the HADEP brought a new kind of fragmentation to the
22 Bulent Ecevit was banned from active politics at that time by the Corps of the 1980 
Coup d'etat. The ban was abrogated in 1987 by referendum and Mr Ecevit replaced Mrs 
Ecevit.
231 have to mention . that some people argue that the DSP is not social democratic 
party, due to its very nationalist approach to the Kurdish unrest. It also opposes to the  
entry of Turkiye to the EC. One of the main reason for this argument is that it appraises 
the relations with the other Muslim countries.
241 use the RPP for the party before 1980 period. After this period, I use two terms for 
social democratic inheritance of the RPP, the SHP until mid-1995, and the CHP after 
that. In fact the CHP is the Turkish abbreviation of the Republican People's Party. I 
found necessary to the indicate the newly again emergent RPP version as the CHP.
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party system of Turkiye, that of ethnic identity and regionalism. It is 
pro-Kurdish and a socialist party, as is the HB of Spain. The HADEP's 
ancestor, the HEP, made an election coalition with the SHP and won 21 
seats in the Meclis, while the HADEP joined the 1995 general election in 
coalition with the re-emerging socialist parties and polled 4.18 per cent of 
country-wide votes cast. Its performance in the East of Turkiye, 
especially in the South East, was particularly strong. It placed second 
after the RP.
It can be also argued that the fragmentation in the far right is 
institutionalised because of the improvement and stable performance of 
the two far right wing political parties, the RP and MHP. The MHP is 
ultra nationalist, while the MSP/RP is pro-Islamist. Both emerged in 
the late 1960s. They were the fruits of the changing socio-economic 
conditions of the late 1960s (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:15). Their 
performance has improved significantly since their re-emergence in the 
mid-1980s. In the 1987 general elections the RP polled 7.2 per cent, while 
the MHP polled 2.1 per cent. However, both parties were disqualified 
from having seats in the TBMM by the 10 per cent country wide quota. 
They made an election coalition in the 1991 general election and polled 
16.88 per cent. The performance of both parties has dramatically 
improved since. In the 1995 general elections the RP polled 21.31 per 
cent, while the MHP polled 8.19 per cent. The RP was in office in 
coalition with the DYP.
The Refah Partisi (RP/ Welfare Party)
Before examining the results of the 1995 general election, an 
analysis of the emergence of the RP is necessary. It will thus become 25
25 When it reemerged after the 1980 coup d'etat its name was the Nationalist Workers 
Party (Milliyetci Calisma Partisi /M CP).
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easier to understand its rise in the 1990s. The RP is not a phenomenon 
of the 1990s as its roots go to the rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation of the late 1960s. Margulies and Yildizoglu26 argue 
that the emergence of the RP originated in the economic crisis of the 
late 1960s which brought about a "number of dislocations in the 
existing balance of class forces". Big business interests often registered 
as large holding companies based for the most part in Istanbul, which 
had close links with foreign capital, clashed with "the interests of small and 
medium provincial capital". The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi / AP) was the 
main beneficiary, becoming identified as the party of big business. As a 
result it lost the support from other constituencies, accelerating the rise of a 
number of smaller parties. "One of these, the Nationalist Order Party (later 
the National Salvation Party, or NSP27, (Milli Selamet Partisi /MSP), 
emerged as the first party in many decades to openly espouse an Islamist 
political philosophy. The Party's congress, in 1970, echoed with cries of 
"AUa-u-ekber”."
The rise of the MSP is significant because it allowed the return of 
Islam to act as "a rallying cry for socio-economic opposition to the 
central authority". Electoral support for the Party came from artisans, 
small traders and other low income earners from rural areas. These 
social groups were hardest hit by the economic crisis and had been 
unable to defend themselves through existing political institutions.
As they also indicate that there has been an Islamist movement growing 
independent of the RP: "While the MSP became the organised Islamist expression of 
popular discontent, an unofficial Islamist movement also grew alongside it. This 
movement went far beyond the party. It spread through unofficial Quranic courses, local 
associations and youth clubs, charitable associations formed around mosques, and a 
variety of journals... Significantly, the urban working class did not line up behind the  
Islamist banner: it had its own means of struggle (industrial strikes) and its own 
independent organisations (trade union). An Islamist labour confederation (Hak-Is) 
remained marginal (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:15).
27The MSP is ancestor of the RP. Mr Erbakan, currently leader of the RP, was founder 
and leader of the MSP.
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"These groups felt not only their economic welfare, but also their 
traditional institutions and values to be under attack. They saw the 
growing socialist movement as a threat to the family, religion and 
cultural values" (Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1988: 14-15). Hence 
Margulies and Yildizoglu argue:
The MSP's propaganda stressed the importance of 'morals and 
virtue', opposed secularism to the extent possible within the 
law, and strongly attacked communism, freemasonry and 
Zionism. Party leader Necmettin Erbakan became 'the 
champion of independent industrial development'. He 
opposed Turkiye's entry into the EEC, as this would further 
strengthen big business vis-a-vis smaller provincial 
businesses. He branded the EEC as a product of a 'new crusader 
mentality'. (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988: 14-15).
The MSP joined a coalition government led by the social democratic 
Republican People's Party (RPP or CHP) in 1974. The coalition was 
significant because it broke an historic barrier and granted the MSP and 
its policies a degree of legitimacy. The MSP was the third largest party in 
parliament, during the 1970s, with about 11 per cent of the vote. The 
Party gave political organisation and a national voice to the lower and 
middle classes. Thus it granted the Islamist movement the legitimacy of 
a national party platform. "The very existence of the MSP forced all 
major parties to take the 'Islamist' vote into account and court it more 
explicitly" (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:14-15).
As some authors argue, but without noting its importance, there 
are other causes of the rise of both the RP and Islamist movement. 
These causes are not immediately related to the changing social and 
economic structure of Turkiye. One of the most important of these, as
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Margulies and Yildizoglu argue28, is the elimination of harsh 
suppression of the Left after the 1980 Coup d'etat:
... the anti-socialist stance of the generals favoured the 
religious right. With the physical elimination of the Left and 
its organisations, socialism practically disappeared from the 
national arena as an oppositional movement. The right-wing 
opposition, by contrast, was able to obtain positions in parts of 
the state bureaucracy and the educational apparatus where the 
left had previously been influential... The demoralisation and 
sense of crisis within the left led a few left-wing intellectuals 
to embrace Islam, giving the movement some fresh ideas and 
theological interpretations (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:16­
17).
Socio-economic conditions in the 1990s, especially through to 
1995, have worsened. The rapid increase in inequality has strongly 
affected the middle-class. Inflation has risen to 100 per cent. The 
currency has been devalued a number of times after the 1991 
general election. The nature of the media has changed. There are 
16 country-wide TV channels, hundreds of local TV channels and 
thousands of radio stations. Discontent regarding for traditional 
institutions and values, which started with the fast urbanisation of the 
late 1960s, has deepened. Corruption allegations have intensified the 
discontent. In addition, with thousands of victims of the separatist war 
the political unrest in the East has deepened. The incapability of centre 
political parties to deal with these problems has opened the way for 
political parties that oppose the social and political structure, such as the 
RP, HADEP and MHP.
28Margulies and Yildizoglu argue that "These general effects of the coup combined with 
a number of developments which made the subsequent period a fertile one for the 
growth of the Islamist movement Firstly, sodo-economic conditions that gave rise to 
the movement in the 1970s continued and in some cases intensified after 1980. Clearly 
less important but nevertheless significant has been the impact of the Iranian 
revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These two developments came 
together to present Islam as a world force ('a third way') capable of fighting both 
capitalism /imperialism and communism" (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:17).
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There have also been international causes of the rise of the 
Islamist movement in the 1990s. Islamists base their international 
policy on the so-called Muslim-Christian conflict. This issue is 
frequently raised in internal politics. Relations with Christian countries 
which are in conflict with Muslim countries are especially condemned 
as are relations with their allies such as Israel. Improvement in 
relationships between Turkiye and 'Muslim countries', such as Iraq and 
Iran, are actively sought. It can be argued that the 1980s' Iranian 
revolution, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the wars in Bosnia 
and Chechenya all contributed to the rise of the Islamist movement. 
Due to the combination of worsening social, political and economic 
conditions, not only the 'unofficial Islamist movement prospered.' The 
RP became the biggest party after the last general elections held in 
December 1995.
'Propagating Islam' also contributed to the rise of the Islamist 
movement in Turkiye since the 1980s. Islam has been propagated both 
by the state, as a 'cement for national unity,' and by illegal Islamist 
groups. Rouleau's study of the respected English-language newspaper the 
Daily Turkish News highlighted the fact that:
Turkiye had no fewer than 290 publishing houses and printing 
presses, 300 publications including four dailies, some hundred 
unlicensed radio stations and about 30 likewise unlicensed 
television channels, all propagating Islamic ideology... (Roulau,
1993:119).
In addition to Public schools, the state has financed Islam-oriented 
schools, or imam hatip schools, where tens of thousand of young 
people29 (Aksit 1991:145-147), "many of whom will certainly enter
29 In early 1994, it was estimated that every 1 in every 10 students of high school attend 
these imam-hatip.
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government services", are trained in the teachings of the Prophet. 
Under the current constitution, promulgated by the military 
government, the teaching of region (ie. Islam) is compulsory in all 
schools 'to cement national unity', in the words of General Kenan Evren, 
head of the military coup d'etat of 1980" (Roulau 1993:119). As a result 
the RP improved its performance and took first place in the 1995 general 
election while the Left movements, especially the SHP/CHP, have 
entered into a deep recession.
Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti/ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (SHP/CHP)
The SHP/CHP, unlike the RP, has gradually lost strength since the 
1989 local elections. To understand the SHP/CHP, a brief analysis of its 
ancestor, the RPP, is important. The founders of the RPP were also the 
founders of the modem Turkish state, M.K. Ataturk and his colleagues. Until 
1945 there was a single party system in Turkiye and that party was the RPP. 
The characteristics of the Party and of the State were the same. In 1950 it lost 
the government to the Democratic Party. After the mid-1960s, changes began 
to occur in its ideology. When the RPP moved to the Left in the 
late 1960s (Pevsner 1984:37,40,60-64) it 'gradually became, at least in 
some aspects, a western style social democratic party. It became very 
strong in growing urban areas' (Tachau 1991:109), due to support from 
the intelligentsia who are, in the words of Mango, 'progressive, 
enlightened and free-thinkers, in the nineteenth-century sense of the 
term' (Mango 1991:172). Tachau argues that:
Moreover, it appears that the improved performance of the 
RPP in urban areas was due in large part to electoral shifts 
among the lower class, and these shifts apparently involved 
direct switches from the support of the Justice Party (Adalet 
Partisi /AP) to the RPP. Interestingly, the RPP's performance 
did not improve in similar fashion in rural areas, either in 
more industrialised or in less developed provinces (Tachau 
1991:109).
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This electoral shift, however, should not be understood to mean that the 
RPP had support of a large number of the working class, as its 
counterparts in northern Europe. The class identity of the HP/SHP/CHP 
was not clear in the 1980s.
After the ban on the RPP along with other political parties by the 
Generals in 1981 the HP/SHP took over the RPP's heritage. Mango 
argues that the SHP/CHP comprises features of the RPP, such as 
"attracting the support of a considerable part of the intelligentsia" 
(Mango 1991:172).
As Mango argues, cultural identity in Turkiye, is very important 
in determining voting behaviour. The study of Turkish politics, is 
characterised by the considerable attention given to the apparent lack of 
a positive correlation between income levels and voting behaviour. 
Poorer citizens have often voted for 'right-wing' rather than for 'left­
wing' parties. This fact has led to the argument that cultural factors are 
more significant than economic ones in determining party choice. 
Such cultural divisions are not peculiar to Turkiye. While they may be 
stronger than in many other European countries and are likely to 
persist, both in Turkiye and in Europe generally, they do not present an 
unbreachable barrier to achieving a democratic society or to the goals-of 
social democracy. The question remains whether perceived cultural 
identity is a more important factor than perceived economic interest in 
determining voting behaviour? (Mango 1991:181)
The question does not have a simple answer since both class 
and cultural interests may coincide. A voter might consider that if 30
30 "Distinguished from European social democratic parties by its origins, the SHP shares 
with them this characteristic of attracting the support of a considerabe part o "ie 
intelligentsia. The social identity -in Marxist terms, the class basis- of the SHP is uncertain, 
but its cultural identity, like that of the RPP, is clear: it is perceived to be the party ot the 
"progressives', of the 'enlightened', of free-thinkers in the nineteenth-century sense o e 
term" (Mango 1991:172).
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people with a shared identity win government they will ensure that 
their ethnic, cultural and class compatriots will benefit. It is rational to 
hypothesise that religious voters may well believe that the election of a 
theist government will bring personal material benefits, just as might a 
secularist voter entertain similar hopes of a secular government. As 
Mango has argued:
In the circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether it 
was 'religious reaction' (ie. cultural factors) or economic 
discontent which mobilised support for the Free Party in the 
1930s (when the world economic crisis had caused much 
hardship among the public), and the Democratic Party in the 
late 1940s (when the economic effects of the Second World 
War and of the policies pursued by the RPP to manage a war 
economy were still keenly felt). Where poorer citizens vote 
for 'right-wing' parties for reasons of both cultural identity 
and economic self interest, because 'left-wing' parties had 
failed to improve their lot in the past and are believed 
incapable of doing so in the future, the assumed absence of 
correlation between personal income and voting behaviour is 
illusory (Mango 1991:181).
As explained by Mango, because of the effects of cultural identity on 
voting behaviour, deficiency of class identity of firstly the RPP and later 
both HP/SHP/CHP and DSP becomes clear.
Many other characteristics of the RPP, such as strong voter 
attraction in urban areas, were also carried over to the HP/SHP. In the 
1987 general election and the 1989 local elections, the HP/SHP 's 
performance in metropolitan areas maintained the trend. It took first 
place in all constituencies of Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and Adana by 
garnering considerably more votes than its country-wide average. In the 
1989 local elections 40 of the 67 provincial centre's mayors were SHP 
candidates (Mango 1991:197-198). After 1989, however, it gradually lost 
ground in metropolitan areas, until it only polled 20 per cent of the
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votes cast in the 1991 general election and 13.2 per cent in the 1994 local 
elections . In the 1995 general election, it hardly exceeded the country 
wide quota; it could poll 10.72 per cent. In metropolitan areas its vote 
was 10.51 per cent (see graph-II/14). From the results of the 1995 general 
elections, it can be argued that the SHP/CHP has lost the identity of being 
a party of the intelligentsia.
The performance of the SHP/CHP declined not only in 
metropolitan areas, but all around Turkiye. Unlike the decline of its 
counterparts in Europe, that of the SHP /CHP in the 1990s can not be just 
explained by a changing social structure because the same social structure 
had given rise to the SHP between 1984 and 1989. The causes of the 
decline of the performance of the SHP/CHP can be grouped into four
• 32categories. First, the SHP has not had a charismatic leader. Leadership 
in Turkiye is crucially important. The SHP leader Erdal Inonu was not a 
charismatic leader* , although his personality was considered respectable 
even by supporters of other parties. He was not seen as a true leader. 
This led to a leadership battle in the party after 1989. Several early 
congresses were held but until late 1995 the battle was not finalised. The 
first battle was between Inonu and the contender Baykal which was to 
continue for over three years. After Inonu's retirement from the 
leadership the battle continued between two new contenders. Karayalcin 
and Gurkan. After the merger of the SHP with CHP leadership battles 
still ensued. The last battle was won by Baykal assisted by the merger in 
mid-1995 a few months before the 1995 general election. The widely 
publicised fractional rivalries within the SFIP/CHP have affected people
31 However, the SHP and CHP separately entered the 1994 local elections. The poll 
given above is just SHP's; the CHP's is not included.
32 As Tachau argues as well, "in one sense, this strong dependence on personal leadership 
reflected a deep-seated attribute of Turkish political culture" (Tachau 1991:113).
• In Turkey the state is seen as 'father'. The 'true leader' should act as a father. He 
should control his family in every way and no one in the family challanege him.
147
as the sentiment the party can not even run themselves let alone the 
Country still holds. Because leadership is such a significant factor for 
success of political parties in Turkiye, this factor alone explains much of 
the decline of the SHP/CHP in the 1990s.
The second cause stems from allegations that some bureaucrats 
engaged in corruption. The first allegations appeared in the newly 
growing Turkish media. It was alleged that some bureaucrats of the 
Istanbul municipality, which was under SHP governance, illegally made 
money for both themselves and the Party. One of the bureaucrats was 
imprisoned. The party also accepted that it received funds over the 
limit allowed by the law. Although these are very common practices in 
Turkiye, the involvement of party members in corruption was very 
damaging to the Party's reputation.
The SHP's election coalition with the newly established Kurdish 
party, the HEP, in the 1991 general election is a third cause. Due to this 
coalition some candidates from the HEP entered the Meclis. These 
representatives allegedly supported the pro-Kurdish separatist 
movement. Later the HEP was banned and some of its members 
imprisoned. The SHP was severely criticised in public and was blamed 
for letting these people become members of the Meclis. If we remember 
that the DSP's very Right wing approach to Kurdish unrest coincided 
with a strong improvement in its electoral performance, it can be argued 
that the SHP / HEP coalition contributed to the decline of the SHP.
Finally, the poor performance of the SHP during its term in office 
in coalition with the DYP is another likely cause of its decline in the 
1990s. The Party could not convince its coalition partner to meet most of 
its election promises. In other words, during their term in office the 
DYP was dominant and there were few changes or initiatives which 
could be attributed to the SHP. Of these changes, the most important
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one is "the right to have a lawyer during interrogation'. The Party could 
not implement its promise to abolish taxes on minimum wages. The 
coalition, therefore, increased the perception that the social democrats 
were incapable of running the country.
1995 General Elections
The last general election in Turkiye was held on the 24th of 
December 1995. Volatility and fragmentation continued in Turkish 
politics. While the total vote for the centre left parties decreased to 25.38 
per cent, its worst level since the late 1960s, the total vote for the right wing 
increased.
Table-II/10








Party Votes % N. of Seats Without % 10
gathered Country Wide
Quota
RP 6,012,450 21.38 158 137
DYP 5,369,009 19.18 135 118
ANAP 5,527,288 19.65 132 122
DSP 4,118,025 14.64 76 73
CHP 3,011,076 10.71 49 44
MHP 2,301,343 8.18 — 34








(http: / / www.cc.utk.edu/~basoglu/secim.htl)
The left wing electorate in metropolitan areas supported the DSP instead 
of the SHP/CHP. It was the first time that the DSP polled more than the 
SHP/CHP. The performances of both parties (see map-6 and map-7) vary 
over the different regions. It is difficult to argue that the DSP is a 
country-wide party because of its poor performance in the East. The
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performance of the DSP in metropolitan areas was higher than its 
country-wide average, while that of the CHP was slightly less than its 
country-wide average. The performances of centre right political parties, 
the DYP and the ANAP, decreased, while those of the far right parties, 
the RP and the MHP, increased. The improved performance of the two 
far right parties was the direct result of the poor performance of the two 
centre right parties. It is therefore evident that the volatility of the 
Turkish electorate was maintained in the last general election.
Moreover, as outlined above, the fragmentation of the party 
system continued in the 1995 general election. The Turkish party system 
became a typical example of a multi-party system. Despite a very high 
country-wide quota, 10 per cent of country wide votes cast allowed five 
parties33, the RP, DYP, ANAP, DSP and CHP, to win seats in the Meclis. 
Two of the five parties, the CHP and DSP are centre-left parties; two of 
them, the ANAP and DYP, are conservative and the RP is a pro-Islamist 
party. The RP which became the largest party in the 1995 general 
election is currently in office in coalition with the DYP. There are two 
other parties with a high level of voter support, the HADEP and MHP, 
outside the Parliament. The MHP is an ultra-Turkish nationalist party, 
while the HADEP is a pro-Kurdish and socialist party, similar to the HB 
in Spain. They polled 8.18 per cent and 4.17 per cent of votes respectively 
but they were disqualified by the country wide quota.
The emergence of the HADEP, however, meant that the party
system experienced a new kind of fragmentation. It brought new kinds
of divisions such as regionalism and ethnic nationalism into the party
system. Therefore, it must be considered an exceptional party amongst
the political parties which have emerged since the establishment of the
33 There is another party, the BBP (The Great Unity Party), in the Meclis, which is a 
pro-Islamist and ultra-Turkish nationalist. It could enter the Meclis by establishing 
election coalition with the ANAP. It has 7 members in the TBMM.
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multi-party system in Turkiye. It is the third Kurdish oriented party to 
emerge after the 1980 Coup d'etat. The former Kurdish parties, the HEP 
(the People's Labour Party) and the DEP (Democratic Labour Party) were 
banned due to allegations that their members had relations with the 
illegal PKK (the Kurdish Workers Party). The HADEP joined the 
election in alliance with the socialist parties, the SIP (the Socialist Labour 
Party), the SPP (the Socialist United Party) and the DDR (the Democratic 
and Transformation Party)34. Against its 4.17 per cent of the country 
wide average, in the East its proportion was very high, see map-8. It can 
be argued that because of both its strong presence in the East and its 
ethnic national identity the emergence of the HADEP is potentially as 
significant as the rise of the RP.
My analysis of the party system and political parties allows an 
analysis of the results of the 1995 general elections and the performance 
of major political parties in different regions. The constituencies where 
each party took first place are analysed and displayed in map-4. The RP 
took first place in 36 of the 82 constituencies of Turkiye. The DYP took 
first place in 22 constituencies, while the ANAP took first place in 11 
constituencies. The DSP took first place in 7, with the HADEP 4 and the 
CHP2.
The election results show that relatively larger parties were 
favoured by the election system through the distribution of votes. The 
RP won 28.72 per cent of seats with its 21.38 per cent vote.
^ h e s e  socialist parties formed a socialist party called the ODP, the Freedom and 
Solidary Party, in January 1995.
The Strength of Major Political Parties in the 1995 general Election
In terms of taking first place in each constituency
Map-4
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The CHP won 8.90 per cent of the seats with its 10.71 per cent, while the 
DSP won 13.81 per cent of seats with its 14.64 per cent. Hence, the 
election system favours bigger parties, while it punishes smaller parties.
An examination of the performance of the RP through the 
constituencies in the 1995 general election shows that its performance 
was relatively high in rural and peripheral areas while it was low in 
urban and central areas. Graph 14 illustrates that in urban areas, except 
Istanbul, its performance was less than its country-wide average while 
it was higher in rural areas. Its performance was less than its average 
in the West, while it was higher in the East.
Graph-II/14
Metropolitan Areas and Turkiye





In areas of economic and political unrest, or where people are affected 
by bad socio-economic conditions, such as in the East and shanty towns 
of Istanbul, its performance was considerably higher that its country­
wide average. Although the performance of the RP improved in 
metropolitan areas, such is still lower than its country-wide average
Map-5
The Electorate Map of the RP in the 1995 General Election
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Close examination of the performance of the RP in urban areas shows 
that it was relatively weak in metropolitan areas35, such as Izmir, Adana, 
Bursa and Mersin. Although it took first place in all three constituencies 
of Istanbul with an average 24 per cent poll, and in one of the two 
constituencies of Ankara, its performance was lower than its 
countrywide average (see graph 11/14). In the coastal provinces of the 
Mediterranean and Aegean seas (see the electorate map of RP -map-5-) it 
polled lower than its average. It also took first place by polling 29.2 per 
cent in Kocaeli, which is the second most industrialised province after 
Istanbul according to 1986 statistics (Sonmez 1990:68). In the 1994 local 
elections the RP also won local government in Ankara, Istanbul and 
Konya.
The RP, however, performed very well in rural areas, especially 
in central Anatolia and the East. In some provinces in Central Anatolia, 
such as Aksaray, Konya, Karaman, Yozgat and Sivas, it polled two times 
higher than its country-wide average of 21.38 per cent. In Konya, for 
example, the RP polled 44.1 per cent. In Sivas and Yozgat, where the 
pro-Islamist and ultra-Turkish nationalist parties have been very strong, 
the RP polled 39.20 per cent and 35.94 per cent, respectively. In the East 
where Kurdish unrest has deepened the RP's performance improved. 
The vote for the RP was even higher than that of the HADEP. The RP 
did well in Bitlis, Siirt, Mus, Bingol, Sanli Urfa and Adiyaman. It polled
53.9 per cent in the Bingol province.
The performance of the DSP (as seen in graph-H/14) improved in 
the metropolitan areas. While its country-wide average was 14.66 per 
cent, it polled 19.25 per cent and took second place after the ANAP m
35 These are Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Mersin and Adana.
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metropolitan areas. The performance of both the CHP and DSP36, 
however, in line with that of their ancestor the RPP, was relatively poor 
in rural areas. The DSP polled badly in rural areas (see graph-E/14). The 
poor performance of both parties was more significant in the East. 
Although the CHP took first place in Tunceli and polled very well in 
Erzincan, its average in the East was only 6.58 per cent. The DSP's vote 
was even worse; it polled only 3.15 per cent in the East.
The trend established in the metropolitan areas and in those 
provinces with a relatively high proportion of Alevi sect followers also 
applies in the East for the CHP and DSP. They performed particularly 
badly in the South East. In the South East the CHP polled 3.85 per cent, 
while the DSP polled 2.00 per cent.
The significance of the poor performance of these parties in the 
East is that it can not be explained by the rural/urban divide. The most 
salient issue is their approach to the Kurdish question. In addition, the 
existence of the HADEP made it almost impossible for these parties to get 
support in the East because left wing voters supported the HADEP. The 
country-wide left wing political parties, therefore, became very weak in 
Eastern Anatolia (see graph-II/15). Because the DSP performed poorly in 
the East, it is difficult to argue that the DSP is a country-wide party.
In the 1995 general election, the centre-left parties also performed 
badly in their former strongholds. For example, in Mersin they lost their 
first place to the ANAP and the CHP fell to fourth place, while the DSP 
took fifth place. Izmir is another province where Left wing movements 
used to be very strong. In one of the two constituencies of Izmir the DSP 
took first place by polling 24.0 per cent.
36 However, it has to be mentioned that the DSP denies that it is heir of the RPP, even though 
its leader was the last leader of the RPP before the 1980 C o u p  d  e ta t .
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Ankara, Hatay, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Kars and Gaziantep were other 
provinces where the Left lost first place. For example, in Hakkari 
province in the 1983 general election the Left polled 51.1 per cent, in 1987 
31.5 per cent and in the 1989 local elections 33.6 per cent (Sonmez 
1990:205). In 1995, on the other hand, the CHP polled 2.66 per cent, while 
the DSP polled 1.97 per cent.
The DSP took first place in seven provinces (see map-4). Three of 
the seven provinces, Edirne, Kirklareli and Tekirdag, are in the west 
of Turkiye. These are amongst the rich provinces. Adana is another 
province where the DSP took first place. The DSP took first place in one 
of the two constituencies of Izmir. While Izmir is one of the richest 
provinces, Adana reflects the Turkish average. The other two provinces, 
Zonguldak and Bartin which are mining areas, are on the coast of the 
Black Sea. Like its poor performance in the East, its performance was 
very poor in the provinces where the followers of the Alevi37 sect 
constitute a high proportion of left wing supporters. These provinces 
include Corum, Yozgat, Sivas, which are in central Anatolia; Hatay on the 
Mediterranean coast; Adiyaman, Tunceli, Erzincan and Malatya in the 
East. The Alevis have been supporters of left wing parties since the early 
1970s.
The CHP, on the other hand, took first place in Tunceli and Hatay. 
These two provinces have always been safe constituencies for the Left 
(see the electorate map of the CHP map-6). The majority of people in 
Tunceli, in eastern Anatolia, are Alevi followers. The comparison of the 
electorate map of the DSP, map-7, with that of the CHP, map-6, shows
37 The Alevi sect is very different from the other sects of Islam. Actually it is difficult to 
argue that it is a part of Islam. This is simply because the Alevis in Turkiye do not go to the 
Mosque, do not fasten in holy months, Ramadan, do not go to Mecca for pilgrimage. More 
importantly the Alevi women do not wear the black veil and they are not separated from 
men in public meetings. They also praise Ali who is cousin of the Prophet Mohammed more 
than Mohammed himself.
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that the CHP is a country-wide party, although it polled less than the 
DSP. However, it is still very weak in the East, especially in the South 
east. It performed best in Erzincan with 26.76 per cent. Tokat, Ankara-1 
and Corum are the other provinces where it polled considerably higher 
than its country -wide average. In these constituencies Alevis also 
constitute a majority of the left wing electorate.
The CHP did not do as well as the DSP in metropolitan areas. For 
example, in the three constituencies of Istanbul, the two constituencies 
of Izmir, Adana and Bursa, the DSP polled better than the CHP. In 
Ankara, on the other hand, the CHP's performance was better than the 
DSP's.
The régionalisation of politics is important for the centre right 
wing political parties as well. The support for centre-right parties differs 
significantly between regions. For example, (see map-4) the DYP38 took 
first place in almost all provinces in West and South west Anatolia, 
except in one of the two constituencies in Izmir. In the Isparta province 
the DYP led all other parties by polling 39 per cent. It also took first place 
in the three of nine provinces of the Marmara region, Canakkale, 
Balikesir and Bursa, which are relatively rich and industrialised areas. 
These provinces have a continuity with the western and south western 
provinces (see map 4). Of the other provinces where the DYP took first 
place, two are on the Black sea coast, Karabuk and Kastamonu, two are 
on the Eastern border, Ardahan and Igdir. Of the other three provinces 
Sirnak is in Eastern Anatolia, Nigde is in central Anatolia and Kilis is on 
the southern border of Turkiye. Sirnak, Ardahan and Igdir are amongst the 
poorer provinces while Karabuk’s economy is based on mining.
The provinces where the ANAP took first place vary 
geographically, although most of them are on the Black Sea coast.
38 For the electorate map of the DYP see appendix.
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Régionalisation is important for the ANAP39, because it took first place 
in eight of the ten provinces on the Black sea coast (see map-4). Its best 
performance, 54.53 per cent, was in the Rize province, home town of the 
party leader, Mesut Yilmaz. In the metropolitan areas its average vote 
was the highest, although it only took first place in two constituencies: 
one each of the two constituencies of Ankara and Mersin (see graph-14). 
Of the provinces in which it took first place, Yalova is in Marmara; 
Mersin is on the Mediterranean coast; Mar din and Erzurum are in 
eastern Anatolia; Nevsehir and one of the constituencies of Ankara are 
in central Anatolia.
Graph-n/15
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The performance of the HADEP also requires examination, 
although it could not win any seats in the Meclis, due to its 
disqualification by the quota.
39 For the electorate map of the ANAP see appendix.
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It is a pro-Kurdish and socialist party. It polled 4.17 per cent of country 
wide votes cast, and took the sixth place in the 1995 general elections. 
Examination of the performance of HADEP (see both map-8 and graph- 
H/15) shows that it is a regional party with a Kurdish ethnic identity, like 
the regional parties that have ethnic identity in Spain. It polled 15 per 
cent of the votes cast in the East and took first place in 4 of the 22 
constituencies of the East. These are Diyabakir, Van, Batman and 
Hakkari. Its share was 46.47 per cent in Diyarbakir, 27.27 per cent in Van, 
37.40 per cent in Batman and 54.35 per cent in Hakkari. It performed 
considerably over its country-wide average in Siirt; 26.68 per cent, 
Mardin; 22.01 per cent, Sirnak; 25.86 per cent and Igdir; 21.70 per cent. 
These provinces are all in South east Anatolia. HADEP performed even 
better in the South east (see graph-II/15). It polled 21.78 per cent of the 
votes and took first place in the South east, against the RP's average of 
20.9 per cent. In these provinces the Kurdish movement has been very 
strong. HADEP’s performance outside the East, however, was very poor. 
Here it polled over its country-wide average only in three constituencies, 
Gazi Antep, Mersin and Adana. Its performance was poor in 
metropolitan areas, such as Istanbul (see graph-II/14), although Kurds 
constitute 15.0040 per cent of Istanbul's population (Sonmez 1990:223). 
Due to its high performance in the East, the HADEP is best considered a 
regional party with an ethnic identity.
Conclusion
In Spain in the last two general elections, the PSOE lost many 
seats and thus lost office. Although support for both PSOE and PP has
40 As Sonmez argues, Kurds constitute 10.46 per cent of Istanbul's population ini 1975 11.96 
per cent in 1980 and 12.55 per cent in 1984. The increase has probably been higher in the 
1990s due to the war in the East. This is also because some people have been forced to leave 
the East. Therefore, the percentage of Kurds living in Istanbul can be more t aan per cen 
of the population (Sonmez 1990:223).
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changed, I have argued that it is difficult to claim that there was a swing 
from the PSOE to the PP. Hence the PSOE is not subject to a long term 
decline in its electoral fortunes. My examination of support for these 
parties across the regions demonstrates this point. In certain regions, 
including Catalonia, Baleares, Aragon and Asturias, the PSOE improved 
its performance. In some other regions, such as the Basque Country, 
Murcia, La Rioja and Communidad Valencia, even though it garnered 
an increasing number of votes, its proportional support decreased, 
because the PP was able to concentrate the right wing votes behind it. In 
the other regions, such as Madrid, Castilla Y Leon, Galicia, Extremadura, 
Andalucia, Castilla La Mancha and Navarra, the PSOE's support 
declined. It lost 12 seats in these regions. Even in these regions, the loss 
of the PSOE was considerably less than the gain of the PP. All these facts 
indicate that there was not a swing from the PSOE to the PP but a 
consolidation and concentration of the right wing support base.
The source of the PP's increased strength lay in the consolidation 
and concentration of the votes of the minor parties. The results of the 
general elections, show support for 'other', mainly right wing parties has 
gradually decreased. The disappearance of the CDS was the main reason 
for the rise of the PP. Additionally, some regional parties, such as the 
PAR in Aragon, made an election coalition with the PP. Because of this 
partnership PP won a further 4 seats. In 1996 the PP may have also 
benefited from a higher turnout. Hence, it is clear that the swing to the 
PP was not from the PSOE. There is evidence of a swing from the PSOE 
to the IU. However, the increase in votes garnered by the IU was
considerably more than those lost by the PSOE.
I have argued that both regional social structural variations and 
regional political parties play a significant role in Spanish politics. The 
effects of regional interests on the electorate in the election of political
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parties is significant, especially in the relatively less developed regions, 
such as Galicia, Castilla Y Leon, Extremadura and Andalucia. In all 
provinces of Galicia and Castilla Y Leon, the performances of PP were 
considerably higher than those of the PSOE, while in all provinces of 
Extremadura and Andalucia those of the PSOE were considerably higher 
than those of PP. Castilla La Mancha is a bridge region between 
strongholds. While in the provinces on the border of Extremadura and 
Andalucia, the PSOE polls higher than PP, in the provinces on the 
border of Castilla Y Leon the PP polls higher than PSOE.
In the "historical regions', the Basque Country and Catalonia, 
regional parties, such as the PNV, HB, CiU and ERC, are dominant in 
both regional elections and general elections. These regional political 
parties are also needed as coalition partners because in the last three 
general elections neither the PSOE nor the PP can win an absolute 
majority in the Cortes. I have argued that due to the steady performance 
of the regional parties Spain is likely to be governed by coalitions in the 
next decade.
Tradition has been an important factor in support for political 
parties in Spanish electorates. The performance of both major parties is 
more dependent on tradition than the class structure of the regions, 
especially in the less industrialised and poorer regions. Although the 
employment structure and developmental level of these regions are 
similar, Galicia and Castilla Y Leon are the PP's strongholds, while 
Extremadura and Andalucia are the PSOE's strongholds. Traditional 
socialist support has been strong in the latter two, while electoral 
support has been negligible in the former. Navarra had been favoured 
by the Franco regime. These trends prove the argument that tradition is 
crucial in the Spanish regions. While Navarra is one of the most 
industrialised regions in Spain, the PP has gained considerably more
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support than the PSOE. In the most industrialised regions, the Basque 
Country and Catalonia, the main parties' performance differs 
significantly. In the Basque Country PSOE's performance was very poor, 
while in Catalonia PSOE's performance was better than the PP's. Strong 
ethnic nationalism in these regions contributes to the weakness of the 
Madrid based Right-wing political parties. Bigger regional parties, such 
as the CiU and PNV, are right-wing parties. While the right-wing are 
stronger in these regions, it is not a Madrid based right-wing.
The December 1995 general election in Turkiye saw a continuing 
fragmentation and volatility. The party system became a typical 
example of a multi-party system. Despite a very high country wide 
quota, there are five parties which were able to win seats in the 
parliament. Volatility was demonstrated by the swing in voter support 
not only between left-wing and right-wing parties, but also among 
competing Left-wing and Right-wing parties. While the RP became the 
biggest party, the performance of centre-right parties, the ANAP and the 
DYP, became closer. The DSP, on the centre-left gained more support 
than the SHP/CHP
Fragmentation has increased in the 1990s. With the emergence of 
the HADEP, the party system has become even more fragmented. As 
mentioned above, the HADEP is a regional party with an ethnic national 
identity, similar to those of Spain. HADEP's average performance in the 
East was considerably higher than its country-wide average, especially in 
the South east where Kurds constitute the majority of the population of 
the region. In the far right fragmentation has also become 
institutionalised by the growth of the RP and MHP, since the late 1960s. 
Hence, fragmentation occurs in the centre-left and in the centre-right 
starting after the 1980 coup d'etat. The localised support bases of the 
political parties in the regions means that
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régionalisation of political parties has become a major force in the party 
system in Turkiye.
The Refah Partisi (RP/ Welfare Party) is not merely a 
phenomenon of the 1990s, its roots go back to the rapid changes in the 
socio-economic conditions which began in the late 1960s and have 
intensified in the 1990s. The rise of the RP also stems from the 
propagation of Islam with religious courses, religious media and 
religious schools. The RP's strength is in the areas most affected by 
socio-economic changes, such as the shanty towns of metropolitan cities 
and the rural industries of the East. In the provinces of central Anatolia, 
such as Konya, Si vas, Yozgat and Karaman and in the East where the 
Kurdish question has continued for 14 years, support for the RP was 
considerably above its country-wide average. Its average performance in 
urban areas, however, was lower than its country wide average. Its poor 
performance was obvious in the provinces on the Aegean coast.
The overall performances of Left wing political parties has 
declined in recent years. This is mainly due to the decline in support for 
the SHP/CHP, because the DSP improved its performance, especially in 
urban areas. However, the DSP is not a country-wide party because its 
support is almost non-existent in the East. Support for SHP/CHP, on 
the other hand, was spread all over the country, despite its relatively 
poor performance in the East. The SHP/CHP polled very well in the 
provinces where the Alevi followers constitute most of the left 
electorate. Its support in the metropolitan areas decreased.
I argued that there are four main reasons for the decline of the 
SHP/CHP. These include the lack of a charismatic leader after the 1980 
intervention, the leadership battle within the party, its election coalition 
with the Kurdish party in 1991 and its poor performance while in office.
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Its rival is Bulent Ecevit, the very charismatic leader of the RPP in the 
1970s. The SHP/CHP took the fifth place in the 1995 general election.
In the short term, if these conditions continue, it can be argued 
that the fragmentation in the party system of Turkiye will continue 
because the socio-economic conditions will continue to worsen. In the 
light of recent historical patterns of support, we may, therefore, expect 
the rise of a socialist party, the ODP, due to the inadequate response of 
the centre-left parties to changing socio-economic conditions. The rise of 
a socialist party will be a barrier to the further rise of Islamist 
movements and in turn the rise of the RP. The strength of the RP in the 
future also depends on its ability to respond to deteriorating socio­
economic conditions in office. A continuation of the fragmentation of 
the Islamist movement or the rise of fundamentalist factions in the 
party also threaten the RP. Of course, another possibility is its absorption 
by secularism.
Despite having authoritarian regimes in their recent history, the 
parliamentary system in both Spain and Turkiye have been stable in the 
last two decades. The role and power of the heads of states in both 
countries are subject to similar controls as their counterparts in 
developed countries. In addition, the threat of future authoritarian 
regimes, mainly resides in the armed forces, the political power of which 
have decreased in both countries, especially in Spain.
The further development of democratic institutions and greater 
integration of both countries into the democratic countries league, the 
European Union, have led to a weakening of the role and power of the 
armed forces. Furthermore, the election process works well. Since the 
last takeover of power by civilian politicians, regular elections have been 
held in both countries. More importantly, changes of government have 
occurred as a result of these elections. Moreover, in both countries there
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are workers' organisations which have a strong democratic heritage. 
The trade union movements in both countries reflect a Mediterranean* 
type of labour movement with a low overall ratio of union membership 
and considerable fragmentation. Although they are far from being able 
to perform the role played by Scandinavian trade unions in the 
establishment of a social democratic welfare state, they have considerable 
defensive powers which can defend aspects of social citizenship as well 
as civil and political rights
In addition, both Spain and Turkiye have true political parties. 
Both countries are multi party systems. The party system of Turkiye is a 
typical example of a multi-party system. In the party system of Turkiye 
fragmentation has occurred both in the centre-right and in the centre- 
left. In Spain there are two major parties, the PSOE and PP, and minor 
parties* 41. Fragmentation in Spain is due to tensions brought by the 
nationalities question. There are two kinds of left and right parties, ie. 
country-wide-centre-right party and regional centre-right parties.
From my analysis of the development of the political systems in 
both Turkiye and Spain I argue that the political systems are good  
enough  to allow social democratic parties to carry out policies to 
promote social justice. The developmental level of their political 
systems corresponds to the level of their economic and social 
development. Spain is economically and socially more developed than 
Turkiye in terms of its ability to meet goals of social justice. These 
distinctions between Spain and Turkiye become clearer through an 
analysis of economic and social development indicators which are the 
themes of the next chapter.
*By Mediterranean I refer to the countries on the Mediterrannean sea. Their 
characteristics include low ratio of union membership/ fragmented trade union and late  
industrialisation.
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Introduction
In this chapter I shall address the question of whether the social 
and economic development of Spain and Turkiye has reached a level 
which can allow a social democratic party to address social justice issues. 
As I explain in chapter one social democracy of the 1990s retains the 
traditional goal of seeking to create conditions of social justice. While 
contemporary social democracy seeks social justice by different means in 
than in earlier periods, the goal of social justice is unchanged. The means 
to achieve the goal have changed, .as in many cases has the precise 
definition of social justice has changed. In chapter two I examined the 
parliamentary systems of Spain and Turkiye and their democratic 
political institutions. I found that parliamentary systems of both 
countries are developed well enough for social democracy to gain office. 
In this chapter I will analyse their economic and social developmental 
levels. The argument of this chapter is that, while the levels of economic 
and social development of Spain and Turkiye in comparison with three 
developed countries in Europe: Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, 
have considerable areas in need of social democratic reform, the structure 
of the economies allows for a more traditional social democratic alliance 
to develop. The industrial structure of Spain and Turkiye is contrasted 
with the service oriented and emerging "post-industrial" or "post-fordist" 
economies of northern Europe. I will thus examine the contribution of 
major sectors, such as agriculture, industry and services, to total civilian 
employment and GDP. Their wealth, employment structure and lastly 
regional inequality are also examined. In comparing social 
developmental levels, indicators used primarily by social democrats, ie. 
health care and education, are used. Such study relies on analysing two 
indexes published by the UN Development Program, the HDI and GDI
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LEVELS of ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT of SPAIN and TURKIYE
The developmental level of Spain and Turkiye are analysed to 
understand their specific problems in comparison with developed 
northern European social democratic countries, such as Denmark, 
Germany and Netherlands. The contributions of major sectors both to 
GDP and to the total civilian employment of each country, GNP per 
capita, GDP per capita PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), real GDP growth 
rate, labour force participation and unemployment are examined to 
enable a multi layered comparison.
Contributions of sectors to GDP & civilian employment
The contribution of major sectors, such as industry, agriculture and 
the service sector, either to total civilian employment or to GDP, is an 
indicator of the developmental level of a country. The contribution of 
each sector both to GDP and to civilian employment is one of the 
significant differences between developed and developing countries. In 
the developed countries the contribution of services to GDP is high, 
industry is decreasing its contribution from a high point usually achieved 
over two decades ago, while that of agriculture is low. On the other hand, 
in developing countries the contribution of agriculture is high but 
declining, while that of industry is low but often growing. There are 
differences among developing countries as well depending on the 
orientation of the economy: whether investment is export oriented or 
geared to import substitution.
In terms of the contribution of each sector, to civilian 
employment, Turkiye has a profile typical of a newly industrialised 
country. In 1992 the contribution of agriculture to total civilian
employment was 43.9 per cent, while industry was 22.1 per cent and that of 
the service sector was 34 per cent. In contrast the figures in Denmark were 
5.7 per cent, 27.7 per cent and 66.6 per cent respectively. The difference
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between Turkiye and Germany and the Netherlands is much greater, as 
will become apparent below. Agriculture's contribution declined in 
Turkiye 11 per cent from 1980 to 1992. In Turkiye the decline of 
agriculture's contribution has meant a shift in employment to both 
industry and the service sector. In the developed countries industry's and 
agriculture's contribution is declining and employment is growing in the 
service sector.
In terms of the contribution of each sector to the GDP, the 
developmental level of Turkiye is more moderate. Although the 
contribution of agriculture to total civilian employment is the highest 
proportion, agriculture's contribution to the GDP is the lowest. In 1992 
agriculture's contribution to the GDP was 16.6 per cent, industry's 35.4 per 
cent and the service sector's 48.0 per cent. In the light of these figures 
Turkiye demonstrates that it is a country that has recently passed from a pre­
industrial to an industrial country.
Table-Ill/I
Sectoral Contributions
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
Agri- 1980 54.9 19.3 7.1 5.3 4.9
Contri- culture 1992 43.9 10.1 5.7 3.1 4.0
button to Indus 1980 18.9 36.1 30.4 43.7 31.7
civilian try 1992 22.1 32.4 27.7 38.3 24.6
employ- 1980 26.2 44.6 62.4 52.9 63.6
nient % Service 1992 34.0 57.5 66.6 58.5 71.4
Agri 1980 21.7 7.1 4.8 2.1 3.5
Contri- culture 1992 16.6 4.6 3.5 1.3 3.6
button Indus 1980 31.0 38.6 25.0 42.7 31.8
to GDP try 1992 35.4 34.8 23.5 8.2 28.1
% 1980 47.3 54.3 70.2 55.2 63.7
Service 1992 48.0 60.6 73.1 60.5 68.2
(Source: OECD In Figures-188 1994)
Unlike Turkiye, Spain is an industrialised country. In terms of the 
contribution of each sector to total civilian employment, according to 1992 
figures, however, there are still important differences between Spain and 
the developed countries. Agriculture's contribution is 10.1 per cent in 
Spain, while it is 5.7 per cent in Denmark. In comparison to the typical
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share in developed countries agriculture has a very high share in civilian 
employment. Industry's contribution, at 32.4 per cent was higher than 
both Denmark's, 27.7 per cent, and Netherlands', 24.6 per cent. The 
contribution of the service sector in Spain, 57.5 per cent, was only 1 per 
cent less than that in Germany, 58.5 per cent, while it was considerably 
less than that in Denmark, 66.6 per cent, and that in the Netherlands, 71.4 
per cent. In terms of the changing trend of the contribution of each sector 
to civilian employment, Spain shows a similar trend to the developed 
countries. While the contributions of both agriculture and industry 
decline, the contribution of the service sector increases.
In terms of the contribution of major sectors to the GDP of Spain, 
the figures show similar level to those of civilian employment. In the 
light of these figures it can be argued that Spain is an industrialised 
country.
Income
The second criterion used for comparing countries is their GNPs 
(Gross National Products). GNP can be used as an indicator of wealth of a 
country. However, the size of the GNP does not give much information 
about the particular nature of wealth in a country because it is the GNP 
per head of population in the country which makes the amount of the 
GNP for each citizen meaningful. Typically lesser developed countries 
show a low GNP per capita; although this is not always the case. Oil rich 
countries with low populations and high GNPs are often poorly 
developed in terms of the goods and services which are available to the 
general population and wealth is often concentrated in a very few hands 
(eg. Kuwait, Brunei, Saudi Arabia). Hence, while GNP per capita may be a 
useful first indicator more qualitative measures must be used to 
determine the level of development. The rate of change of GNP per
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capita can give a useful index of trends. The GNP per capita of Spain and 
Turkiye in comparison with the developed countries, Denmark, 
Germany and Netherlands, is shown below. As seen in table III/2, GNP 
per capita in the developed countries is higher than those in Spain and 
Turkiye.
Table- III/2
Current GNP Per Capita (US $)
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
1970 400 1,100 3,130 2,860 2,500
1976 1,000 3,060 8,040 7,480 6,850
1980 1,390 5,300 13,120 13,340 12,020
1982 1,290 5,320 12,110 12,270 10,930
1986 1,110 4,840 12,650 11,990 10,040
1988 1,280 7,750 18,540 18,460 14,510
1989(ES) 1,370 9,150 20,510 20,750 16,010
1992 2,030 14,320 26,310 23,360 20,850
(Source: World Tables 1989-90; Human Development Report 1995)
The trend figures are important in this comparison. In 1970 GNP per 
capita in Germany was 7 times higher than that in Turkiye. But the gap 
between them increased to 11.5 times in the 1992. Turkiye has not been 
able to reduce the gap despite considerable growth. The GNP per capita in 
Spain in 1970 was 2.6 times less than that in Germany, while the gap 
between them reduced to 1.63 times in 1992. In this period while Turkiye 
increased its per capita GNP. 5 times Spain increased 13 times.
Real GDP per capita, PPP $
Even if wealth and income distribution figures are used the 
question still arises as to whether GNP per capita is a satisfactory indicator 
of comparative wealth for countries. In many ways it is not a satisfactory 
measure because the level of prices as against wages in each country need 
to be considered if the comparison is to be meaningful. After combining 
the level of prices with GDP per capita there can be found a more 
satisfactory indicator of wealth of a country or a better indicator of the 
living
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standard of people in that country. The method is called Purchasing 
Power Parity12 (PPP), and it takes prices in each country into account when 
finding real GDP per capita. The significance of this measure is illustrated 
by the fact that, according to this method, the gap between Turkiye and 
Germany reduces to three times (see table IH/3). Both Spain and Turkiye 
significantly decrease the gap between them and the developed countries 
in terms of GDP per capita PPP.
Table- m / 3
Real GDP Per Capita (PPP $)
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
1987-a 3,781 8,989 15,119 14,730 12,661
1990-b 4,652 11,723 16,781 18,213 15,695
1990-c 5,020 10,840 15,380 16,290 14,600
1992-d 5,230 13,400 19,080 21,120 17,780
a= actual
(Source: b= Human Development Report 1993,
d= Human Development Report 1995, 
c= World Development Report 1992)
The gap between Turkiye and Germany in 1987 was 3.895 times, it reduced 
to 3.245 in 1990. In the same period the gap between Spain and Germany 
reduced from 1.638 to 1.502 times. In this period in Spain the increase of 
real GDP per capita PPP2 3 was 1.205 times, while in Turkiye it was 1.327 
times.
2 (The purchasing pow er parity (PPP) theory  is a short-cut method of estimating the 
equilibrium exchange rate when a nation has a balance-of-payments disequilibrium. The 
need for such a measurement arises because a nation does not usually have knowledge of the  
exact shape of its demand and supply curves of foreign exchange. Indeed, the theory was 
elaborated and brought forcefully back into use by the Swedish economist Cassel to 
estimate the equilibrium exchange rate et which nations could return to the gold standard 
after the disruption of international trade and the large changes in relative commodity 
prices in the various nations caused by World War I. Of course, under a freely fluctuating 
exchange rate system, there is no need for such a measurement since the exchange rate is 
supposed to automatically gravitate towards the equilibrium rate. There is an absolute and 
relative version of the PPP theory" (Salvatore 1993:473).
3 The examination of the Purchasing Power Parity, see the table in the appendix, in terms 
of different needs, each country provides different level of living standards to its citizens. 
For example, a certain amount of food and beverages and tobacco is U$ 66 in Turkiye, while 
it is 92 U$ in Germany. The gap between Turkiye and Germany is 0.5 times, while in terms 
of real GDP (PPP) the gap is three times. On the other hand, in terms of medical and
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Growth of GDP
An analysis of the growth rate of real GDP shows that the lesser 
developed countries reduced the gap between themselves and the 
developed countries. It is seen that the GDP growth rate of the lesser 
developed countries is not less than those of the developed countries.
Table- ffl/4
Real GDP Growth Rate
Percentage changes from previous period
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
OECD
average
1970-77 6.1 4.7 2.5 ' 2.7 3.3 3.5
1978- 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.0 2.5 4.1
1982- 3.6 1.6 3.0 -0.9 -1.4 -0.1
1986- 7.0 3.2 3.6 2.3 2.7 2.6
1990- 9.3 3.7 1.4 5.7 4.1 2.6
1991- 0.9 2.2 1.3 5.0 2.3 1.0
1992- 6.0 0.7 0.8 2.2 1.3 1.6
1993- 7.5 -1.1 1.5 -1.1 0.4 1.2
1994- -5.4 2.0 4.4 2.9 2.5 2.9
(Source: OECD Outlook- V.57,1995)
However, as seen from the GNP per capita, the gap between the two 
groups has not decreased but has widened in favour of the developed 
countries.
Employment
U nem ploym ent
The unemployment rate is another criterion used for compaiing the 
economic performance of countries. The meaning of unemployment for 
a country is that the country can not use its sources efficiently. There are 
also social effects of unemployment. It can create social problems, such as 
an increasing usage of drugs, alcohol and crime. As I argued in Chapter 
one social democrats, such as C.A.R. Crosland, emphasise the negative 
effects of unemployment on social justice. Many of the social democrats
health care the gap between them is twelve times.
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discussed in chapter one argued that full employment contributes to the 
fulfilment of social justice, because citizenship, taken beyond minimal 
political rights, should entail a right to work (Sayers 1987:17).
In the 1990s, however, it is difficult to distinguish between 
countries in terms of unemployment. As seen from the figures below, 
there are not many differences between the lesser developed and 
developed countries.
Table- m/ 5  
Unemployment Rate
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
OECD
average
1978- 9.8 7.0 7.3 3.7 3.8 5.2
1980- 8.1 11.5 7.0 3.2 4.0 5.7
1982- 7.0 16.4 9.8 6.4 8.5 7.9
1984- 7.6 20.1 10.1 7.9 10.6 7.9
1986- 7.9 21.0 7.8 7.7 8.4 7.8
1988- 8.4 19.5 8.6 7.6 7.8 6.8
1990- 8.0 16.3 9.6 6.2 6.0 6.2
1992- 7.9 18.4 11.2 7.7 5.4 7.6
1993- 8.7 22.7 12.2 8.9 6.5 8.0
1994- 10.9 24.1 12.1 9. 7.5 8.1
(Source: OECD Outlook 1996)
In the 1990s, in all countries except in Spain, the percentage of 
unemployment is similar. The unemployment rate in Denmark is 
higher than that in Turkiye. However, in the future it can be expected 
that there will be higher unemployment in Turkiye because of a 
combination of its young population, its high population growth, rapid 
rate of structural change in its GDP, and changing employment 
opportunities. In other words, more young people will expect work in 
the future. More people will be forced out of agriculture so that the 
number of unemployed people will increase. In Turkiye the 
unemployment rate is very close to the OECD average. Spain has the 
highest unemployment rate, 24.1 per cent in 1994, among OECD 
countries, despite 14 years of socialist government. The high
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unemployment rates in many European countries have a significant 
effect on their ability to achieve social justice goals. Due to high 
unemployment rates in both countries, it cannot be argued that they can 
contribute to the fulfilment of social justice or the requirements of social 
citizenship. But unemployment rates taken on their own can be 
misleading if Labour force participation rates are not considered as well.
Labour force participation rate
To make a satisfactory statement about the state of employment of 
a country and its effect on the fulfilment of social justice, labour force 
participation and unemployment need to be analysed together. This is 
because a low unemployment rate with low labour force participation 
does not contribute to the fulfilment of social justice. In 1993 in Turkiye 
labour force participation is 56.9 per cent and in Spain it is 57.7 per cent, 
while in Denmark it is 81.3 per cent, in Germany 69.7 per cent and in 
Netherlands 60.4 per cent. As seen from the figures below, the rate in 
both Spain and Turkiye is much lower than those in the developed 
countries and the OECD average.
Table- ffl/6
Labour force participation rate
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands OECD
Average
1970-77 71.6 59.8 76.1 68.7 60.3 67.5
1980 68.2 56.3 79.2 68.3 57.7 69.0
1983 62.9 55.8 80.3 67.3 57.4 68.8
1986 60.9 55.8 82.6 68.0 56.4 69.4
1989 59.6 57.3 82.8 68.6 57.4 70.6
1992 56.6 57.5 81.2 69.9 59.6 70.9
1993 56.9 57.7 81.3 69.7 60.4 70.7
(Source: OECD Outlook, 1995 & 1996)
It is also seen that in Turkiye participation declined from 71.6 per cent m 
1970 / 1977 to 56.6 per cent in 1992 and then it slightly increased to 56.9 per 
cent in 1993, while the decline in Spain stopped in the mid-1980s and
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then it slowly increased. The decline in labour force participation in 
Turkiye occurred against the age structure of the Turkish population which 
was younger than it is now. Hie number of people eligible for work at 
60.5 per cent in 1992 is higher than in I960, at 55.1 per cent. The cause of 
the decline in labour force participation in Turkiye is most likely to be a 
result of the decline of agriculture's contribution to total civilian 
employment (see above table HI/1). Not all people who left agriculture 
can return to the labour force in other forms of employment hence, they 
tend to leave the labour market. Most of these people are women. The 
labour force participation of females demonstrates this argument because 
women's labour force participation declined from 37.3 per cent in 1972 to 
33.8 per cent in 1991 (see table m/23).
In summary thus far it can be seen that, in terms of the criteria 
used by UN agencies and the OECD, Spain and Turkiye are less developed 
than Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. The gap between Turkiye 
and the developed countries is obvious. Turkiye is a developing country, 
especially in terms of the contribution of agriculture to total civilian 
employment. The gap is much bigger in terms of current GNP per capita. 
In the comparison of real GDP per capita (PPP $) the gap, however, is less. 
The labour force participation in both Spain and Turkiye is less than 
those in the developed countries. In addition, Spain has huge 
unemployment. It, therefore, cannot be argued that Turkiye and, 
especially Spain, contribute to the fulfilment of the social citizenship 
provisions of social justice goals because of their high unemployment 
and low labour force participation. But overall country comparisons can 
be misleading to a degree if there are considerable regional variations. 
Taking social justice criteria seriously, therefore, involves the study of 
regional disparities.
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REGIONS: Formation and Inequality
Clark has argued that transforming the Spanish state from an 
authoritarian state requires both parliamentary democracy and regional 
autonomy. While many analyses of the restoration of democracy in 
Spain, have highlighted the successful transformation of the political 
institutions of the state from dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy 
headed by a constitutional monarch, such accounts have focussed only on 
the central apparatus of the state in Spain. Equally as significant, 
according to Clark, has been "the transformation of a unitary state into 
one based on seventeen regional governments called Autonomous 
Communities."
One of the central features of post-Franco reforms has been 
devoted to the devolution of increased power, resources, and 
responsibility to Spain's "historic regions" (whose autonomous 
status antedated the Spanish Civil War), as well as other 
regions that gained autonomous status after 1978. Many would 
argue that the gains for the autonomous regions during the late 
1970s were of monumental importance for Spanish politics 
(Clark 1987:139).
Hence, one of the important features of the democratic 
transformation of Spain after the mid-1970s was the establishment of the 
Autonomous Communities and the devolution of some powers of 
central government to them. The Autonomous Communities or regions 
are critical to this section. Regions in Spain and Turkiye are examined 
because they form a primary site of political, cultural and economic 
identification. First, the formation of regions is examined. The causes of 
divisions between regions are not only ethnic divergence but also the 
geographical features of these countries, the historical development of the 
administration systems of these countries, the needs of authoritarian 
regimes and subjective sentiments. Second, the economic developmental
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level of regions is examined. It is found that regions formed around 
nationality questions also have different levels of development. These 
can be the relatively more developed regions in Spain, the Basque 
Country and Catalonia, or the less developed regions in Turkiye, such as 
Eastern Anatolia. Lastly, the process of economic development of regions 
is analysed to examine the effects of central economic policies on the 
development of these regions. I argue that the effects of economic 
policies applied to the East have made it the least developed in Turkiye. 
Regionalism is thus a product of a whole configuration of social, cultural, 
geographic, economic and political factors.
The nationalities question in both Spain and Turkiye has been 
present for many decades and is analysed in chapter four. The question 
arises: why do these countries have such movements? Apart from the 
nationalities question but often related to it are regionalist movements, 
especially in Spain. The formation of regions in both countries is the 
theme of the next section.
The Formation of Regions 
Spain
The causes of the formation of regions in Spain are not only 
cultural, linguistic or racial but there are also geographical and historical 
causes. Hooper argues that it is part of an existential crisis of Europe: to 
some extent, the strength of regional feelings in Spain is simply a 
manifestation of the Mediterranean tendency to subjectiveness (Hooper 
1995:371). People give first priority to their patria chia, little fatherland, 
and then to their regions. The State comes after all these (Hooper 
1995:372). Hooper adds to this subjective or physiological explanation a 
physical cause, mountains between regions are another cause for the 
formation of regions, as he argues:
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apart from being a formidable obstacle to communication between 
the people of the periphery, it is itself rive by a succession of mountain 
ranges -those East and West ramparts- as Laurie Lee called them, 
which go ranging across Spain and divide its people into separate 
races (Hooper 1995:372).
Barton4 agrees with Hooper about the effects of the geography of Spain on 
the formation of regions.
The political and economic causes of the formation of separate 
regions in Spain can be found in. the course of its history (Barton 
1993:107). Hooper argues that the Muslim invasion was influential in the 
formation of regions: "the Muslim invasion shattered the tentative unity 
that had been achieved by the Visigoths" (Hooper 1995:374). When the 
Muslims invaded Iberia, unification of regions in other countries of 
Europe began. "The arrival of Muslims also put paid to any hope of a 
single language5... Galician, Babel (language of Asturia), Castilian, 
Aragonese, and Catalan..." (Hooper 1995:375) all flourished. The Muslim 
invasion finished in 1492 by occupation of the Kingdom of Granada, the 
last Muslim stronghold on the Peninsula (Hooper 1995:377). However, 
Barton argues that the control achieved earlier by both the Romans and 
Visigoths was very limited:
But if, as some historians have asserted, the administrative and 
cultural unity imposed by Rome over the peninsula seems in 
some way to presage the subsequent political unification of 
Spain, recent studies have sought to emphasise the limitations 
of their control... For one thing, we are told, the patina of 
Roman culture was not spread evenly across the peninsula and
4 Barton argues that "the physical divisions have endowed the peninsula with an 
astonishing regional diversity with the result that even if political unity has been 
frequently held up by some as a natural goal, Spain's 'geographical handicap', as Sanchez- 
Albomoz once referred to it, has in fact tended to encourage the development of regionalist 
and separatist movements" (Barton 1993:106).
5 Hooper suggests that "today almost a quarter of Spain's inhabitants speak a vernacular 
language in addition to, or instead of the official language of the State" (Hooper 1995:375).
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in some areas, notably in the mountainous districts of Galicia, 
Asturias, Cantabria and the Basque country, tribal organisation 
seems largely to have remained in place (Barton 1993:112).
Recent research suggests that despite the centralising efforts of the 
Visigothic regime it retained all the fragility and decentralising 
tendencies of the Roman Hispana before it (Barton 1993:114).
Although the political unification of Spain was completed, the 
national unification of Spain was not (Barton 1993:107; Perez-Diaz 
1993:194). Thompson claims that the contribution of the union of Castile 
and Aragon to cultural as much as political and economic unity was very 
limited. He argues that even "the idea of community as a national 
entity" was little developed not only in attempting to form a "union of 
the crowns, but also in regard to the component kingdoms of the crown 
of Castile itself" (Thompson 1995:127). It is explicit that Castile itself 
opposed the process of true political and economic unionisation of Spain. 
As Thompson argues:
Equally consistent was the belief, enunciated in a particularly 
unambiguous manner by a royal councillor of Castile early in 
the reign of Philip IV, restating what the Comuneros and the 
Cortes had asserted a hundred years before, that The taxes that 
are imposed should be for the defence of the province that pays 
them, and for its own ends, and not to subsidise other princes, 
or even for other associated kingdoms even if they belong to the 
same king" (Thompson 1995:130-131).
Thompson argues6 the other kingdoms under the union were treated as 
foreigners (Thompson 1995:132)7. As illustrated above, the political
6 He also argues that: "it is much more common in the seventeenth century than in the 
sixteenth to find the kingdom divided into Old Castile, New Castile and Andalucia, and 
for a little' Castile to be spoken of as apart from some of the component parts of a 'greater' 
Castile, such as Asturias and Galicia. Dominguez Oritz talks of an 'Andalusian front' in the 
Cortes in the seventeenth century; but equally there are indications of a Castilian front, and 
the hostility of Old Castile to Andalucia in the Cortes is apparent" (Thompson 1995:154).
7 Thompson argues that "Alongside the unrestrained enthusiasm for peninsular unity 
expressed in certain political and cultural quarters in the later fifteenth century, there was
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unification of Spain was very limited, because even the leader of the 
Union contributed to the continuation of small kingdoms, which are the 
basis of today's regions.
Along with Castile's nullification of any movement toward a true 
unification of Spain, political and economic divisions were apparent in 
Castile itself (Newton 1983:100). Thompson argues that Castile was itself 
a composite kingdom within a monarchy that was itself an aggregate of 
monarchies. Castile performed the functions of both a core kingdom and 
the ruler of an empire brought together during the course of the 
Reconquest. It was created by aggregating conquered lands within a 
defined territory. However, indistinct political, legal, cultural and 
historical identities which had been partially submerged in the process of 
conquest and resettlement remained. Due to the open-ended nature of 
the Reconquista:
the protracted indefiniteness of the extent and the limits of the 
territory of the crown of Castile, compared with the kingdoms 
of the crown of Aragon, the accretion of successive layers of 
space external to the core kingdom but themselves emotionally 
void of political personality, ruptured the territorial coincidence 
between community loyalty and political obedience. A clear 
vision of Castilianism was therefore blurred by this parallax 
between a core and an extended Castile. Eight kingdoms 
continued to be individually represented in the Castilian Cortes 
(Castile, Leon, Toledo, Murcia, Cordoba, Jaen, Seville, Granada) 
and even in the early sixteenth century it was common to refer 
pluralistically to 'the crown of the kingdoms of Castile, and of 
Leon and of Granada' (Thompson 1995:136).
The politically, economically and culturally divergent state of Spain 
created in these open-ended political arrangements continued until the 
start of the industrialisation in Spain.
an equally pronounced sense of Castilian territoriality, in which the Aragonese were 
regarded as no less foreign than Gascons and Navarrese (Thompson 1995:132).
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The restructuring of military organisation in the 17th century had 
its effect on the development of both provincialism8 and regionalism. 
Thompson9 argues the growth of regionalism was also related to 
developments in military organisation and "the course of military events 
in the seventeenth century which tended to enhance provincialism and 
to create new institutional forms for the expression of provincial 
sentiment". The integration of the monarchy as a whole was thus 
undermined by the exigencies of the military organisation which was 
meant to facilitate it (Thompson 1995:152). This was because the structure 
of military organisation both reflected and contributed to the political 
and economically divergent nature of the state in Spam. It is a very 
important cause for the formation of regions in Spain, especially that of 
Extremadura.
The politically and economically divergent state of Spain originates 
because regions possessed special 'political faculties and economic 
privileges'. Hooper claims that under the Habsburg and Bourbon
8 Thompson also argues that "the prevalent sense of community in Castile was civic rather 
than national; Castile was a community of substantial, semi-independent cities and towns, 
not (at least until the eighteenth century) dominated, as Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon, 
by a single mega-capital city. That structure as a community of cities was embodied in the 
composition of the Cortes" (Thompson 1995:137).
9 Thompson continues, "the squadrons, paid and fitted out by the provinces, were to sail 
under the province's name, be commanded by native generals, admirals and captains, 
manned by native seamen, winter in their own province, and, in the Galician case at least, 
serve provincial interests. The net effect, it was recognised, by shaking natives out into 
their own provincial squadrons, was to provincialise the entire Armada and to weaken the 
specifically royal component in the fleet. Similarly, territorial defence and the problems 
of military recruitment were leading towards a similar sort of provincialisation... 
Moreover, the very experience of war, especially of front-line provinces like Galicia, 
Extremadura and Andalucia, sharpened their sense of separateness from parts of the 
kingdom less burdened and less ravaged. Army structure tended to reinforce this 
separateness by taking on provincial forms and imposing a further institutional definition 
on the sense of region. Significantly, it was as provinces that Galicia and Extremadura, by 
financial contributions to the war effort, acquired their votes in the Cortes, the purchase 
and cooperation both definition of regionality and an expression of regional solidarity. But 
everywhere the intolerable burdens of war forced localities to think first themselves and 
of what was best for themselves and their regions, rather than of the generality" 
(Thompson 1995:153).
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monarchs, who ruled Spain from the beginning of the sixteenth century 
until the end of the eighteen century...
several regions, which had been once independent, enjoyed 
political faculties and economic privileges that seriously limited 
the power of the central government and made the 
construction of the modern state virtually impossible (Hooper 
1995:379-380).
The effects of these privileges on the formation of regions and of regional 
consciousness were very important. For example, the economic 
privileges of Navarre were to continue even under the Franco regime. 
These privileges divided the Basque home-land into the two 
Autonomous Communities, Navarre and the Basque Country. Regions 
have been very jealous of these privileges and any attempt at annulling 
them was a cause of rebellion in the regions (Hooper 1995:379).
It should be noted that the better organised forces seeking 
autonomy in Spain could achieve 'home rule' status long before the 
democratic transformation of the Spanish state in the 1970s. Under the 
Second Republic, some of these autonomous communities, such as 
Catalonia, Basques and Galicia, were granted 'home rule statutes10'. 
Hence, today's division of the Spanish state into the Autonomous 
Communities is not simply a phenomenon of the 1970s but its roots go 
back to the Second Republic.
Apart from the effects of political and economic factors on the
formation of regions, colonial sentiments against some regions were also
a crucial cause. The 'undercurrent of discontent' in Catalonia and the
Basque Country had effects on the development of regions and on the
regional consciousness in these regions. Hooper claims that
10 Hooper argues that "When the Monarchy was once again overthrown m 1931, the 
pressure for home rule was immense. The Catalans were granted a Statute of Autonomy m 
1932, while the Basques and the Galicians were granted on the verge of gaming a limited 
form of home rule when civil war broke out again in 1936" (Hooper 1995:382).
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the Bourbon Felipe V who emerged as the victor from the War 
of Succession punished Catalans, Aragonese and Valencians who 
had supported his opponent by annulling their laws and 
institutions and thus creating within the Catalan speaking part of 
Spain an undercurrent of discontent that has persisted to this day 
(Hooper 1995:380).
Like Catalans, Basques11 have had the same feelings. This psychological 
factor forced people of these regions to think that they have been treated 
differently and thus they have similar interests or feelings. When these 
feelings are combined with the cultural divergence of people living in 
those areas from the rest of the people in the country, the areas inevitably 
become regions.
Industrialisation1 2 has also affected the nationalities question. 
Early industrialisation of some regions, such as the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, in comparison with other parts of Spain is another reason for 
differential ethnic nationalist consciousness. It, however, can not be 
argued that early industrialisation is a single cause by itself; it becomes an 
important cause when it coincides with ethnic differences, such as those 
of the Basques and Catalans.
The effects of early industrialisation in some regions on the 
formation of today's regions becomes obvious when it coincides with 
unequal development13 among regions (Newton 1983:101). In other 
words, in Spain unequal development of regions is another cause of the 
formation of separate regions. As will be examined later, the economic
11 Hooper argues that "When Carlism was finally defeated in the 1870s the central 
government penalised the Basques, including the large section of the community which had 
stayed loyal to the central government, by annulling their traditional rights and 
privileges" (Hooper 1995:381).
12 Hooper argues that "...these two parts of Spain, the Basques and the Catalans, were the 
first to become industrialised and were therefore the earliest to nurture a substantial 
middle class of the kind which, in many parts of the World, had been eager to support 
nationalist aspirations (Hooper 1995:382).
13 This cause is very important in Turkiye as well.
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developmental level of some regions, such as Catalonia, Basque country 
and Balearic Islands, are similar to Europe's post industrial countries, 
while those of some others are well below the Spanish average. The 
unequal developmental level of regions is illustrated by the unequal 
distribution of GDP per capita between the regions. For example, GDP per 
capita income is 112.7 in Catalonia, while it is 75.1 in Andalucia; Spain's 
average is 100. The inequality between regions contributes to regional 
consciousness in both rich and poor regions.
Authoritarian regimes also contributed to the formation of regions. 
As Hooper suggests/ ’Franco's centralism’ was another factor for the 
formation of regions in Spain: "indeed, such was the intransigence of 
Franco's centralism that it succeeded in creating nationalist groups in 
areas such as Extremadura and Murcia where no one had previously 
questioned their Spanishness" (Hooper 1995:383). The regionalising 
effects of authoritarian governments were further aided by their 
assimilation policies toward ethnic nationalities. This was most obvious 
in the Franco era for Catalans and Basques. The Franco regime had 
banned the cultures of these 'historical communities'. As Zaldivar and 
Castells argue this was against the tradition in Spain:
Over the centuries Spain was built out of a national, linguistic 
and institutional diversity. Even under the system of national 
unity created by the Catholic Monarchs, a variety of regional 
privileges remained, including those of Aragon, Catalonia, 
Navarre, Ala va, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya; and there was rich 
cultural variety including Celtic elements in Galicia, and links 
with the Caribbean in the Canary Islands. Repeated attempts in 
Spanish history to abolish the fueros and unify institutions and 
cultures by force (attempts that were successful in other 
European countries, France for example) ran up against deep 
popular feeling, and in the nineteenth century, against a 
movement among bourgeoisie and middle classes of Catalonia 
and Euskadi (Basque Country) for separation from a central 
State remote from their history and social interests (Zaldivar & 
Castells 1992:145).
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Due to the pressure on the ethnic nationalities and the banning of their 
languages, names and the practice of culture, ethnic consciousness has 
developed among members of the ethnic nationalities. Furthermore, this 
factor has contributed to the worsening of the nationalities question in 
Turkiye.
Turkiye
In Turkiye14, unlike in Spain, there are no political regions. 
Regionalism is not institutionalised in the constitution and in political 
organisations as it is in Spain. The centre has always had doubts about 
devolving its authority not only to local governments but also to 
peripheral organisations. This scepticism becomes more obvious in the 
case of ethnic identity because devolving power to ethnic identities is 
reminiscent of the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. The structure 
of the Turkish state is, therefore, very centralised and there are no 
political or administrative regions. The basis of today's regions in 
Turkiye, such as the Mediterranean, Aegean, Black Sea, Marmara, Central 
Anatolia, East Anatolia, and South East Anatolia region, is geographical. 
These are neither cultural, historical, nor administrative regions. . .
In terms of levels of economic development and ethnic division, 
however, Turkiye can be divided into regions. For example, although 
Kurds reside in all parts of Turkiye, they constitute a majority of the 
population in both Eastern and South East Anatolia. Due to the ethnic 
differences of the East from the rest of Turkiye, the East can be considered 
as a separate region, like the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain.
14 It has to be mentioned that as Oslon argues that in 1921 in the TBMM a decision on giving 
Kurds an autonomous area which includes Tunceli, Elazig, Diyarbakir, Bingol, Mus, Bitlis, 
Batman, Siirt, Mardin, Hakkari and some parts of Malatya and Adiyaman was taken. The 
decision was revised in 1924 just before Sheikh Said rebellion, but still it has not been put 
into practice.
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During the Ottoman Empire the administration of Eastern Anatolia was 
left to 'Agas'15 (feudal) forces in the East. This kind of administration 
continued until the establishment of the Republic. The young Turkish 
state had to fight the Kurdish nationalist movement. However, the new 
Turkish state allowed feudalism to exist in the East and at times 
collaborated with some feudal remnants to suppress rebellions.
The level of development of the East, as will become more evident 
below, is considerably less than the rest of Turkiye. The unequal level of 
development of the region has strengthened the development of the 
Kurdish movement. The underdevelopment of the region leads people 
to think that they are treated differently from the rest of country. When 
these feelings coincide with ethnic difference, regional consciousness and 
ethnic nationalism, begin to rise.
The Economic Development Process of Regions 
Spain
One of the main problems in Spain is the unequal economic 
development of regions. Development of some regions, such as the 
Basque country and Catalonia, is similar to those of the developed 
countries in Europe, while those of some regions, such as Extremadura 
and Galicia, is considerably lower than the Spanish average. The 
question arises why some regions in Spain are more developed than 
others? The question can be analysed from the case of either developed 
regions or of less developed regions. In other words, both the causes of 
early development of rich and industrialised regions and the causes of
15 Some feudal own thirty o forty villages. They can more importantly manipulate voters 
in their villages. In other words, the success of a party, for example the DYP, depends cn 
its relations with the Agas. There is no need to work on voters in these villages. If the DYP 
convinced two or three Agas, it would take first place in that province.
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less development of relatively poor and less industrialised regions are 
examined.
The geographical position of regions contributed to the early 
development of some regions. Harrison argues that the opportunity 
which provinces in the periphery have had to trade with foreign markets 
opened the way for them to develop. Hence:
... the Basque provinces owed their industrial and commercial 
fortunes to their geographical situation on the main trade route 
between central Spain and northern Europe (Harrison 1978:15).
By being on the periphery, these regions16 had an opportunity that the 
others did not. This geographical opportunity would also create other
opportunities, such as very early construction of railways by foreign 
investors in these areas.
The construction of railways in Spain accelerated the early 
development of the regions on the periphery and in turn contributed to 
unequal development between regions. Railway construction linked the 
Spanish market to 'advanced capitalist nations of .: Western Europe'. 
Harrison argues that
The most deleterious effects of the railway building program 
were that by entrusting the construction of the Spanish network 
to foreign companies, each with its own conception of what most 
beneficial to them, the Progressives and their successors 
ensured the economic colonisation of Spain by European 
capitalism. Instead of connecting the industrial producers with 
the consuming public in the formation of a national market, 
the lines built by Pereires, Rothschild and Pros-Gilhou for the 
most part radiated from Madrid to the ports and the French 
frontier. Areas with little to offer to the great foreign 
enterprises in terms of foodstuffs or raw materials, such as
16 Like the Basque provinces, "the initial expansion of the Catalan industry depended an 
the existence of a prosperous regional market in agricultural products. But m the second 
half of the century Catalan manufacturers came to rely on Spain's American colonies, 
which provided a vigorous and expanding market for their products (Harrison 19 8. )
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Galicia, had very poor connections with the rest of Spain, while 
Almeria in the south east had none at all (Harrison 1978:52-53).
Here lies another cause of unequal economic development between 
regions in Spain: economic colonisation of Spain by other European 
countries. In the process of economic colonisation, foreign investors 
invested only in those regions which were profitable to foreign rather 
than national interests. Foreign investment had little to offer to the 
construction of the national market. Thus foreign investment has 
contributed to unequal development between regions in Turkiye. 
Regions, such as Extremadura and Galicia, which had to rely on 'deficient 
internal trade' within a poor market lost out (Harrison 1978:15). The 
more there were positive effects stemming from geographical position for 
some regions to develop, the more the negative effects of geography 
impeded development in other regions.
The distribution of land among agricultural families has also 
impeded the economy of some regions. Harrison argues that "... poor 
agricultural productivity, which resulted in chronically low per capita 
incomes among rural consumers, in turn put the brakes on industrial 
development" (Harrison 1993:14). In southern Spain "large estates" 
which control "one per cent of all holdings still occupy 49 per cent of the 
cultivated land surface" (Harrison 1978:160). At the other end of the 
spectrum is Galicia which is a classic example of "an area of small 
holdings ... in the north western corners of the Peninsula, whose land 
surface is divided into 15 million parcels" (Harrison 1978:5). The negative 
effects of the distribution of land on the unequal development between 
regions can be reversed by the economic policies applied to these regions.
National economic policies have also strengthened unequal 
development between regions. Such policies can affect the development
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of regions either by accelerating inequality between regions or by reducing 
the inequality. Payne argues that the relative neglect of the rural 
economy is not just a measure of "the influence of wealthy landowners 
in blocking reforms":
but also (due) to the fact that Franco's government, like most 
twentieth century authoritarian states, has been much more 
attracted by the glamorous goal of accelerating industrial growth 
than by the prosaic tasks of reorganising peasant agriculture (Payne 
1967:55).
The evidence gathered by Payne shows that relatively less developed 
areas were neglected by the Franco regime. The growth of each sector 
during the 1960s, lends weight to his argument. For example, between 
1960 and 1973 the growth rate of industry was 10.2 per cent, services 6.7 
per cent and agriculture 2.3 per cent, while average growth was 7.2 % 
(Harrison 1993:23). Neglect of agriculture as a result of national economic 
policy contributed to inequality between regions in favour of the early 
developed regions. National economic policies also contributed to 
inequality between regions in Turkiye.
In Spain inequality between regions declined in the 1980s. As 
Beltran argues, between 1983 and 1987 there was a significant equalising 
process. During this term, as seen in table-ffi/7, all relatively poor 
regions, except Galicia, grew at a rate above the Spanish average. The 
growth rate17 was 6.9 per cent in Extremadura, 4.4 per cent in Castilla La 
Mancha and 4.0 per cent in Andalucia. In the second term between 1985 
and 1989, however, only Andalucia grew (4.9 per cent, above the average, 
4.7 per cent) while Extremadura, Galicia and Castilla La Mancha grew but 
did not meet the average. OECD figures between 1986 and 1990, table- 
m/8 ,  show that both Andalucia and Castilla La Mancha grew above the
17 See appendix for sectoral distribution of the growth.
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country's average, while Galicia and Extremadura did not meet the 
average. The reduction of the gap between rich and poor regions can also 
be seen from the increase of real GDP per capita in each region.
Table-III/7
Real Rates of Growth in GDP,
Región 1983-87 1985-89 Region 1983-87 1985-89
Extremadura 6.9 3.9 G alicia 3.2 4.0
Canarias 6.2 5.5 N avarra 3.1 5.0
Baleares 5.3 5.9 Madrid 2.7 4.6
Murcia 5.2 5.4 Cataluña 2.6 5.0
Castilla-La Mancha 4.4 4.3 Asturias 1.8 2.9
V alencia 4.1 5.4 La Rioja 1.4 5.0
Andalucia 4.0 4.9 Euskadi 1.3 3.7
Castilla-Y León 3.1 4.0 Cantabria 1.1 4.7
Spain average 3.3 4.7 Aragon 3.1 5.1
(Source: 1983-1987 Beltran 1993:227; & 1985-1989 Zaldivar & Castells 1992:155)
The gap between rich and poor regions in terms of real GDP per 
capita decreased in the 1980s. As seen from graph-III/2, the ratio between 
the richest region, Balearic Islands, and the poorest, Extremadura, was 
1.790:1 in 1985 and it reduced to 1.765:1 in 1990. A comparison of real GDP 
per capita of each region with the EC's average shows that the inequality 
between regions decreased in the 1980s. The argument is valid either for 
the gap between Spain's average and relatively poor regions or for the gap 
between rich and poor regions. TableTH/8 shows that Spain was more 
egalitarian in the 1980s than in the 1960s. For example, the ratio of 
inequality for Extremadura was 1.608:1 in 1960 and it reduced to 1,532:1 in 
1989. The reduction is more obvious for Galicia and Castilla La Mancha. 
Moreover, the ratio of inequality between the richest and the poorest 
regions dropped in the 1980s. The ratio of inequality for Extremadura in 
1960 was 2,698:1, while it dropped to 2,180:1 in 1989. For Galicia the ratio 
was 2,421:1 and 1,765:1 respectively. For Castilla La Mancha it was 2,520:1 
and 1,791:1 respectively, while for Andalucia it is 2,404:1 and 1,990.1
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respectively. Table III/8 shows that, in the 1980s, relatively poorer regions 
also reduced the gap between them and the EC average.
Table-ni/8
Relative GDP per capita of Regions compared with EC, 1960-1989
_______________ _________ (Average EC = 100)_______________
Regions 1960 1964 1975 1985 1989
Baleares 66.5 88.7 95.2 107.4 107.5
Madrid 81.4 97.5 104.4 94.6 96.3
Cataluña 86.4 101.0 102.7 88.9 94.7
N avarra 69.2 84.4 90.3 78.8 86.0
Aragón 63.3 ■ 70.8 80.8 79.8 85.1
Basque Country 99.3 109.3 109.9 81.1 83.7
La Rioja 68.2 79.7 82.5 78.6 82.8
C. of Valencia 70.3 69.4 81.7 76.5 81.8
Total 59.2 68.3 80.4 71.8 76.0
Canarias 45.4 52.5 63.2 66.2 73.9
Cantabria 80.6 86.8 83.4 70.6 72.5
Asturias 69.7 71.6 84.4 68.9 72.4
Castilla Y León 47.3 60.7 69.0 64.4 68.3
Murcia 45.4 49.2 68.3 60.2 64.8
Galicia 41.0 47.5 60.1 57.1 60.9
Castilla-La Mancha 39.4 46.3 62.6 55.2 60.0
Andalucia 41.3 44.8 58.7 50.9 54.0
Extremadura 36.8 36.6 47.2 47.2 49.3
(Source: Zaldivar & Castells 1992:333)
Therefore credit can be given to the Socialists for the reduction of 
the gap between regions in the 1980s in Spain, because they were in office 
during this term. They have used the 'Inter-regional Compensation 
Fund18 (Fondo de Compensación Inter-territorial /FCIY effectively to 
reduce the gap between rich and poor regions. The fund19 was designed 
in the Constitution to help disparate regions. In the 1980s the relatively 
poorer regions were given more funds than other regions. As a result, it
18 Donaghy and Newton argue that "Article 157.1 of the Constitution also foresaw the 
creation of an Inter-regional Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Inter-territorial 
/FCI) as a means of ensuring adequate finances for the disparate regions. This has now 
begun to function and the intention is that a minimum of thirty per cent of the amount 
designated by the state for public investment should be channelled to the regions in 
accordance with a 'needs' formula based on population density, income, emigration and 
unemployment levels inter alia. In 1985 Andalucia and Galicia received by far the highest 
proportion of the fund, twenty-seven per cent and ten per cent respectively" (Donaghy & 
Newton 1987:106).
19 see appendix for distribution of the fund between regions.
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can be argued that the Socialist governments in Spain contributed to the 
reduction of inequality between regions.
Turkiye
In Turkiye, unlike in Spain, inequality between regions has 
increased. Moreover, inequality between regions in Turkiye is worse 
than that in Spain. The formation of inequality between regions in 
Turkiye has similar causes to that in Spain. Increasing inequality has 
origins which began with colonisation of the Ottoman Empire by 
European countries. Sonmez argues that
when Europe started to colonise the Ottoman Empire, they chose 
areas which were most beneficial to them. In 18th and 19th 
centuries Europeans, especially French and British, built railway  ̂for 
foodstuff and raw materials. These areas were also a market for 
them (Sonmez 1990:73-74).
Hence, in a process similar to that in Spain, foreign interests dictated 
where essential infrastructure would develop rather than national 
interests. Railways were built primarily to service foreign market 
interests and to exploit Turkish resources. As a result the interests of 
regions and the national economy suffered. The railway arrived in 
Eastern Anatolia in 1928. The railway between the eastern end of Eastern 
Anatolia to the West Anatolia was completed in 1955.
Geographical and topographical conditions have also played an 
important part in regional development. One of the causes of the early 
development of Marmara is its climate and its prosperous cultivated 
land. While the East has very hard winters and dry summers, the West 
has a typical Mediterranean climate. Eastern Anatolia also consists of 
very high mountains; the average height is around 1,226 metres above sea 
level (Sonmez 1990:256). Geography results in a very poor market in the
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East, while it results in productive agriculture in the West. However, it 
has to be mentioned that until the 1960s the productivity of the East had 
been equal to Turkiye's average. Since the 1960s, the productivity of the 
East has dropped in comparison with the rest of Turkiye (Sonmez 
1990:164-201).
Table- ffl/9
East Anatolia and Agricultural Population
Area









The proportion of the population which depends on agriculture in 
Eastern Anatolia is considerably above Turkiye's average. While 78.6 per 
cent of the population in the East depends on agriculture, the average is 
58.9 per cent in Turkiye. This very high proportion of the population 
relying on agricultural income results in low per capita income in Eastern 
Anatolia and in turn poor markets. Against these obvious negative 
conditions of the East, the question arises whether this process could have 
been reversed by economic policies, or how could national economic 
policies affect the development of the East?
The application of national economic policies , in Eastern Anatolia 
is another cause of its under development. After the establishment of 
Modern Turkish State, as Sonmez argues, Eastern Anatolia was seen as 
'Turkiye's farm'. Furthermore, he argues the necessary policies to put a 
brake on the vicious circle of poverty in the East were not implemented 
(Sonmez 1990:152). Graph-III/3 shows that the contribution of agriculture 
to the GDP of the East is 46.2 per cent, while that in Marmara is only 7.9 
per cent. The contribution of industry is 10.5 per cent in the East, while it 
is 33.7 per cent in Marmara (Sonmez 1990:152). In Turkiye, as in Spain
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during the Franco era "...in fast growth years of 1960s and 1970s, industry 
which is the locomotive of growth was concentrated on regions other 
than the Eastern Anatolia either by private hands or by the state" 
(Sonmez 1990:156). For example, investment in the East concentrated on 
the energy and mining areas. But, as Sonmez argues/ "both energy and 
mining were necessary for the industry in the West more than that in the 
East". Therefore, the national government addressed the needs of the West 
rather than those of "the East when making investment in the East" (Sonmez 
1990:157).
Table-111/10









Istanbul 7.40 8.30 5.80 3.80
Marmara 11.70 12.00 12.00 15.70
East 11.85 11.92 7.11 7.20
Sectoral Distribution of investment made inthe East
Energy 24.1 40.0 16.0 19.8
Mine 9.6 5.0 4.0 11.8
Agriculture 13.2 14.6 9.4 8.4
Manufacturing 8.0 11.0 27.4 23.2
Transportation 11.2 7.3 13.6 8.0
H ealth 5.0 3.0 2.9 2.5
Education 17.0 11.8 15.0 11.3
Others 11.9 6.3 11.7 15.0
(Source: Sonmez 1990:158)
The data in table HI/10 proves this argument. The general decline of 
investment in the East reflects the drop in energy and mining, (the drop 
between plan I. and plan II. and plan III. and planlV). The drop in energy 
and mining investment from plan II. to plan HI. was 26 per cent, during 
the same period the total drop in investment was 4.81 per cent. As a 
result, it can be argued that the economic policies applied to the East could 
not help break the vicious circle of under development of the region.
Besides these policies, foreign investors contributed to the under 
development of the East by investing in the Marmara region. In 1972 74.5
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per cent of all foreign firms in Turkiye were in the Marmara and 58.0 per 
cent of them were in Istanbul. In terms of capital investment, these 
figures are 85.7 per cent and 49.7 per cent of capital invested respectively.
Table-m/U
The Distribution of Foreign Firms to regions, 1972
A rea Foreign Investment Turkiye Share of foreign
Firms Capital total capital in total (%)
Istanbul 64 59,404 1,231,426 39.5
M armara 82 102,407 2,230,043 42.1
Turkiye 110 119,520 2,591,820 41.4
Marmara /  Turkiye 74.5 85.7 86.0 41.1
Istanbul /  Turkiye 58.0 49.7 47.5 39.5
(Source: Sonmez 1990:57)
In a process similar to that I identified in Spain before the 1980s, a 
combination of national economic policies and the actions of foreign 
investors contributed to a vicious circle of unequal development between 
regions in Turkiye. .
The Economic Structure of the Regions 
Spain
After analysing both the formation and the process of development 
of regions, an analysis of the current level of their development is 
necessary to identify the social justice issues involved for any 
contemporary social democratic program. It is necessary, moreover, 
because the level of development of regions has significant effects on 
nationalities questions such as the 'undercurrent of discontent in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia and in the East in Turkiye.
We might recall that I have demonstrated that Spain consists of 17 
Autonomous Communities and two provinces. The level of 
development of these regions differs. The difference can be seen through 
either population density, or the regional structure of employment as 
well as relative GDP per capita levels. The data in table-HI/12 shows that
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population density (population/regional area) is very high in Madrid, 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, Valencia and Canary Islands, while it is 
relatively low in Extremadura, Castilla La Mancha, Castilla Y Leon and 
Aragon.
Table-m/12














Andalucía 17.3 17.8 13.4 888
Canary Islands 1.4 3.8 3.8 1,180
Catalonia 6.3 15.5 18.8 1,435
Valencia 4.6 9.8 18.8 . 1,435
G alicia 5.8 7.2 5.5 901
Aragon 9.4 3.1 3.4 1,295
Asturias 2.1 2.9 2.8 1,122
Balearic Islands 1.0 1.8 2.3 1,525
Cantabria 1.0 1.4 1.3 1,157
Castilla - Leon 18.7 6.8 6.1 1,057
Castilla - La - Mancha 15.7 4.4 3.7 990
Extremadura 8.2 2.9 1.9 764
Madrid 1.6 12.6 16.0 1,498
Murcia 2.2 2.6 2.6 1,150
La Rioja 1.0 0.7 0.7 1,276
N avarra 2.1 1.3 1.7 1,532
Basque Country 1.4 5.5 6.5 1,400
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain 1993)
The regions that have a high population density, the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Communidad Valencia also are amongst the most 
industrialised regions in Spain. The contribution of industry to total
civilian employment of these regions (graph-III/1) is considerably 
higher than the Spanish average. The contribution of agriculture to total 
civilian employment in Catalonia at 3.7 per cent, and in the Basque 
Country at 2.9 per cent, is similar, while that in Valencia, at 8.4 per cent, is 
relatively higher, but it is lower than the average of 10.7 per cent. The 
contribution of service sector to civilian employment of these regions is 
also similar, slightly lower than the average of 56.3 per cent. The last 
mentioned regions are two of the most industrialised in Spain.
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(Compiled from OECD Economic Surveys-Spain 1993)
In regions with relatively low population density, Extremadura, 
Castilla La Mancha, Castilla Y Leon, the contribution of agriculture to 
total civilian employment is higher than the average for Spain as a 
whole. The highest contribution is in Galicia with 30.2 per cent. The 
contribution of industry to civilian employment in these regions is well 
below the average of 22.9 per cent. In Castilla La Mancha, however, the 
contribution of industry is 22.7 per cent. Only in the Canary Islands, 
where the contribution of the service sector to civilian employment of 
the region is very high at 73.2 per cent is the contribution of industry 
lower than that of the regions. These are the less industrialised regions in 
Spain.
Examining the contribution of the service sector to civilian 
employment shows that the regions with the highest average of service 
sector employment are also amongst the rich regions, especially Madrid 
and Baleares. But the rule does not apply in the Canary Islands and 
especially in Andalucia. Andalucia is amongst the poorer regions, while 
Canarias is a middle-ranking region. In these regions the higher
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contribution to employment of the service sector is due to the tourist 
sector. The contribution of the service sector to civilian employment in 
relatively poor regions differs. Galicia has the lowest proportion followed 
by Castilla La Mancha, while Castilla Y Leon and Extremadura have 
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Turkiye
Eastern Anatolia is the least developed region in Turkiye. With its 
16.9 per cent of total population of Turkiye in 1985 (Sonmez 1990:259) it 
covers 27.8 per cent of total area of Turkiye (Sonmez 1990:255). The ratio 
of population/total area of the region is 0.607. The population density of 
the East is considerably lower than that of the West. The East is also less 
urbanised than the West. In the mid-1980s the urban population in 
Eastern Anatolia was 41 per cent, while the Turkish average was 53.0 per 
cent (Sonmez 1990:260). .
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An examination of the contribution of each sector to the GDP of 
each region shows that Marmara is an industrialised region, while the 
East is a pre-industrial region.
Graph-Ill/3
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(Compiled from Sonmez 1990:152)
The contribution of agriculture to the GDP of the East is 46.2 per cent 
whilst it is only 7.9 per cent in Marmara. The contribution of industry to 
the GDP of these regions is 10.5 per cent and 33.7 per cent respectively 
(Sonmez 1990:152).
The inequality between the East and the rest of Turkiye is 
illustrated by the contribution of each region to the GNP of Turkiye. The 
share of the East to the GNP of Turkiye has declined since 1965. Its share 
was 10.39 per cent in 1965 and it declined to 8.17 per cent in 1979 and to 
7.68 per cent in 1986. As mentioned above, although the East has 16.9 per 
cent of the population, its share of GNP is merely 7.68 per cent. This 
results in a very low per capita income in the East. On the other hand, 
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(Compiled from Sonmez 1990:67, 190, 193)
The comparison of GDP per capita in the East with that of Istanbul and 
Turkiye's average shows that GDP per capita in the East is five times 
lower than that in Istanbul and 1.5 times lower than Turkiye's average. 
The East is considerably poorer than the other regions in Turkiye 
(Sonmez 1990:67, 190, 193).
Table- ffi/13
Comparison of Per Capita, Istanbul and Eastern Anatolia
Area 1965 1975 1985
Istanbul 1 100.0 100.0 100.0
The richest provinces of Elazig 34.3 32.4 53.3
the East Siirt 33.0 30.2 21.9
The poorest provinces of Agri 16.8 17.0 10.7
the East Hakkari 18.2 18.7 9.5
(Source: Sonmez 1990:216)
The data in figure-5 show that in Turkiye, unlike in Spain, the 
inequality between regions has increased. The ratio of inequality between 
the national average and the poorest region (Spain/Extremadura) in 
Spain in 1985 is 1.472:1, while in Turkiye (Turkiye/East) it was 2.394:1 in 
1986. The data in table III/13 and figure III/5 shows the extent to
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which the gap between the East and Istanbul increased between 1975 and 
1985, while Turkiye’s average increased against Istanbul.
Graph- IH/5
(Compiled from Sonmez 1990:216)
The comparison of GDP per capita in the provinces in the East with 
Istanbul shows that the gap between Istanbul and Hakkari in 1985 was 
more than ten fold, while the gap between Istanbul and Elazig was two 
fold. The East is not only the least developed region but it is also the 
poorest region in Turkiye.
In summary in both Spain and Turkiye the importance of 
nationalities questions have continued. The ETA in Spain and the PICK 
in Turkiye have long fought for independence. The democratic 
transformation of the mid-1970s in Spain, however, contributed to the 
resolution of the question. Spain was divided into seventeen 
Autonomous Communities and the central government shares its power 
(25 per cent of budget is spent by the Autonomous Communities) with 
them (Maxwell and Spiegel 1994:77). In Turkiye, on the other hand, the 
resolution of the question seems to be far away.
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The nationalities questions in Spain and Turkiye are not a 
phenomenon of the 20th century. They have existed throughout the 
course of history, but in Turkiye the problem has increased in recent 
years. There are many causes of regionalism. Spain has never really been 
a united country even in the Middle Ages. However, politics has often 
played a significant part in developing regional identity; the 
representation system in the Cortes and restructured military 
organisation in the 17th and 18th centuries are among some of the most 
important factors for the presence of . regionalism in Spain. The toleration 
and presence of regional governments since the Middle Ages has been a 
very important part of the administration system of Spain. Economic and 
political privileges continued even under the Franco regime. The 
presence of privileges is not only due to jealousies of regions, but the 
unwillingness of Castile to press for a true integration of kingdoms. The 
barrier before the true integration of the union of Castile and Aragon was 
Castile's treatment of Aragon. The treatment of the rebellious regions 
resulted in an 'undercurrent of discontent' and this itself became a cause 
for the development of regionalism. The onset of industrialisation 
deepened nationalities questions, especially in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia. Later in the 20th century, the harsh assimilation policies of 
authoritarian regimes increased both the 'undercurrent of discontent' and 
national ethnic consciousness. As I have also shown, the geographical 
features of both countries were a cause of the formation of regions in both 
countries.
The unequal developmental level of regions in both countries has 
also contributed to nationalities questions. The causes for the formation 
of unequal development in regions varies. The geographical positions of 
some regions in both countries contributed to their early development. 
The land structure and topography of relatively less developed regions
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was often a factor in their under development. In the nineteenth 
century, the regions on the periphery benefited from the economic 
colonisation of both countries by other European countries. The 
construction of the railway started in the regions on the periphery, while 
rail's arrival to the relatively poorer regions occurred almost a century 
later. National economic policies introduced in the twentieth century 
contributed to the under development of regions, especially in Turkiye. 
Moreover, the political exigencies of authoritarian regimes in both 
countries contributed to the formation of regions and of unequal 
development between those regions. As a result, unequal development 
between regions continues and this contributes to discontent which 
underlies nationalities questions.
In Spain under the Socialist governments of the 1980s, the 
inequality between poor and rich regions and the national average 
decreased. The relatively poorer regions are now closer to the average. 
Although the unequal development between regions is considerably 
higher in Turkiye, the inequality between the East and the national 
average has increased at a time when that in Spain was decreasing.
I have argued that the continuation of significant inequality 
between regions in both countries will continue to contribute to the 
nationalities question. But political causes remain highly significant the 
contribution of authoritarian regimes to national unrest is probably 
greater than that arising from the unequal developmental level of 
regions. Observing the lessons of social democratic rule in Spain would 
suggest that the resolution to the nationalities question in Turkiye 
requires the establishment of a true democracy, which recognises national 
and ethnic issues as legitimate and the devolution of some authority to 
regions. Perhaps a federal system in Turkiye would resolve many of the 
problems I have identified.
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LEVELS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPAIN and TURKIYE
In comparing the achievements of various forms of the welfare 
state and social democratic governments with liberal democrats, social 
democratic Political Scientists such as Fracis Castles, use social indicators, 
such as health care and education. Health care is measured by: the 
number of doctors and beds per capita, levels of infant mortality and life 
expectancy. Education is measured by: literacy and school retainment 
ratios. These indicators illustrate the performance of governments in 
meeting goals most contemporary social democrats regard as crucial to 
achieving social justice. They also show the consequences of public 
policies. In other words, the indicators are implications of equal 
opportunity and social mobility. Due to the entrenched nature of gender 
inequality and its special characteristics it is necessary in analysing social 
indicators that gender difference is examined as a special issue. One 
important factor in examining gender difference is an analysis of female 
labour force participation, as this has long been considered a strong 
indicator of equality of opportunity in employment. Before examining 
such social indicators it is necessary to analyse the demographic features 
of Spain and Turkiye .
Demography
The demography of Turkiye shows many of the characteristics of 
developing countries, while that of Spain shows characteristics similar to 
developed countries. The population growth rate of Turkiye is very high 
at 2.3 per cent in 1991 /1992, while that of Spain is very low at 0.2% for the 
same period. Turkiye also has very young population. The data shows 
that 35.1 per cent of the population is under 15 years age. Consequently, 
the proportion of 15-64 age group in Turkiye is less than that in the other
209




Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Nether
lands1 otal area I h ousand sq km 780,6 504,8 43,1 248,6 40.8Population 1992 59,233 39,085 5,170 64,846 14,313Growth 19 74 /75 2.4 1.0 0.3 -0.4 0.9rate 19 91 /92 0.220 2.3 0.3 1.2 0.8
under 1960 41.2 27.3 25.2 21.3 30.0
Age
15 1992 35.1 18.4 17.0 15.5 18.315-64 1960 55.1 64.5 64.2 67.8 61.0structure 1992 60.5 67.6 67.5 69.2 68.764 and 1960 3.7 8.2 10.6 10.9 9.0over 1992 4.4 14.0 15.5 15.3 13.0
(Source: OECD In Figures-188 1994)
Health Care
The health care systems of Spain and Turkiye differs considerably. 
And the difference demonstrates the impact of a long term social 
democratic government addressing its traditional concerns in Spain.
Table- EU/15 
Life Expectancy
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
1981-c 62 74 75 73 76
1986-c 65 76 75 75 77
1987-a 65 77 76 75 77
1990-b 65.1 77.0 75.8 75.2 77.2
1990-c 67 76 75 76 77
(Source: a= Human Development Report 1990, b= Human Development Report 1993, c= World Development Report 1992)
Health care in Spain is similar to that in developed countries, while 
health care in Turkiye in comparison to both Spain and the developed 
countries is considerably less developed. The success of the health care 
systems in Spain and Turkiye can be measured by life expectancy figures. 
In 1990 in Spain life expectancy was higher than Denmark and equal to 
Germany, while life expectancy in Turkiye was considerably lower than
20 In 1996 it is 1.8.
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any of the comparators. The gap in life expectancy between Turkiye and 
the Netherlands is 10 years. Life expectancy in Turkiye, however, 
increased by 5 years between 1981 and 1990. In terms of life expectancy 
Spain is in the same category as most of the developed countries.
Infant Mortality
Tnfant mortality' rate is also one of the best available indicators of 
health care system of a country (Castles 1978:64). A high infant mortality 
rate is an indication of poor health care.
Table- m/16
Infant mortality Life expectancy at birth
women men
Country 1960 1991 1960 1991 1960 1991
Turkiye 19.74 5.65 49.7 68.4 46.5 64.1
Spain 4.37 0.78 72.2 80.3 67.4 73.2
Denmark 2.15 0.75 74.1 77.7 72.3 72.0
Germany 3.38 0.71 72.4 79.0 66.9 72.6
Netherlands 1.79 0.65 75.5 80.3 71.6 74.0
(Source: OECD In Figures-188 1994)
Although the infant mortality rate in Turkiye reduced from 19.74 per cent 
in 1960 to 5.65 per cent in 1991, it is considerably higher than that of the 
developed countries and also of that of Spain. The above figures show 
that, since the 1960s, Spain reduced infant mortality to the level of most 
developed countries. In terms of 'life expectancy at birth', although 
Turkiye increased from 49.7 years for women and 46.5 years for men in 
1960 to 68.4 years for women and 64.1 years for men in 1991, life 
expectancies of both sexes at birth are considerably lower than both that in 
Spain and those in the developed countries. In terms of both indicators, 
Spain is in a similar category to most developed countries.
211
Number of doctors, nurses and beds per capita 
In terms of the number of doctors, nurses and beds per capita, 
Spain also shows similar characteristics to the developed countries. 






1965 1980 1984 1965 1980 1984
Turkiye 2,900 1630 1,390 1,130 1,030
Spain 800 460 320 1,220 330 260
Denmark 740 480 400 190 210 60
Germany 640 450 380 500 170 230
Netherlands 860 540 450 270 130
(Source: World Development Report 1992 & 1983)
The data in table D3/17 and table-IE/18 shows there is a significant 
difference between Turkiye and both Spain and the developed countries. 
In the 1990s the number of doctors for per 1,000 population was 3.9 in 
Spain, while it was 2.8 in Denmark, 3.2 in Germany, and 2.5 in the 
Netherlands. The. figures for Spain are even higher than those for a 
number of the most developed countries.
Table- ffl/18 
Per 1,000 of Population
D o c t o r s  B e d s
















(Source: OECD In Figure-188 1994)
The above figures display the consequences of health care in those 
countries. It is clear that Spain has similar quality health care to the 
developed countries, while Turkiye has a less developed health care 
system compared with both Spain and the developed countries. The
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priority that each country gives to health care is seen through analysis of 
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
The low proportion of Turkish GDP spent on health care goes a long 
way towards explaining the poor performance of Turkiye in the above 
mentioned indicators. In all countries examined public sector health 
expenditure is approximately 4 times higher than that of the private 
sector, while in Turkiye public sector health expenditure is less than 
private sector's. The figures also show that Turkiye spends less of its GDP 
on health care than other countries examined. Turkiye spends only 4.0 
per cent of its GDP, while Denmark spends 6.3 per cent, Germany 8.0 per 
cent, the Netherlands 7.9 per cent and Spain 6.6 per cent.
These figures shows that the health care system of Spain displays 
similar characteristics to those of developed countries of northern 
Europe. Spain spends more of its GDP on health care than Denmark.
Table-IE/19
Health Expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1990
Country Total Public sector Private sector Per capita
Turkiye 4.0 1.5 2.5 76
Spain . 6.6 5.2 1.4 831
Denmark 6.3 5.3 1.0 1,588
Germany 8.0 5.8 2.2 1,511
Netherlands 7.9 5.7 2.2 1,500
(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
In terms of per capita income spent on health care, however, there is 
considerable difference between the less developed countries and 
developed countries. To make the amount spent on health care 
meaningful, the purchasing power parity of the amount spent needs to be 
considered because the same amount of money (expressed as constant $ 
US) buys a different amount of service if that service is bought in 
different countries. As data in the purchasing parity index (see appendix) 
shows; different amounts of money are needed to buy the same basket of
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goods in different countries. While the basket costs 39 US dollars in 
Spain, it costs 62 US dollars in Germany. That is to say if we buy the same 
amount of service in Germany instead of buying it in Spain an extra 23 
US dollars has to be paid. Therefore, the gap between Spain and the 
developed countries in terms of GDP per capita spent on health care is 
filled by the relatively low price of health services. This comparison does 
not improve the position for Turkiye, despite its considerably lower price 
level for health services there is still huge gap between it and that of 
developed countries.
Education
Education is often used as a way of indirectly achieving equal 
opportunity and social mobility. Free (of direct charge) education for all 
people, particularly at the tertiary level, can give the children of low 
income earners an opportunity to jump to a higher social strata. That is 
to say a child of manual worker can be an engineer and in turn enjoy a 
better living standard. Of course there are conditions which limit the role 
of education as an instrument for social change. For example, if there is 
huge quality differences between public and private schools, education 
may lose this role, because graduates from public schools will have less 
chance of entering university or of finding a job. Although it is difficult 
to examine the quality difference between public schools and private 
schools, a substantial quality difference between them will negatively 
affect the role of education in promoting social mobility. Governments 
can contribute to the role of education by increasing the proportion of 
national income spent on education. The proportion of GNP spent on 
education, therefore, may give an overview of the level of education in a 
country, but the best available indicator of education as an instrument for 
social change is the retainment ratio of age cohorts between the ages 5
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and 29 (Castle 1978:63). Higher percentages at all levels mean that the 
number of students attending school is a high and that high percentage of 
the children of low income earners is present at every level of education. 
Lastly these indicators are completed by examining literacy rates to give 
an indication of how Spain and Turkiye are meeting social development 
goals.
Spain and Turkiye spend less of their GNP on public education 
than Denmark and the Netherlands, although they have increased the 
proportion in recent years. Despite having a considerably younger 
population (the number of people aged between 5 and 29 constitutes 51.8 
per cent of its population) Turkiye spent 3.1 per cent of its GNP which was 
1.1 per cent less than Spain, 4.4 per cent less than Denmark and 3.2 per 
cent less than the Netherlands in 1991.
Table- m/20.
Expenditure on Public Education
_____ as percentage of GNP_____
Country 1980 1985 1988 1990
Turkiye 2.8 2.3 1.8 3.1
Spain 3.3 4.0 4.2 (1989)
Denmark 6.9 7.2 7.7 7.5 (1989)
Germany 4.7 4.6 4.3 4.1
Netherlands 7.9 6.8 6.8 6.3
(Source: Statistical Abs1:ract of thé World, 19??)
As I argued earlier the proportion of GNP spent on education does not 
give any idea about the role of education as an instrument of social 
mobility. Castle (Castle 1978:63) uses the retention ratio for the age 
group 5 to 29 instead. In Turkiye 38.8 per cent of this age group are 
enrolled at the primary and lower levels, which is 11.2 per cent less than 
Germany and 18.5 per cent less than Spain in 1991. This gap may be 
because of the underdevelopment of pre-school institutions, because 
Turkiye's secondary school retention ratio is equal to the others. On the
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other hand, in upper secondary at 5.3 per cent, and tertiary levels at 2.5 per 
cent, there is a big gap between Turkiye and the other countries. At the 
upper secondary level the gap between Turkiye and Spain is 11.3 per cent, 
while at the tertiary level it is 5.8 per cent. It can therefore be argued that 
social mobility, which is defined above, in Turkiye is less than that in 
Spain and in the developed countries.
Spain, on the other hand, provides a similar measure of 
participation of education to the developed countries in terms of 
retention ratio. The proportion of students at the primary and lower, 
secondary and upper secondary levels in Spain at 7.3 per cent, 3 per cent 
and 4.6 per cent respectively are higher than those in Germany.
Table- III/21
Youth population and participation in education, 1991
Country
Population 














Turkiye 51.8 38.8 31.0 5.3 2.5 20.1
Spain 39.1 57.3 32.0 17.0 8.3 22.4
Germany 32.4 50.0 29.0 12.4 8.6 16.2
France 35.8 57.7 35.8 12.3 9.6 20.7
(Source: OECD Economic Survey-Turkiye 1994)
At the tertiary level, however, the retention ratio in Germany is 0.3 per 
cent higher than that in Spain. It can be inferred that in Spain social 
mobility, in terms of retention ratio, is as high as that in Germany, while 
it is in Turkiye considerably less than those in the other countries.
Adult illiteracy is a widespread social problem in the lesser 
developed countries, especially in Turkiye, although the signs of 
reduction is seen in many lesser developed countries. The high rate of 
illiteracy in Turkiye is inherited from the Ottoman Empire. After the 
change of the alphabet to the Roman alphabet in 1928, the data show that
literacy has rapidly
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increased. The increase in literacy was 15 per cent between 1960 and 1970, 
5 per cent between 1970 and 1980 and 21 per cent between 1980 and 1990.
Table- m/22 
Adult Literacy Rate (%)
Country 1960a 1970a 1980c 1985b 1990b
Turkiye 40 5 5 / 1 60 74 81
Spain 87 ■ 94. : — 95 97.
Denmark — 99 99 99 99
Germany — 99 .' 99 9 9 / 9 9 ,'
N etherlands — 99 - 99 99 99 ./,
(Source: a= World Tables 1980,
b= Human Development Report 1993, 
c= World Development Report 1983)
Developed countries resolved most of their illiteracy problems 
before the 1970s. Spain, on the other hand, almost caught up with the 
developed countries by the mid 1990s. There is only a 1.5 per cent gap 
between Spain and the developed countries. As with the other indicators, 
in terms of literacy level, Turkiye is less well developed than the other 
countries, while Spain has almost resolved the illiteracy problem.
Female participation in employment
Another criterion used for comparison of the level of social 
development of countries is the labour force participation of females. 
Female labour force participation relates to gender inequality. Like 
having a high proportion of females at all levels of education a higher 
proportion of females in labour force may mean there is less 
gender inequality and the country is more socially developed. But a high 
female labour force participation ratio may also result from a large 
percentage of the population being employed in agriculture. In terms of 
female labour force participation, there is a significant difference 
between developed and developing countries. However, the
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categorisation of the countries into developed and less developed is not as 
clear as the indicators analysed earlier.
Table- m / 2 3
Labour Force, Female (%)
Year Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
1972 37.3 20.3 37.7 40.3 27.3
1976 36.1 22.1 40.8 40.8 29.1
1980 34.4 23.6 43.9 41.3 31.0
1984 34.1 24.0 44.2 40.9 31.0
1988 33.8 24.3 44.5 40.6 30.9
1990 33.7 24.4 44.6 40.5 30.9
1991 33.8 24.5 44.6 39.2 30.8
(Source: World Tables 1994)
Female labour force participation in Germany and Denmark is higher 
than that in Spain and Turkiye. On the other hand, participation in 
Turkiye is higher than that in the Netherlands. Unlike the other 
countries, participation in Turkiye decreased until 1990, which may be 
because of the declining contribution of agriculture to civilian 
employment. While the contribution of industry and of service sectors to 
civilian employment increased, women who are forced out of agriculture 
are unable to return to employment because of their lower educational 
level and because of cultural barriers.
In Spain female labour force participation is considerably lower 
than both that in Turkiye and those in the developed countries. This is a 
very interesting statistic when we consider the strength of the Spanish 
tourist sector which often employs less qualified women. However, 
because of the high proportion of Spanish females in higher education it 
is reasonable to expect that a higher proportion of Spanish females will 
gain employment in the future.
In summary it is difficult to categorise countries into 
developmental groups because many sometimes contradictory criteria 
have to be used and according to different criteria countries fit into
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different categories. Life expectancy at birth in Spain is higher than that 
in Germany and Denmark. Female labour force participation in Turkiye 
is higher than that in the Netherlands. The number of doctors per one 
thousand people in Spain is higher than that in all developed countries. 
More importantly in terms of the HDI (human development index) 
Spain ranks ninth in the World, while Denmark ranks sixteenth, 
Germany fifteenth, and the Netherlands fourth. However, in terms of 
infant mortality, the number of beds for per one thousand people and adult 
literacy rate, Spain and Turkiye are less developed than Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands. It is clear that in terms of the indicators of social 
development, Turkiye is one of the lesser developed countries in Europe, 
while Spain can be regarded as a developed country.
Human Development Index (HDI)
The Human Development Index (HDI) combines key social and 
economic indicators together and ranks all countries in the World. The 
HDI is a composite of three measurements: "life expectancy at birth, 
educational attainment, comprising adult literacy, with two thirds weight, 
and a combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio, with 
one third of weight; and income..." Each country is given a HDI value 
which indicates the distance that country has to go to achieve a set of 
defined goals: "an average life span of 85 years, access to education for all 
and a decent level of income." The aim of each country is have its HDI 
score as close to 1 as possible, as that indicates it is in sight of achieving its 
goals. Income is treated in a complex manner. "The HDI adjusts real 
income (in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars) for the diminishing 
utility of higher levels of income to human development. The premise 
is that people do not need an infinite income for a decent standaid of 
living. So, the HDI defines a threshold for income regarded as adequate
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for a reasonable standard of living." The threshold is set by calculating 
"the average global real GDP per capita in PPP dollars in 1992", this 
amounted to about US $ 5,000 (Human Development Report-1995:18).
The HDI can thus be considered as an indicator of the social 
developmental level of a country. It consists of social indicators, such as 
the school retention ratio, adult literacy rate, life expectancy at birth and 
it also combines these with income. As mentioned above, the school 
retention ratio is the best available indicator of the role of education as a 
social mobility instrument, while the infant mortality rate is the best 
available indicator of the role of health care as an equal opportunity 
instrument (Castle 1978:63, 64).
The inclusion of GDP per capita (PPP) in the HDI makes it a 
valuable indicator in comparing countries. But the HDI should not be 
considered, on its own, as a sufficient indicator of development. This is 
because there are other indicators, such as the indicators of gender 
inequality, that need to be used for examining the level of development 
of countries and comparing countries. However, because it is a composite 
of valuable indicators the HDI can be used as one measure of the social 
developmental level of a country, and for comparing countries to be used
in combination with other measures.
Using the HDI as an indicator of social development of a country, it 
is seen that while Spain ranks very high, Turkiye ranks very low among 
European countries in the World ranking. Spain's ranking is higher than 
Denmark's and Germany's, although its real GDP per capita is 
considerably less than Denmark's and Germany's. Spain jumps twenty 
rungs up the ladder as the last column shows. That means Spain is closer 
to 'certain defined goals' given above. On the other hand, Turkiye is far 
behind the other countries. Turkiye also falls one rank down in comparison
with its real GDP per capita.
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1992 1992 1992 1992 index
Turkiye 66.5 80.5 61 5,230 5,141 0.69 0.74 0.94 0.792 -1
Spain 77.6 . 98.0 86 13.400 5,307 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.930 20
Denmark 75.3 99.0 84 19,080 5,346 0.84 0.94 0.98 0.920 -4
Germany 76.0 99.0 81 21,120 5,367 0.85 0.93 0.98 0.921 -9
Netherlands 77.4 99.0 88 17,780 5,343 0.87 0.95 0.98 0.936 16
(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
As seen from the figures above, in terms of their social developmental 
levels, Spain is not only closer to the 'defined goals7, but it is also included 
with the developed countries, such as Germany and Denmark, while 
Turkiye is categorised with the lesser developed countries. However, as 
mentioned above, to make the level of social development of these 
countries clearer, we also need to analyse the indicators of gender 
inequality in these countries.
Gender related Development Index (GDI)
I argued above that gender inequality is a critical indicator of social 
development and a crucial measure of social justice. In addition to the 
HDI, the United Nations calculates another index called the GDI. As the 
table below shows, the calculation of the GDI uses the same indicators as 
the HDI. But in addition the GDI analyses gender inequality. The 
methodology used to calculate the GDI imposes a penalty weighting for 
inequality. Hence, the GDI will fall if the achievement levels of both 
women and men in a country decline/ or if a greater disparity between 
their achievement arises. ’’The greater the gender disparity in basic 
capabilities, the lower a country's GDI compared with its HDI. The GDI is 
simply the HDI discounted, or adjusted downward for gender inequality”
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(Human Development Report 1995: 73). Examination of the GDI thus 
makes clearer the social developmental levels of countries.
Table-m/25
GDI (gender related development index) ranking 1992
C o u n try GDÏ
GDI
ra n k
Sh are  of 
earned  incom e
%
Life expectancy 
y e ars (1992)
A d u lt literacy 
rate  
(%)
1 9 9 2
C om bined  
p r im a ry  
se co n d a ry  an d  
te rtiary  g ross 
en rolm en t 






F M F M F M F M
T u rk iy e 0 .7 4 4 4 5 3 0 .2 6 9 .8 6 8 .6 6 4 .5 7 0 .1 9 0 .6 5 4 .1 6 8 .3 21
S p a in 0 .7 9 5 3 4 1 8 .6 8 1 .4 8 0 .5 7 4 .6 9 8 .0 9 8 .0 8 8 .7 8 3 .0 -2 6
D en m a rk 0 .9 0 4 4 3 9 .8 6 0 ,2 7 8 .2 7 2 .5 9 9 .0 9 9 .0 8 5 .6 8 2 .3 10
N e th e rla n d s 0 .8 5 1 2 0 2 5 .2 7 4 .8 8 0 .4 7 4 .4 9 9 .0 9 9 .0 8 6 .5 8 9 .4 -1 6
(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
The GDI ranking of countries (see table III/ 25) differs from the HDI 
ranking. Turkiye's ranking increases in the GDI calculation in 
comparison to the HDI, while Spain's ranking decreases. Like Turkiye, 
Denmark's ranking increases as well. However, inequality between sexes 
in Turkiye is only lower in the share of earned income21, while in 
education the disparity is higher than those in the other countries. For 
example, in terms of the gross enrolment ratio the inequality in Turkiye is 
14.2 per cent, while in the Netherlands it is 2.9 per cent, in Spain 5.7 per cent 
and in Denmark 3.3 per cent. A reduction of gender inequality in education 
in Turkiye will significantly increase its GDI ranking.
Consideration of the GDI shows that Spain s social developmental 
level falls to the category of less developed countries, while Turkiye 
remains in the category of less developed countries, despite her better 
performance in the gender inequality ranking.
Conclusion
I have argued that Spain, and especially Turkiye, are members of 
the lesser developed countries in Europe. However, in terms of both
21 See also for lower average wage for women in Appendix.
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economic and social development indicators, there should be a 
distinction between Turkiye and Spain. The level of development in 
Spain is very close to that of developed countries, particularly in 
considering most indicators of social development. Turkiye, on the other 
hand, displays the status of a newly industrialised country. The 
contribution of agriculture to total civilian employment is very high, 
while that of industry is over 20 per cent, but still lags behind the other 
countries. In both Spain and Turkiye a key index of their lower 
developmental levels is indicated by their substantial inequality between 
regions.
The sharpest distinction between Spain and Turkiye is in GDP per 
capita. Their employment structures, however, do not differ. Their labor 
force participation rates are similar and lower than the developed 
countries. Despite the low labour force participation rate in Spain, 
unemployment is very high. In Turkiye it is closer to the OECD average. 
In Spain female labor force participation is very low, while in Turkiye it is 
higher even than that of the Netherlands. Hence, in terms of the level of 
economic development, Spain, and especially Turkiye, are lesser 
developed countries in Europe.
Inequality between regions is one of the most important problems 
before both countries. It is one of the chief causes of nationalities 
problems, either for relatively richer regions in Spain, or poorer regions 
in Turkiye. There are, however, many other reasons for the formation of 
regions in both countries, such as ethnic nationalities, the development 
of the political system, authoritarian regimes, geography, the 
manipulation of economic development by foreign investors and 
national and international economic policies. It should be noted that 
social democrats in Spain have been remarkably successful in reducing 
inequality through both economic and political measures, especially by
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decentralising power through autonomous regions. On the other hand, 
Turkiye regional inequalities have increased sharply, as the Kurdish 
separatist movement has intensified. Following Spain's lead, the 
regional question in Turkiye requires resolution through a combination 
of economic, political and social policies, as distinct from a passive 
reliance on the benign ’trickle-down* effects of economic development 
which appears to be Turkiye’s response.
The levels of social development in Spain and Turkiye differ 
sharply. The indicators of social development show there are significant 
differences between Turkiye and both the developed countries and Spain. 
Turkiye is a less developed country socially as well as economically. 
However, the distinction is not as sharp between Spain and the 
developed countries of Europe because Spain displays similar levels of 
social development to the developed countries on most indices. The HDI 
ranking shows that, despite its lower level of GDP per capita, Spain ranks 
higher than Germany and Denmark. Interestingly however, Turkiye's 
ranking increases in the GDI comparisons, while Spain's ranking 
decreases.
The lower social and economic developmental levels of Spain and 
Turkiye cannot be inferred, however, that their developmental levels are 
not adequate for social democracy to be successful in implementing its 
policies. Rather their level of development, especially that of Turkiye, 
means that social democratic policies are imperative, because social 
democrats focus on meeting both indicators of human development and 
the quality of economic growth. Their level of social and economic 
development is sufficient as is their parliamentary system for social 
democracy to work.
Both countries have, however, problems which may impede the 
parliamentary process. These problems are human right abuses,
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nationalities questions and in Turkiye religious fundamentalism. These 
specific problems need examination to make clearer their implications for a 
social democratic program and democracy.
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C H A PT ER  FO U R
IN  SEA RC H  OF SO CIA L JU STIC E
TH E PO LITIC A L TASKS FO R  
SO C IA L D EM O C R A C Y
IN  TU R K IYE and SPAIN
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Introduction
This chapter examines the specific problems which impede 
achieving the goals of social justice in Spain and Turkiye. The presence 
of these problems is an indication of the imperfection of democracy in 
both countries. I argue that such issues do not simply represent goals 
for social democratic attention but may even hinder social democracy in 
carrying out its policies through the parliamentary system. These 
problems, therefore, require examination to make the extent of their 
impact on the respective political systems clearer. The existence of 
gender inequality clearly affects the process of democracy. As I argued 
in chapter three, gender inequality is also an important indicator of 
social development. Hence, any progress towards the resolution of 
gender inequality in Spain and Turkiye needs to be examined.
As I argued in the second and third chapter, Spain, through its 
democratic transformation in the mid-1970s has been relatively 
successful in resolving a number of problems associated with 
nationalities issues and inequalities between regions. However, there 
are still serious allegations of human rights abuses associated with 
nationalities issues in Spain, such as extra-judicial executions of 
members of the separatist Basque group, the ETA. It is evident from 
Amnesty International campaigns against human rights abuses that 
human right abuses are more widespread in Turkiye. The Kurdish 
separatist movement has been an ongoing problem for Turkiye since 
the establishment of the Republic. The Islamist movement, like the 
Kurdish movement, has become a serious threat to secularism. Since 
the early 1980s both problems have deepened.
Gender differences in Spain and Turkiye clearly exist. Although 
there are no legal restrictions on women's rights in both countries,
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women have a low level of participation in the labour force and their 
literacy rate is low. They are employed in home-based or in 
unrecognised work, such as in agriculture. The number of women in 
professional occupations and in politics is very low, especially in 
Turkiye. However, the statistics show that the overall conditions for 
women have improved in both countries, especially in Spain.
It is difficult, however, to argue there has been adequate progress 
in protecting human rights, especially in Turkiye. Freedom of 
expression and basic civil and political rights such as freedom from ill- 
treatment by security forces, racial and religious discrimination are not 
fully guaranteed, at least to the degree that they are in the developed  
countries.
In this chapter, therefore, I shall examine aspects of civil, political 
and human rights. These issues are inseparable from gender inequality, 
nationalities questions and the challenge from Islamist 
fundamentalism in Turkiye. These issues constitute the main social 
justice issues which need to be addressed in any social democratic 
political program in Turkiye or Spain.
Gender Issues and Social Justice
Along with many other aspects of social development conditions 
for women in Spain have improved in the last two decades. Arribas 
argues that one of "the most significant changes to have taken place in 
Spain in the last two decades is to the role that women play in society. 
They now enjoy a higher level of formal education and thereby an 
enhanced presence in the employment market. Such achievements are 
accompanied by a greater measure of financial independence. In areas 
of legal and social equality Spanish women have made consistent gains
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in the past few years (Arribas 1991:183). These improvements began with 
the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s (Trefall 1985:49).
Table-IV /1
’Changes to the Social Situation of Women in Spain’
% of illiteracy
1950 1960 1970 1975 1980/1 1985/6
18.3 17.8 12.2 10.3 8.9 5.0
Children per women 2.5 2.9 2.8 — 2 1.2
% women total active population 15.8 20.1 19.6 21.3 24.8 34.4
% women in agriculture — — 26.8 20.9 17.1 12.6
% of active women with higher qualificat — — 0.6 6.2 8.7 14.1
% women of total university students — --- 31.5 31.6 39.7 53.7
(Source: Arribas 1991:193)
These improvements to the role of women began with the 
abrogation of laws which were obstacles to women's advancement. The 
first step was made in the making of 1978 the Spanish Constitution. 
Browne argues that the constitution paved the way for a number of 
significant reforms that "were to affect women directly." The 
Constitution created a framework which made equal treatment for 
women a legal requirement and part of the necessary underlying 
political consensus, not something "intrinsically threatening to the 
social order". The constitution goes further than making all Spaniards 
equal before the law (Article 14). It specifically protects women's 'right 
to work' and to 'a free choice of occupation or activity, to promotion 
through work and to remuneration sufficient to meet their needs and 
those of their family.' And it proclaims that women 'shall in no 
circumstances be subjected to discrimination based on sex' (A.35) 
(Browne 1989:71).
The 1978 Constitution made more than a symbolic contribution 
to improving conditions for women. Many of the barriers that 
had previously prevented women from participating in active life 
were abolished in the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s
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(Threlfall 1985:49). The data in Table IV/1 show female illiteracy has 
declined while the proportion of women at tertiary level is now above 50 
per cent. The percentage of women in the labor force has increased to 
almost 50 per cent in the years between 1980 and 1985, while that in 
agriculture decreased. The number of women with higher 
qualifications has also increased. Social and economic conditions for 
Spanish women have improved significantly, but the effects of these 
improvements, however, have not yet made their mark in politics.
Active participation of women in politics is low. Table IV/2 
shows that the number of women parliamentarians is very low, 
amounting proportionately to around 6 per cent of total members of 
Congress (Browne 1989:70). Browne1 argues that while the number of 
women in the labour force has increased, the number of women elected 
to the Cortes has been steady (Browne 1989:70). The number of women 
enrolling in a political party has also been steady (Threlfall 1984:147).
Table- IV/2
Women in Parliament-Congress of Depu ties
Parliamentary groups
1977-79 1979-82 1982-
















0 — - 
15 7.4 
0 — - 
19
Total Women 21 6.0 20 5.7 13 5.1
(Threlfall 1984:153)
Gender issues present a special set of difficulties for social 
democrats in Spain. It needs to be stressed that polling data suggest
1 Browne argues that "overall, female representation in the Cortes has settled a t 
almost about 6 per cent, a level comparable with many other West European countries, 
but considerably lower than in Scandinavia. In the mid-1980s, 8 per cent of councillors, 
and 6 per cent of the members of autonomous parliaments were female" (Browne 
1989:70).
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that the majority of Spanish women prefer right and centre-right wing 
political parties. Such conservative parties defend many of the current 
values of society which discriminate against women. Threlfall argues 
that the extent of this preference has not dropped under 6 per cent in 
favour of centre and right parties (Threlfall 1984:140-146). Hence the 
Socialists have a considerable organisational and programatic task 
before them to make attract votes from women and gain more women 
candidates.
In many developed northern European countries improvement 
in the conditions for women are directly related to the strength of the 
women's movement. An active women's movement means that 
gender issues will occupy politics and in turn the resolution of many 
gender issues will be quicker. Browne argues that "in Spain the 
women's movement has been marginal to the mass of women in 
Spanish society, playing the role of agent provocation but ultimately 
less influential than the media, the opinion polls and the political parties 
(Moxon-Browne 1989:76).
Browne argues that, however, there are a wide range of 
associations relating to women which came into existence in the mid- 
1980s which are "wholly or partly devoted to the advancement of 
women's interests". The Coordinadora Estatal is an umbrella group for 
feminist associations associated with non-parliamentary parties. The 
two major trade union federations, "the UGT and the Com isiones 
Obreras, have women's groups". The Roman Catholic Church 
sponsors "a network of women's group throughout the country whose 
role is rather ambivalent, at least from a feminist perspective... . The 
Association of Conservative Women which aims to preserve what it 
regards as the best of traditional values while addressing women s role
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in modern society is allied to the Alianza Popular . There are also 
numerous other women's groups which provide services for women 
such as abortion advice centres, literacy groups, rape counselling 
services and refuges for battered wives.
Table- IV/3
Estimated Distribution of Vote According to Gender and party
General Elections 1979 and 1982
% of total % men % women
Left-wing parties
1979 1982 1979 1982 1979 1982
PSOE 30.5 48.4 31.5 51.7 28.4 45.0
PCE 10.8 4.1 14.3 5.7 7.1 2.5
Sub-total 41.3 52.3 44.8 57.4 35.5 47.5
Centre and rig it wing parties
CDS 2.9 -----  2.7 -—  3.1
CD 5.7 4.6 6.7
UCD 35.0 7.1 29.2 5.8 39.1 8.7
AP 26.2 — 24.9 — 27.5
Sub-total 40.7 36.2 33.8 33.4 45.8 39.3
(Source: Threlfall 1984:142-3)
Such organisations may not necessarily be feminist in outlook (Moxon- 
Browne 1989:80-81). Spanish social democracy thus needs a stronger basis 
of support from a more clearly feminist inspired women's movement. 
Many of the political changes need to be aided by widespread adoption 
into society, through women's groups. Spanish social democracy has 
yet to find a successful way of bringing about a transformation of civil 
society which will complete its tasks in addressing gender issues.
It is evident that the political and social rights of Spanish women 
have been clarified and protected since the democratic transformation 
in the mid-1970s by changing laws and encouraging greater 
participation of women in education and employment. However, as I 
argued in chapter three, it is difficult to argue that the gender inequality 
in Spain has been reduced to the level of that accepted in the developed 
countries of northern Europe.
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In Turkiye, as in Spain, gender inequality is greater than in 
developed countries. Kazgan argues that it was only from late in the 
19th century that women began to make their mark in the labour 
market. Women were employed first as teachers in girls' schools 
demonstrating the influence of Western ideas which were adopted 
mostly in the upper social class. Nearly twenty years later women 
started work in factories. Similar to developments in other European 
countries this was mainly a result of labour shortages brought about by 
successive wars. Both the first wave of female employment in 
professional work and the second in factory labour met with 
considerable opposition (Kazgan 1981:132).
Kazgan argues that the huge gender inequality in Turkiye is 
inherited from the Ottomans. However, even after World War One, 
and the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye, women in Turkiye 
were not active in the labour market, except in agriculture.
Nevertheless, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye 
conditions for women in Turkiye improved greatly. Kazgan argues that 
Ataturk's reforms sought to grant women equal legal rights, equal 
opportunity in education and a measure of equality in employment. 
But the reforms did not bring immediate improvements in labour 
market opportunities for women because they lacked the necessary 
economic foundations. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the 
secularisation of the State, "they facilitated a further encroachment 
upon the sex role assignment of Quranic teachings". The reforms also 
"initiated an impulse towards economic development and 
modernisation, which in turn, additively raised the educational 
requirements of women, particularly in terms of labour force 
membership" (Kazgan 1981:132). With the changes that have occurred
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since the early years of the Republic, women in Turkiye began to 
participate more fully in the labour market mainly either in education 
or the industrial labour force.
Table-IV/4
Labour Force Participation of Women
(Age 15 Years and Over) 1950-1970 in Percentage
Total Labour Force Non-Agricultural Labour Force
Years Active Total active Non-agricul. Total
females in total population female labour non-agricul.
labour force in population as % of active labour in total
age 15 and over age 15 and over females active populatior
1950 47.0 88.4 3.5 17.0
1955 43.1 83.7 3.9 19.8
1960 40.3 79.6 4.7 26.5
1965 37.9 74.1 4.0 28.2
1970 37.5 60.1 10.0 34.8
1975 35.2 51.8 11.0 37.8
(Source: Kazgan 1984:134)
It should be stressed, however, that despite the improvements in 
the legal system, such improvement has not been translated to daily 
life. For example, in education the female retention ratio is less than 
male retention ratio, especially at tertiary level. The number of women 
politicians in Turkiye is very low and considerably below the 
standards achieved in the northern European social democracies. 
Although female labour force participation is high, the number of 
women in non-agricultural sectors, at 11 per cent, is very low. The low 
proportion of women in the non-agricultural labour force is perhaps to 
be expected. The proportion of non-agricultural labour in the total 
active population, at 37.8 per cent, is already low in Turkiye. It can be 
inferred, therefore, that a very high proportion of females are employed 
in agriculture in what is mostly unrecognised work.
The problem of gender inequality is more starkly apparent in 
literacy rates. The proportion of literate females is 20 per cent less than
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that of literate males. The gap between the sexes exists at every level of 
education.
Table- IV/5
Distribution of Population by Last School Graduated From and Sex
(Ages 11 and over) 1975 __________
School Female Male
Non-graduates 59.6 34.1
Primary school 33.0 50.3
Junior High 3.7 7.6
Vocational School at junior-high level 0.1 0.2
High School 1.7 3.5
Vocational School at high-school level 1.4 2.4
College 0.5 1.9
(Source: Ozbay 1981:160)
For example, the gap at the level of primary school graduates is 
approximately 20 per cent. At the next level of graduates the gap 
doubles and at college level the gap triples. The low proportion of 
women in both education and labour force is reflected in politics.
T able- I V / 6
W o m e n  in  th e  P a rlia m e n t, 1 9 3 5 -8 0  (National Assembly)
Parliam ent
terms
N of women in 
the Parliament
Women as 
% of total CHP1 DP2 jp3 the others
1935-39 18 4.5 — — — —
1939-43 15 3.7 — — — —
1943-46 16 3.7 — — — —
1946-50 9 1.9 9 — — —
1950-54 3 0.6 1 1 — 1
1954-57 4 0.7 — 4 — “ “  -
1957-60 8 1.3 1 7 — —
1961-65 3 0.7 --- — 2 1
1965-69 8 1.7 3 —  . 3 2
1969-73 5 1.1 2 — 2 1
1973-77 6 1.3 3 — 2 1
1977-80 4 0.9 2 — 2
. — »
(Source: Arat 1989: 52-59)
The gender inequality in Turkiye is most significant in politics. 
The figures above show female participation in politics is very low in 
Turkiye. The number of women politicians is also very low. After 1945
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the number and proportion of women representatives decreased. Since 
1960 the proportion of women representatives has been around 1 per 
cent. Gender inequality in politics is considerably higher, therefore, 
than that in education and the labour market. Hence, it can be argued 
that in Turkiye gender inequality is a significant barrier to achieving 
social justice especially in politics despite the improvements made since 
the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye*.
Human Rights and Social Justice
My argument is that a resolution of human rights issues will 
contribute to the social and economic development of a country. In 
other words, the existence of human rights abuses negatively affects 
social and economic development because the existence of such human 
rights abuses will cause not to use efficiently the human resources of a 
country. By addressing human rights abuses a country can use its 
human resources more effectively because people will not be left out of 
the system due to their political, religious, racial and sex differences. 
Moreover, many highly qualified people migrate to democratic 
countries because of human rights abuses in their home countries. 
Resolution of human rights abuses also contributes to the stability of 
political life which, in turn, may attract more foreign investment 
because political stability is one of the most important criteria foreign 
investors consider before investing in a country.
Despite such arguments, in developing countries economic 
development is often given priority over human rights considerations. 
Equality before the law regardless of age, religion, race and sex, freedom 
of thought and of speech, freedom of ethnic cultures and protection 
against ill-treatment by security forces, constitute basic human rights.
* Despite the gender inequality, there has been a number of female politicians, such as Tansu Ciller 
who managed to be in top positions. Although the number of female activists is lorn ur ey, 
they may be very influential in their profession. However, their appearence in top positions 
cannot be inferred as low level of gender inequality, because the number of female activists is very 
low.
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These are often regarded as incompatible with economic development 
by governments in developing countries. In other words, the 
governments try to justify human right abuses with economic 
development.
In Turkiye human rights abuses continue. Ill-treatment by 
security forces, torture, extrajudicial executions and the abuse of 
freedom of expression exist. For example, "at least 13 detainees died in 
custody, allegedly as a result of torture in 1992". Such abuses continued 
in 1993 with 24 deaths and in 1994 with 29 deaths (Amnesty 
International Reports (AIR), 1993, 1994 and 1995). In addition, 4 people 
in 1992, 26 in 1993 and 55 in 1994 disappeared in custody. In the 
Amnesty International Report 1993, it was alleged that the number of 
extrajudicial executions had increased. More than 260 killings occurred 
in mysterious circumstances in south east Turkey, of which many were 
blamed on Hizbullah, (a local group with no apparent connection to the 
Lebanese group). The main targets of "alleged extrajudicial executions 
included members of HEP, (People's Work Party-based on Kurdish 
people and banned in 1993) members of the THRA, (Turkish Human 
Rights Associations) and journalists". In 1992 10 journalist were killed 
in south east Turkiye in what were most likely extrajudicial executions. 
In Istanbul and Ankara claims of extrajudicial executions arose when 
police launched a series of operations against 'safe houses' used by 
Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)" (AIR 1993:291). There were also 
allegations of "ill-treatment in prisons" in Turkiye.
Importantly for political life "scores of prisoners of conscience 
were detained briefly and several were sentenced to prison terms (AIR 
1993:289). The Kurdish question can not now be openly discussed in 
public. People who argue that the government should change its 
policies to bring a resolution of the Kurdish problem in the East and 
South east of Turkiye are charged as separatists or supporters of the
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PKK. It is clear that serious human rights abuses exist in Turkiye which 
violate the basic principles of justice.
Despite 14 years of socialist government in Spain, human rights 
abuses exist. The Amnesty International Report includes 'allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment by security forces'. In 1992 torture and ill- 
treatment was alleged "following the arrest of approximately 50 people 
in a major security forces operation in the Basque province..." Those 
arrested were suspected of links with the 'Bizkaia' commando unit of 
ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty). Most 
suspects made repeated complaints in court "that they had been 
hooded, blindfolded and forced to do exercises". Others claimed they 
had been "beaten and kicked and two alleged that they had been given 
electric shocks..." Many of those charged "had visible cuts, bruises and 
other injuries when they appeared in court" (AIR 1993:264). Sadly, 
similar allegations are included in previous reports. Moreover, officers 
who were found guilty of torture did not serve their sentences (AIR 
1993-.264)2. Human right abuses thus still exist in Spain which are an 
indictment of the Spanish Socialist Party's lengthy period in office.
Social Justice and Nationalities questions
In recent years nationalities issues have become major questions 
in both Spain and Turkiye (Mango 1994:31). Spain, however, is better 
placed to resolve such issues, except in the Basque region, due to its 
democratic transformation. Although there have been disputes 
between the Autonomous Communities and Madrid, demands for
2 "In October five Civil Guards were found guilty of torturing Joaquin Qlano in 1983. 
They were sentenced to between two and seven months imprisonment, p us varying 
terms of up to seven years disqualification from holding public office... However, t ey 
did not serve their sentences but remained on active service and were par one m 
February 1991" (AIR 1993:264).
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independence have reduced in strength, except from the ETA and its 
legal wing HB. Spain presently has 17 Autonomous Communities. 
Four of these were granted autonomy by statute through the 1978 
constitution process. The rest had statutory autonomy through the 
process determined in the Constitution. The Autonomous 
Communities have become stronger. Besides this, the regional political 
parties, such as CiU, PNV and Canarian Coalition are effective in 
national politics. Their support is now critical if country-wide parties 
are to gain an absolute majority in the Cortes.
In Turkiye the overwhelming nationalities problem is the 
Kurdish movement. Although there were some Kurdish rebels in the 
early years of the Republic of Turkiye (Mango 1994:40), the movement 
gained momentum after the 1980 Coup d'etat. Since 1984 the PKK has 
continued its violent uprisings in Turkiye. Despite Kurds residing all 
around Anatolia, the guerrilla war has been concentrated in the South 
East and East Anatolia, but rarely in metropolitan areas.
The PKK is regarded as a terrorist group by successive 
governments, not as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish 
movement. Therefore, although some legislative and policy changes 
have been made which assist the Kurdish people, military solutions 
have become the main means to suppress the Kurdish movement. 
However, if recent official statements have any bearing on the matter, 
the elite in Turkiye now appears to understand that the Kurdish 
problem cannot be resolved through military force. However, it is 
unclear what other alternatives might exist.
What the Kurdish people want is also unclear. Some appear to 
want a federal system. It is evident that the current structure of the
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Turkish state* needs to change and the legitimacy of Kurdish identity 
recognised in some formal mechanism (Mango 1994:50). A resolution 
of the problem is complicated by the position of Kurds in Iran and Iraq.
Islam ist fundamentalism in Turkiye
In Turkiye, as in other Muslim countries, Islamist 
fundamentalism has become a threat in the last decade. As I argued in 
the Chapter two, the performance of the pro-Islamist party, R ef ah 
Partisi (RP), was such that it took first place in the 1995 general election. 
The number and strength of fundamentalist groups3 outside the RP 
have also increased. Their main strength is in the shanty towns of 
metropolitan areas. Shanty towns now constitute approximately 60 per 
cent of the metropolitan areas of cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and 
Izmir. The strength of the Welfare Party and Islamist social 
movements has also improved in rural areas, especially in the East of 
Turkiye where the Kurdish nationalist movement continues.
The rise of the Islamist movement, as I argued in chapter two, is 
partially accounted for by Government funded Islamist schools I mam  
Hatip. This development raises an important issue of human rights in 
that there is no clear separation between religion and the state. The 
protection of basic civil, political and human rights requires a 
separation of state and religious practice and belief, especially the 
protection of rights of freedom of religion, conscience, belief and 
expression. Quranic courses, schools run by the Islamist sects and 
propagation of Islam as a 'cement for national unity also contribute to 
the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkiye. Imam Hatips are 
established by the Turkish state; the state buys their equipment and pays 
for teachers. These schools then raise fundamentalists (Aksit 1991.151-
* Today's Turkish state presents an authoritarian charecter. The authority of local and 
peripheral organisations is very low. The central goverment has contro over oca 
government in many ways including budget. The devolution of some aut ority o e 
centre to either local or peripheral organisayions is thus necessary.
3 The fundamentalist groups are organised as Sects. Each sect interprets t e Quran an 
Mohammed's behaviour (Sunnet) differently. Competition between sects is very high.
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152). In other words, the graduates of these schools are completely 
against secularism which is one of the most important characteristics of 
Turkiye. The number of these schools is around 1,000; one in every ten 
students study in these schools. There are also countless numbers of 
Quranic courses. The ’secular' State raises its own enemies itself in 
Turkiye.
In Turkiye, however, there are significant counter forces resisting 
the Islamist challenge to secularism. The commitment of Turkiye to 
westernisation goes back to the early eighteenth century (Heper 1994:8­
9). It can be argued that westernisation via economic, social and 
political institutions is solidly grounded in Turkiye (Mango 1994:9). 
Today the parliamentary system in Turkiye, as I argued in chapter two, 
is strongly developed and has functioned well since the 1980 coup d'etat 
(Mango 1994:30). Moreover, the pressures of globalisation and 
unavoidable relations between Turkiye and the European community 
are considerable forces against the overthrow of secularism (Ilkin 
1993:193; Heper 1993:3). Turkiye cannot afford the overthrow of 
secularism because it may lead to a severing of relationships with 
Europe. Another counter force to the Islamists are the followers of the 
Alevi4 sect. Alevis constitute approximately thirty per cent of the 
population (Mango 1994:82) and are strongly in favour of a secular state. 
The Army has a record of supporting secularism and is probably the 
strongest force against the overthrow of the secular characteristics of 
Turkiye. Because of these forces, I would argue that it will be very 
difficult for the Islamist fundamentalists to overthrow secularism as 
easily as in some other Islamic countries.
4 See dip note 37 in Chapter two (p.158).
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Conclusion
In both countries conditions for women have improved very 
rapidly. The proportion of females in the respective labour forces and 
in higher education have increased significantly. Legal processes 
granting equality to women have been enacted. However, at the level 
of civil society many practices still contain discriminatory 
characteristics. In Spain, while the proportion of females in 
universities is higher than males, they have a far lower representation 
in the active labour market than males. In Turkiye the proportion of 
females attending high school and the later stages of education is lower 
than males. Women are employed mostly in agriculture which is unpaid 
and mostly un-recognised work. This is of course not only the result 
of sex discrimination, but also the result of women's low level of 
education and consequently their lower qualifications. Low female 
participation is evident in politics in Spain as well. The proportion of 
women parliamentary representatives in both countries is very low, 
especially in Turkiye.
In Turkiye especially, the problems which cast a shadow over 
democracy, such as human rights abuses, nationalities questions and 
religious fundamentalism, are prevalent and have recently intensified. 
Such problems actively hinder the processes of the parliamentary and 
party systems. The extent of human rights abuses, particularly in 
Turkiye, is particularly distressing. Such include ill-treatment, 
allegations of extra-judicial executions, death while in custody and 
prisoners of thought and conscience. The nationalities question has 
been another common problem. As I argued in discussing party 
systems in chapter two, the nationalities question is more beneficial to 
Spanish social democrats than it is a cause of problems. Social
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democrats have benefited from right wing over reactions. Democracy 
in Spain has been strengthened through the resolution of most of its 
long standing nationalities issues.
In Turkiye, on the other hand, nationalities issues have become 
more divisive and potentially destabilising. While pro-Islamist 
movements at the moment use the parliamentary process, as I have 
argued above, it is difficult for Islamists to gain a majority through 
the electoral process. The armed forces, the followers of the Alevi sect, 
liberal and leftist movements, over two centuries of westernisation in 
Turkiye and its economic dependence on the European economy are 
other factors/forces against the overthrow of secularism in Turkiye by 
pro-Islamist movements.
This chapter has thus examined the main problems which 
impede the achievement of a state of social justice in Spain and 
Turkiye. It must be stressed that the presence of these problems is an 
indication of the imperfection of democracy in both countries, not only 
as a failure of the state but also of civil society. As a result I have 
argued that such issues do not simply represent goals for social 
democrats but threaten the successful passage of social democratic 
policies in the parliamentary system. Social justice issues are therefore 
critical to the social democratic project in both Spain and Turkiye not 
just for programatic reasons but for the continued existence of the 
respective parties. Social justice is not an option for social democracy, 
it is an imperative.
C O N C L U S IO N
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CONCLUSION
I have argued in this thesis that social democracy is not obsolete, 
but has entered a new era in the 1990s. My study of social democracy 
shows that what it stands for and its overall goals have constantly 
changed in the course of its history and differ between countries. This is 
to be expected, as the Marxist social democrat Bernstein stressed, social 
democracy is defined by the movement not by the adoption of a fixed 
program. The movement is motivated by concern over social justice 
issues, achieving a broad range of human rights and a democratic style of 
work. The social democracy of the 1990s differs from that of the 1960s, as 
that of the 1960s differed from that of the 1900s.
The differentiation of the social democratic movement from the 
cominunist movement began with social democrats accepting 
parliamentary means to achieve socialism. Social democrats insisted on a 
parliamentary process to achieve socialism because of their democratic 
convictions and, following Bernstein, they conceived socialism as a 
movement instead of a goal. Social democrats rejected plans for 
wholesale nationalisation and the replacement of market integration by 
bureaucratic planning. They also rejected claims about the "inevitability" 
of catastrophic crisis in the capitalist system. They recognised the 
potential in capitalism for widespread political and social reform 
programs based on achieving social justice through re-distributive 
measures.
In the first period, however, it was often difficult to distinguish 
social democratic political parties from communist parties and state 
socialist parties. Bernstein was a member of the same party as Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky: the German Social Democratic party. And 
not only did each consider themselves Marxists they all agreed that 
programs had to change in response to changing social structure and
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circumstance. By the 1950s, on the other hand, the differentiation 
between the parties became obvious. Social democratic parties were now 
part of the day to day practice of most western political systems 
particularly in Europe and Australasia. Organisationally, communist 
parties established the Third International under the leadership of The 
USSR, while social democratic political parties were under the Second 
International. The organisational separation was important because 
Soviet leadership often became Soviet tutelage and the "orthodoxy" of 
Marxism Leninism, read Stalinism, locked many Communist parties into 
a "time-warp".
Social democracy, on the other hand, reflected in Crosland's 
position, became fully integrated into the capitalist system. The class basis 
of social democratic parties widened in this era. In almost all northern 
European countries social democratic political parties experienced 
significant periods in office during the 1960s. In this era social democratic 
economic policies based on neo Keynesian economics worked well. 
Higher economic growth, the long post-war "boom" and low 
unemployment could be pursued, while the welfare state was constantly 
improved. Hence, these years became known as the golden years of social 
democracy in northern Europe.
After the perceived failure of neo Keynesian economics in the mid- 
1970s, however, social democracy went into deep recession. Neo 
Keynesian economics appeared unable to resolve the problems occurring 
in the economies of the developed countries. Inflation and 
unemployment which were thought to be incompatible in neo Keynesian 
economic theory, occurred at the same time. The social structure, which 
gave rise to social democracy, was also changing. While the traditional 
social democratic electorate of blue-collar working class people decreased, 
the number of white collar workers increased. The contribution of the
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service sector to total civilian employment became greater than that of 
industry. Changing social structure in turn affected the trade union 
movements. Fragmentation in trade union movement began. Even the 
cohesive trade union organisations of the Scandinavian countries were 
negatively affected. These changes brought a new era for social 
democracy. The political parties, as a result, loosened their commitments 
to the characteristic components of the social democracy of the 1960s: neo 
Keynesian economics, full employment and the welfare state. In the new 
era, as will be stressed below, the policies of the social democratic parties 
became more diffuse. While social democracy retained its goal of social 
justice the means to achieve the goal varied.
Social democracy not only varies over time, but also it differs both 
between social democrats in the same country as well as between 
countries. The social democracy of Crosland differs from that of Stuart 
Holland, although the two theorists wrote at each end of the golden years 
of social democracy in Britain. Crosland conceived social democracy as 
full employment plus the welfare state plus neo Keynesian economics, 
and opposed further nationalisation. A decade later Holland argued for 
the selective nationalisation of key profitable major corporations and for 
'dirigiste' planning in Britain in order to empower the state in 
successfully managing the economy of late capitalism. And he criticised 
Crosland's basic understanding of social democracy. Crosland s 
understanding of social democracy reflects the characteristics and concerns 
of social democracy in the 1960s.
As the understanding of social democrats differs between theorists, 
each country's understanding of social democracy also differs. While 
nationalisation was a key policy for British social democrats until the 
1980s, it was not even discussed among Swedish social democrats. Such 
differences between the goals of social democratic movements in different
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countries are reflected in other characteristics of social democracy as well. 
They include; differing relationships between social democratic political 
parties and their respective trade union movements and the extent of 
commitment different parties have to full employment and the welfare 
state. The trade union movement in Scandinavian countries has 
historically been a cohesive centralised movement with a very high 
union membership ratio. In Britain, on the other hand, central 
organisation of the trade unions could not bring about a cohesive 
movement and its membership ratio in comparison with Scandinavian 
countries was not high. The changing nature of the goals of social 
democracy, expressed as what it regards as progressiveness, can also be 
seen by discussing what characteristics define social democracy in the 
1990s.
Defining or delineating social democracy has become even more 
difficult in the post -industrial and post-fordist (or perhaps even post­
modern) era of the 1990s. Social democracy of the 1990s has been 
influenced by issues arising from the two most important social 
movements of the last two decades. These issues, arising from new social 
movements based on gender and the environment, have become key 
components of the programmatic renewal of social democracy in northern 
Europe. Because of the wide range of possible responses and approaches 
to these issues social democratic approaches and responses also differ. 
With the adoption of gender and environmental issues, social democracy 
has widened the social basis of its appeal to include the new social 
movements. But relations between social democrats and "Green- 
movements have been hampered by the creation of Green parties , which 
have risen in some countries to the detriment of social democratic parties. 
Hence, social democrats have made stronger overtures to the new 
politics" of identity particularly in relation to gender issues. In Spain and
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Turkiye the politics of identity has mainly been confined to gender and 
nationality issues. Such issues are the main signs of programmatic renewal 
in these countries.
The changing goals brought by the nature of a post-industrial and 
post-fordist social structure has meant the commitment of social 
democrats to full employment, the welfare state and neo Keynesian 
economics is no longer taken for granted. In practice none of the social 
democratic parties in office in the 1980s and 1990s (French, Spanish and 
Australian) committed themselves to full employment or further 
development of a universalist welfare state. Unemployment rates in 
these countries have not differed strongly from levels achieved by non 
social democratic governments. Despite 14 years of social democratic rule 
in Spain it still had the highest unemployment rate reported amongst 
OECD countries.
The achievements of social democrats in different countries also 
vary. Welfarism as a goal also varies as research on the welfare state 
shows there are several kinds of welfare states. Esping-Anderson calls the 
Scandinavian welfare state the 'social democratic welfare state, but other 
commentators recognise other forms as at least potentially social 
democratic (Castles and Mitchell 1990). The social democratic parties in 
government in the 1980s and 90s had to find new measures which could 
satisfy their new electorate without disenchanting their traditional power 
bases. The satisfaction of "new social movement" agendas and old trade 
union based alliances meant that compromises and "trade-offs" had to 
govern policies. Social justice was still the goal but it now had to 
incorporate issues of life-style and culture along-side the traditional 
economic and democratic agenda. Crosland, to his credit, had foreseen the 
importance of life-style issues in the early 1950s and later social democrats 
had followed his lead. Therefore, while it has become more difficult to
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understand, let alone define social democracy it cannot be argued that social 
democracy has ceased to have influence in the 1990s.
Such complications are not unexpected, however, as Bernstein 
argued: social democracy is comprised by the movement. The "move­
ment is everything;" programs are secondary. Social democracy has once 
again entered a new era. It is a movement which seeks social justice 
although justice is no longer merely driven by economics. Social 
democrats have made numerous concessions to the politics of "new social 
movements" which have broadened their agenda, while building on their 
original concerns. A process such as this almost inevitably leads to some 
significant groups becoming disenchanted. This can be seen as a 
consequence of adopting the parliamentary road with all its attendant 
compromises and pragmatic considerations. It can be argued, therefore, 
that social democracy by recognising issues of identity politics, culture and 
the environment has relevance not only for the 1990s but beyond.
The social democracy of the 1990s offers solutions to the existing 
problems of the times. In the new era, as mentioned above, social 
democracy addresses gender and environmental issues. The concept of 
economic growth has changed to the quality of economic growth. 
Conditions for women even in the most developed countries of northern 
Europe require improvement. Nevertheless, conditions for women in
the Scandinavian countries, where social democracy has been dominant 
for many decades, are considerably better than those in other similar 
developed countries, such as Germany. The relevance of social democracy 
to this issue is more obvious in developing countries because of huge 
gender inequality, a lesser development of democratic institutions,
human rights abuses and nationalities issues.
The approach of social democracy to human rights is broader than 
that of most other ideologies, which either like liberalism privilege civil
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rights or communism privilege social and economic rights with a strong 
emphasis on the economic. Civil/political and social/economic rights are 
equally important for social democracy. Hence, if we are to consider the 
quality of life as a goal of politics, it is the approach of social democracy 
that truly contributes to politics in the lesser developed countries. 
Therefore, I have argued that social democracy has no less relevance in 
the 1990s than in the 1890s or in its "golden years' in the 1960s, but also 
that social democracy has relevance beyond the developed post-industrial 
countries of north Europe and Australasia. From my discussion of social 
democracy it can be seen that it has particular continuing relevance in the 
lesser developed countries of Europe, such as Spain and Turkiye.
Despite the changes outlined above social democracy of the 1990s 
still contains many of the characteristic components of social democracy of 
the 1960s. Although the formal ties between social democratic political 
parties and the trade union movement have been broken in many 
European countries, the relationship between these two parts of the 
labour movement is still strong; because their interests are still 
complementary. Trade unions prefer social democratic governments to 
right wing governments. As part of the relationship with trade unions, 
full employment and the welfare state are very important objectives for 
social democratic parties, although the precise meaning of meeting such 
objectives is not always as clear as it was in the 1960s.
Although social democratic political parties loosened many of their 
commitments to the characteristic components of programs of the 1960s, 
social democratic programs to reduce unemployment are still a major 
element of their administrations. The role of full employment in the 
fulfilment of social justice cannot be understood merely by analysing 
unemployment figures, because the method of calculating 
unemployment for official statistics widely varies between countries. The
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main difference arising from a social democratic approach appears to be 
either higher female labour force participation figures or higher overall 
adult labour force participation ratios. Social democratic labour policies 
and industry policies have also contributed to a marked difference in 
conditions of work between social democratic and non social democratic 
countries.
As with its approach to full employment, the approach of social 
democrats to the welfare state, differs from that of contemporary right 
wing and liberal parties. Right wing political parties characteristically try 
to change education and health care policies to conform to market models 
of service provision which include privatisation, competition and "user 
pays" philosophies. Right wing attitudes to welfare usually regard it as a 
residual category which should be mainly for the "deserving poor". Sodal 
democratic political parties at least defend the existence of a welfare state 
on the grounds of inclusiveness, because they regard social welfare as a 
right of citizenship. In attempting to find new methods of administration 
or ways to improve welfare service provision which will overcome 
the bureaucratism associated with Beveridge style welfare states, 
contemporary social democracy has often seen welfare provision as part of a 
holistic program of measures. Such measures often include the use of 
"public" organisations rather than state based bodies, eg. women's refuges 
provided by local women's organisations. The linkage between social 
democratic parties and women's movements and organisations is 
therefore vital to such projects.
Hence, social democracy has not ceased to have relevance for 
politics in the 1990s, but it has entered a new era. The new era is mostly 
characterised by the adoption of new goals and methods of achieving 
them which are consequences of its search for new bases of political and 
social support. The need for change is mostly governed by the changing
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nature of late capitalism as it becomes more globalist in organisation and 
as post-industrial and post-fordist economic developments occur. In this 
new era social democracy continues to have relevance, not only for the 
developed post-industrial countries of northern Europe, but also for the 
lesser developed industrial countries of Europe, such as Spain and, 
especially Turkiye.
Spain and Turkiye have common problems, such as their 
nationalities questions, significant regional inequalities, a history of 
human rights abuses and long experiences with authoritarian regimes. 
These problems reflect the low level of democracy in both countries. 
Examination of the formation of the nationalities question, or of regional 
identity in Spain, shows that the existence of these issues can be traced 
back to the Middle-Ages. It can be argued that, despite the presence of the 
Basque separatist (ETA) movement, Spain has largely resolved many of the 
political aspects of its nationalities problems through the structure of its 
political institutions. One of the most important institutional paths to a 
resolution was the establishment of the Autonomous Communities and 
devolution of considerable political power to these communities.
On the other hand, it appears Turkiye will continue to face 
difficulties arising from its nationalities problem, despite the fact that its 
approach to the question has changed in recent years. As a response to the 
question, the Turkish social democratic parties support decentralisation as 
long as it does not affect their fight against inequality between classes and 
regions. I have argued, however, that a form of political and 
administrative decentralisation is necessary to resolve most of these 
problems in the first place. As a result, Turkish social democrats should 
support decentralisation not only to solve the nationalities question, but 
also to combat regional and class based inequalities.
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Human rights issues are another problem faced by both Spain and 
Turkiye which highlight deficiencies in their democratic development. This 
issue also presents an obstacle to the development of social democratic 
ideas and practice because of previous bans on communist party activity 
in both countries. As a definition of communism remains contentious, 
any ban on communism can seriously affect the free expression of socialist 
ideas, if authorities so choose. The ban on communist parties continues 
in Turkiye. It is clear that in Turkiye freedom of thought, as it is 
understood in western democracies, does not exist because of the ban of 
communist parties and the existence of prisoners of conscience and other 
political prisoners. Although Spain is in a considerably better position, 
violations of human rights are still present especially associated with 
nationalist separatism.
Islamist fundamentalism in Turkiye is another obstacle to social 
democracy, because of the challenge it poses to secularism. Although the 
pro-Islamist movement has gained momentum since the 1980s there are 
important counter-forces to the overthrow of secularism. The Army is 
the strongest counter-force against Islamist fundamentalism, because the 
army is strongly committed to the secular state. The followers of the 
Alevi sect are another force. It is difficult for pro-Islamists to gain support 
among Alevis because the pro-Islamist movement is Sunni, while Alevi 
is influenced by Shia teaching. There are also strong liberal wings within 
the conservative parties, the DYP and ANAP. An example of this is 
shown by the protest against the coalition of the DYP with RP (Welfare 
party) when 15 parliamentary members of the DYP resigned from the 
party. While other liberals have not yet resigned from the party, a 
significant number strongly oppose anti-secular policies.
Beside these, liberal secularism is one of the mam planks of the centre- 
left parties (the CHP and DSP). The Kurdish nationalist movement
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can also be considered as another force against the fundamentalists, 
because the movement is socialist and always takes part in all broad Left 
movements in Turkiye. Besides these factors, the westernisation of 
Turkiye goes back to the 18th century. By the time of the formation of the 
Republic both westernisation and in turn secularism had developed 
strong roots in Turkiye. In other words, the westernisation process of 
Turkiye has continued for over a century without interruption. Hence, by 
analysing these secular forces, including Turkey's growing relationships 
with the European Community, the pro-Islamist movements can only be 
considered as a potential threat, but not yet a force that can overthrow 
secularism in Turkiye.
The direct or indirect role of the armed forces as a political actor is 
another common problem of Spain and Turkiye. Armed forces in these 
countries are the prime contributors to the existence of authoritarian 
regimes. The power of the army was the result of the under development 
of democratic institutions in both countries, including inadequate 
constitutional safeguards to army involvement in politics.
It is necessary, however, to note that the army took a positive role 
in the development of the parliamentary system in Turkiye until the 
1970s. The powers of the armed forces, especially in Spain, have been 
eroded after the last attempted coups d'etats. In both countries the 
democratic institutions, such as political parties, interest groups, judicial 
system and the mass media have developed further protective shields to 
military encroachment. Such further development of the institutions has 
eroded the power of the armed forces as a political actor. In these countries, 
it is clear that intervention by the armed forces cannot resolve the problems, 
but worsen them.
However, arguing that the armed forces do not play any significant 
role in politics is invalid because they may affect the composition and
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behaviour of cabinets, especially through the existence of the MGK in 
Turkiye. In addition, Spain's full and Turkiye's part integration to 
the European Community will act against coups d'etats occurring in the 
future. As a result, I have argued that the powers of the armed forces 
are not obstacles to social democracy's ability to carry out its policies through 
the parliamentary system in these countries. However, despite the 
significant ongoing human right violations and the recent experience of 
authoritarian regimes in both countries the development of their 
parliamentary systems is well enough for social democratic parties to work. 
The Socialists in Spain, the PSOE, and, the CHP in Turkiye, are the best 
examples of this argument.
Spain, and especially Turkiye, are still among the lesser developed 
countries of Europe, although the social and political development of 
both countries has been rapid in the last two decades. Like Greece and 
Portugal they have had recent experience of authoritarian regimes. The 
Franco regime lasted until the mid-1970s, while Turkiye experienced three 
short periods of army intervention in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In Turkiye 
although there were army interventions on three occasions, in all three 
they immediately announced that the aim of their action was to restore 
the parliamentary system and, as soon as they could do so, they would 
return to their barracks. Despite having such authoritarian regimes iri the 
past the political systems of both countries have been stable since the early 
1980s. Their parliamentary systems function effectively and changes of 
government have taken place in a proper constitutional manner. Even 
when elections have not yielded conclusive results the process of 
coalition building has been constitutional and followed parliamentary 
conventions.
In both countries political parties are characteristic, of the nature of 
their political systems. Duverger argued that by the 1950s Turkiye had
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truly representative political parties. Since then the party system of 
Turkiye has developed further and is now a typical example of a multi­
party system. In Spain the roots of the main established parties go back to 
the late nineteenth century, especially those of the PSOE and of the IU. 
The existence of a competitive political party system is seen in the practice 
of regular parliamentary elections.
In both countries1 regular elections have been held according to the 
respective regulations since the early 1980s and importantly a regular 
change of the party in office has resulted. In Spain after the 1982 general 
election results the PSOE took office from a right wing party, which had 
followed the Franco regime. In 1996 the PSOE lost office to a moderate 
right-wing party, the PP. In Turkiye after the 1980 Coup regime, the 
ANAP a conservative party took office in 1983 and ran Turkiye until 1991. 
Between 1991 and 1995 another conservative party, the DYP, was in office 
in coalition with a centre-Left party, the SHP/CHP. As a result of the 1995 
general election, a pro-Islamist party, the Welfare Party, was in office in 
coalition with the DYP. As I argued above, a change of office between 
parties, which is a crucially important sign of regular process in 
parliamentary systems occurs, according to election results.
The existence of independent trade unions like political parties 
contributes to the functioning of representative democratic system. For 
social democracy, the existence of trade union movements has been 
crucially important. The Swedish trade union movement represents a 
typical example of how trade unions are needed as partners for social 
democratic parties. Trade union movements in Spain and Turkiye, 
however, do not conform to this ideal type. The movements in these 
countries reflect a Mediterranean type of trade union movement, low 
membership, very fragmented and weak central organisations. There are
1 It is important to note that in Turkiye ail elections are held under the complete control of the 
Judiciary.
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several central trade union organisations and each one is close to a 
different political party. There are three union confederations in each 
country: the UGT, CCOO and USO in Spain and the Turk-Is, DISK and 
Hak-Is in Turkiye. Unlike their counterparts in northern Europe, social 
democratic political parties are not dominant in trade union movements. 
Trade union movements in both countries are also financially dependent 
on their respective state.
Despite the social democratic parties not having formal or informal 
relationships with the trade union movement the parties receive many 
votes from the working-class. The class identities of the parties in both 
countries, however, are not as clear as those in northern Europe. It is 
worthwhile noting that since the early 1980s even in the homelands of 
Social Democracy the relationship between the trade union movement 
and social democratic parties has been broken. Furthermore, in southern 
European countries, such as Spain, Greece, France and Portugal, the social 
democratic parties manage to come to office, despite having a weak trade 
union movement. Therefore, in the 1990s the relationship between the 
trade union movement and social democratic parties cannot be 
considered as a necessary condition for the success of Social Democracy.
Hence, it is evident that there is sufficient development of the 
political systems of Turkiye and Spain for social democrats to implement 
their policies. Moreover, the level of economic and social development is 
more than adequate to sustain a redistributive program and welfare state 
measures. This is especially true of Spain. The contribution of each 
economic sector to both total civilian employment and GDP in Spain is 
similar to those in the developed countries of northern Europe, such as 
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Turkiye, on the other hand, is 
a newly industrialised country. The contribution of agriculture to total 
civilian employment in 1992 was still considerably higher than in
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developed European countries. In both countries labour intensive sectors 
constitute a major part of the employment structure: textiles and growing 
tourism in Turkiye and tourism in Spain. Unlike the declining blue 
collar electorates of post-industrial northern European countries, there j s  
a sizeable number of potential blue collar heartlands for social democratic 
parties in both countries. Hence, a traditional social democratic support 
base exists in Turkiye and Spain. Unlike the left parties in Scandinavian 
countries, however, social democrats in Turkiye have been unable to gain 
support amongst the agrarian electorate. This mainly due to the effects of 
religious affiliation on support for political parties. Therefore, in rural 
areas social democratic parties are relatively weak and certainly weaker 
than in other European countries. This is one of the major weaknesses of 
social democrat parties in Turkiye.
Social democrats in Turkiye have to gain increased support from 
religious people2 to win a majority in the TBMM. Religious identity for 
many people is more important than their class identity in their selection 
of political parties. The poor performance of centre-left parties in central 
Anatolia is undoubtedly attributable to this factor. It was the CHP that 
brought secularism to Turkiye. All left wing movements, including the 
social democratic movements in Turkiye are known to be against religion, 
unlike their counterparts in Europe. The success of social democracy in 
Turkiye is dependent on its ability to attract support among the Sunni-sect
electorate without destroying their secular image.
In terms of GDP per capita, Spain, and especially Turkiye, are 
among the poorer countries in Europe. The amount of GDP per capita, 
however, cannot be taken as a determining factor in the success of social 
democracy. Success for social democracy is best considered by comparing
2 By religious people I mean people who practise Islam, but not fundamentalist, or who are for the 
secular state.
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countries in terms of welfare state provision and social security transfers. 
It is clear that with their current level of wealth Spain and Turkiye 
cannot afford the same level of welfare services provided in the 
developed countries. However, for the reasons outlined above, a small 
GDP is not necessarily an obstacle to social democracy being able to initiate 
a welfare program or start redistributing income. Secondly, social 
democracy is not primarily concerned with achieving a fair distribution of 
wealth as a static goal, but providing equal opportunity and equal access 
for all citizens to the wealth of the country. Hence, social democrats seek 
full employment in rewarding jobs, a situation which depends on productive 
growth. Finally, today's typical examples of European welfare states were 
not achieved in a decade but in several decades. The economies of Spain and 
Turkiye are at a similar stage of development as the northern European 
countries were in the "golden years of the 1960s.
Social development in Turkiye and Spain, on the other hand, presents 
a different picture. On some measures, such as life-expectancy and the 
number of doctors per 1,000 population in Spain or female labour 
force participation in Turkiye their performance compares well with the 
developed countries. In Turkiye female labour force participation is very 
high, higher even than in the Netherlands and wage differentiation 
between sexes is lower than in many developed countries. There are no 
restrictions on universal suffrage for women in both countries. In Spain 
in the 1990s, female students constitute over fifty per cent of all tertiary
students. .
The HDI rankings of Spain and Turkiye disprove the existence of a
necessary link between GDP per capita and social development. HDI 
rankings are mostly affected by properly conceived and executed public 
policies. In 1992 Spain's ranking in the HDI is higher than that of many 
developed countries, including Denmark and Germany. Spain s ranking
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for HDI is 9 yet its ranking for GDP per capita is 29, while Germany's HDI 
ranking is 15 against its GDP per capita ranking of 12. On the other hand, 
the HDI ranking of Turkiye (66) is one ranking lower than its GDP per 
capita score. While social conditions in Turkiye demonstrate that a 
link between wealth and human development exists to some degree, 
Turkiye's HDI ranking is primarily a product of political decisions. A low 
level of economic development does not mean that a political program 
cannot be initiated to address serious social issues as the example of Spain 
indicates. The second conclusion is that a prolonged period of social 
democratic government such as in Spain can produce welfare services 
which compare favourably in their results with a wealthy country like 
Germany.
Regional inequality is a common problem to Spain and Turkiye. In 
Turkiye, in terms of GDP per capita, there is huge inequality between 
regions, especially between Marmara and the East. The inequality 
between regions in Spain is less than that in Turkiye. Inequality between 
regions is the product of the neglect of less developed regions by 
successive governments, the geographical position of regions and their 
colonisation by other European countries. On the other hand, I argued 
that social democrats in Spain have become relatively successful in 
reducing inequality between regions. Social democrats argue that the 
reduction of regional inequality cannot be left to the market. Markets 
have not only had little success in reducing regional inequality but have 
often been associated with increasing such inequalities. The approach of 
social democrats to regional inequality, therefore, is consistent with their 
approach to inequality in general. They use economic planning, neo 
Keynesian policies and a great range of incentives including direct 
subsidies for services. The example of wide regional inequalities in Turkiye 
demonstrates that reducing inequality between regions cannot be
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left to market forces. The state needs to invest either directly or indirectly 
to encourage private enterprise to invest in relatively less developed 
regions such as those in the east of Turkiye.
The current social, political and economic developmental levels of 
Spain and Turkiye are such that social democratic policies are required to 
bring them closer to the developed countries of northern Europe. 
Although conditions for women have improved, further improvement is 
still needed to correct the huge gender inequality in these countries. 
Human rights abuses, especially of civil/political rights, are still clearly 
evident in these countries, especially in Turkiye. Social democracy, 
because of its broad approach to human rights is best placed to bring about 
long term solutions. At its best social democracy treats basic civil/political 
rights and broader social, economic . and human rights as equally 
important. With a social democratic approach to human rights, the 
probability of resolving nationalities problems becomes greater. The 
development of human rights will also contribute to the development of 
democratic institutions as well as to economic development for reasons I 
have outlined throughout this thesis.
It might be asked what kind of social democratic policies would 
work best in Spain and Turkiye. But it needs to be remembered that I 
have argued social democracy is best conceived as a movement for social 
justice not as a rigid set of dogmas or as a static program. The success of 
social democracy in these countries depends on achievable programs, 
which are pragmatic in orientation and design. Such programs certainly 
need to address issues of social and economic development as well as 
further democratising their political systems. In these countries, 
however, social democrats cannot focus on démocratisation to the neglect 
of economic development or vice-versa. Political and economic
development are not necessarily mutually exclusive as both are very
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important parts of a viable social democracy. Programs for social 
development have to be realistic, a worthwhile goal such as achieving the 
level of protection afforded by northern European welfare states is not 
achievable in a short time period. Northern European countries achieved 
their levels of welfare state protection in a process lasting several decades. 
Given the current level of wealth in Spain and especially Turkiye social 
democratic goals should be based on attempting to achieve a long-term 





Table-1: Parties Distribution in
Parties 1986 1989 1993 1996
PSOE 184 175 159 141
CP/PP 105 107 141 156
PCE/IU 7 17 18 21
CiU 18 18 17 16
PNV 6 5 5 5
HB 5 4 2 2
CC 1 1 4 4
u v 1 2 1 1
EA - 2 1 1
ERC -  - 1 1
CG/BNG 1 - - 2
CDS 19 14 - .
PAR 1 1 1 -
EE 2 - - -
PA - 2 - -
(Source: Robinson 1987: 121 & Lancaster 1994: 185)
Spain
Table-2: General Election 1961-1977: Turkiye












AP 34.8 158 52.9 240 46.5 256 30.6 149 36.9 189
R PP 36.7 173 28.7 134 27.4 143 33.5 185 41.6 213
M SP — — — — — — 11.9 48 8.6 24
MHP — — — — 3.0 1 3.4 3 6.4 16
DP — — — — — — 12.5 45 1.8 1
CGP — — — — 6.6 15 5.3 13 1.9 3
TBP — — — — 2.8 8 1.1 1 0.4 —
TIP — — 3.0 15 2.7 2 — — — —
CKMP 14.0 54 2.2 11 — — — — — —
MP — — 6.3 31 3.2 6 0.6 — — —
YTP 13.7 65 3.7 19 •2.2 6 — — — —
Independ 6.8 — 3.2 — 5.6 13 2.8 6 2.5 4
ents
(Source: Dodd 1990:223)
1 Justice Party (AP), National Salvation party (MSP), National Action Party (MHP), Republican People s 
Party (RPP), Turkish Workers’ Party (TIP), Turkish Unity Party (TBP), Republican Reliance Party (CGP), 
Republican Peasant’s National Party (CKMP), Nation Party (MP), Democratic Party (DP), New Turkey Party
(YTP)
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T a b le -3 : General Elections 1983-1995 : T urkiye
Parties 1983 1987 1991 1995
ANAP 45 36 24 19.65
SHP/HP/CHP 30.50 25 2Ó1 10.72
DYP — 19 27 19.19
RP — 7.2 16.883 21.31
DSP — 8.5 10.50 14.66
MHP — 2.1 8.19
HADEP — — 4.18
MDP3 23.00 — — —
(Source: Finkel 1990; The Keesing’s Record of World Event; 
http://www.ce.utk.edu./~basoglu/secim.html)
Table-4: Local Elections 1984-1994: Turkiye
Party 1984 1989 1994
ANAP 41.5 21.9 20.9
DYP 13.2 21.9
RP 4.4 9.8 18.8
MCP/MHP — 4.1 8.1
DSP 9.0 8.7
SHP — 28.5 13.4




(Source: DOD 1990:224 and "?he Economist, April 2 :
Table-5: Average Annual Rates of Growth in Regional GDP, 1983-87: Spain
Región Growth rate Primary Industry Construction Services
Extremadura 6.9 11.3 11.8 4.5 5.1
Canarias 6.2 3.2 8.4 13.2 5.2
Baleares 5.3 3.4 -0.5 6.3 6.1
Murcia 5.2 7.0 4.2 5.8 5.2
Castilla-La Mancha 4.4 1.5 4.0 4.1 5.6
Valencia 4.1 0.9 3.7 3.0 4.8
Andalucia 4.0 4.7 0.6 3.1 5.0
Spain average 3.3 2.3 1.4 4.5 4.1
Galicia 3.2 1.3 4.2 2.8 3.3
Aragón 3.1 3.8 1.2 3.1 4.2
Castilla Y León 3.1 2.7 1.9 6.0 3.6
Navarra 3.1 -1.2 3.6 5.5 3.2
Madrid 2.7 -10.4 1.1 4.4 3.1
Cataluña 2.6 -0.4 0 5.0 4.0
Asturias 1.8 -2.2 1.3 3.5 2.4
La Rioja 1.4 -4.8 -0.5 2.7 4.2
Euskadi 1.3 -4.9 -0.9 1.7 3.6
Cantabria 1.1 -2.7 -2.6 3.7 3.1v^ani ui i a _________ ______ * •1
(Source: Beltran 1993:227)
2 In alliance with HEP, pro-Kurdish party
3 In alliance with MHP
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T abled  Evolution of the Inter-Regional Compensation Fund per Inhabitant: Spain
Regions 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Andalucía 7,682 8,872 9,054 8,804 8,101 5,446 5,529 7,400
Aragón 3,745 3,899 4,309 4,224 3,841 2,547 2,144 2,509
Asturias 4,234 4,159 4,024 3,918 3,690 2,046 3,122 4,273
Baleares 3,018 3,163 3,293 2,662 2,368 2,074 1,524 2,277
Canarias 8,353 8,822 7,761 7,002 6,495 5,131 6,108 8,096
Cantabria 2,980 3,167 3,376 3,531 3,519 2,551 2,312 2,390
Castilla-La Mancha 7,414 8,543 8,694 9,433 8,973 6,381 6,489 9,001
Castilla Y León 6,768 7,364 7,458 7,396 7,125 4,907 4,452 6,241
Cataluña 2,358 2,668 2,944 2,959 2,450 1,674 2,473 3,998
Extremadura 14,194 15,556 15,242 13,800 15,503 10,516 8,680 11,760
Galicia 6,540 7,981 7,754 7,732 7,395 5,421 5,752 8,060
Madrid 2,144 2,529 2,431 2,329 2,221 1,626 1,819 2,617
Murcia 4,091 4,574 4,680 4,651 4,051 2,771 3,309 5,076
Navarra 3,040 2,696 2,731 2,708 2,681 1,942 1,913 2,822
Basque Country 2,814 3,127 3,140 3,384 3,338 3,448 4,931 7,484
La Rioja 3,073 2,936 2,752 2,700 2667 1,834 1,784 2,450
Valencia 3,297 3,301 3,459 2,956 3,170 2,358 2,554 3,626
Ceuta 5,417 8,434 7,053 9,810 9,449 7,010 5,971 8,913
Melilla 6,676 9,962 8,300 9,889 9,578 7,070 6,037 8,983
Total 4,947 5,491 5,566 5,431 5,163 3,699 3,957 5,600
(Source: Zaldivar & Castells 1992:342)
Table-7: Public Investment and the East (1984-1989): Turkiye
Turkiye & the East's in the East
Years
Total public investment 
(billion TL)
Total public investment 
(billion TL) %
1984 1,117 148.6 13.3
1985 2,078 286.2 13.8
1986 2,886 460.5 15.9
1987 4,136 590.0 14.3
1988 5,197 702.7 13.5
1984-1988 15,414 2,188.0 14.2
(Source: Sonmez 1990:195)
Table-8: Employment: Selected European Countries
(Percentage changes from previous period)
(Source: OECD Economic Outlook June 1995, no: 57)
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Country 1989 1989 1992 1989 1992 1989 1992
Turkiye 21.4 50.1 43.9 20.5 22.1 29.5 34.0
Spain 6.1 13.0 10.1 32.9 32.4 54.0 57.5
Denmark 6.1 5.7 5.7 27.4 27.7 66.6 66.9
Germany 2.6 3.7 3.1 39.8 38.3 56.5 58.6
Netherlands 22.0 4.7 4.0 31.2 24.6 65.4 71.4
(Source: OECD in Figures, no 170-1991 & 188-1994)
Table-10: Purchasing Power Parity: Selected European Countries
Per Capita Volume Indices-a_______________________________________________
Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands The U. States
P riv a te  F in a l C o n s u m p tio n  E x p e n d itu re 2 0 4 6 5 7 6 9 6 2 1 0 0
F o o d  B e v e r a g e s  a n d  T o b a cc o 6 6 8 4 92 9 2 8 6 1 0 0
C lo th in g  a n d  F o o r w e a r 3 4 3 5 5 7 8 2 6 5 1 0 0
G r o s s  R e n t F u e l a n d  P o w e r 1 3 2 7 9 7 7 1 7 0 1 0 0
H o u se h o ld  E q u ip m e n t a n d  O p e ra tio n 4 1 4 7 7 0 9 8 7 2 1 0 0
M e d ic a l a n d  H e a lth  C a re 8 1 9 12 9 8 8 9 1 0 0
T ra n s p o r t  a n d  C o m m u n ic a t io n 7 2 6 4 3 4 5 3 1 1 0 0
R e c re a tio n , E d u c a t io n  a n d  C u ltu re 7 2 5 5 0 5 9 5 2 1 0 0
M is c e lla n e o u s  G o o d s  a n d  S e rv ic e s 5 5 5 28 3 8 4 7 1 0 0
G o v e rn m e n t F in a l C o n s u m p tio n  
E x p en d itu re 2 7 4 3 1 3 0 5 8 6 7 1 0 0
C o n s tio n 2 1 4 2 71 7 9 5 4 1 0 0
T o ta l G D P 2 2 4 6 74 7 4 6 8 1 0 0
a=1985 figures the volume indices show the size of each country's per capita for the items listed  
relative to that of the United States when converted to US dollars using purchasing power 
parities.
P rice  L ev els-b
P riv a te  F in a l C o n s u m p tio n  E x p e n d itu re  
F o o d  B e v e r a g e s  a n d  T o b a c c o  
C lo th in g  a n d  F o o r w e a r  
G ro s s  R e n t F u e l a n d  P o w e r 
H o u se h o ld  E q u ip m e n t an d  O p e ra tio n  
M e d ic a l a n d  H e a lth  C a re  
T ra n s p o r t  a n d  C o m m u n ic a t io n  
R e c re a tio n , E d u c a t io n  a n d  C u ltu re  
M is c e lla n e o u s  G o o d s  a n d  S e rv ic e s  
G o v e rn m e n t F in a l C o n s u m p tio n  
E x p en d itu re  
C o n s tio n  
T o ta l G D P
Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands The U. States
3 6 5 5 1 0 1 87 76 1 0 0
3 5 6 4 1 0 8 8 0 7 5 1 0 0
5 0 8 6 92 8 8 75 1 0 0
3 6 2 7 75 82 6 6 1 0 0
3 9 6 9 1 0 0 88 82 1 0 0
2 1 3 9 65 62 4 8 1 0 0
3 2 9 1 1 4 6 1 1 7 1 0 4 1 0 0
3 5 8 1 1 2 5 1 0 0 94 1 0 0
3 9 6 1 1 2 9 99 89 1 0 0
1 2 4 6 73 79 7 0 1 0 0
2 8 6 3 95 86 91 1 0 0
2 9 5 6 92 84 7 7 1 0 0
b= 1985 figures, the country of reference for each series is the United States. The price levels are  
defined as the ratios of the PPPs for each component of expenditure to exchange rates. The 
comparative price levels show the number of US dollars required in each country to buy the same 
basket of final goods and services costing $100 in the united States.
(source: OECD  In Figures 1989)
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T a b le -1 1 : Profile of Unemployment, 1994 %: Selected E u ro p ean  C ou ntries
Country All persons Women Youth
Low skilled 
(1992)
Turkiye 8.3 (1993) 6.7 15.3 5.1
Spain 23.8 30.9 38.3 16.0
Denmark 10.1 11.2 10.6 14.1
Germany 6.9 6.7 5.2 8.9
Netherlands 7.2 1.7 (1993) 7.8 8.0
EU 11.1 12.6 18.6 10.0
(Source: OECD Jobs Study, 1950 - 1996, 1995)
Table-12: Human Development Index (HDI), 1990: Selected European Countries
Turkiye Spain Denmark Germany Netherlands
Life expectancy at birth (years) 1990 65.10 77.00 75.80 75.20 77.20
Adult literacy rate % 1990 80.70 97.50 99.00 99.00 99.00
Mean year schooling 1990 3.50 6.80 10.40 11.10 10.60
Educational attainment 1990 1.82 2.46 2.84 2.90 2.86
Real GDP per capita PPP$ 1990 4,662 11,723 16,781 18,213 15,695
Adjusted real GDP per capita 4,662 5,006 5,046 5,050 5,042
Literacy index 0.770 0.960 1.000 1.000 1.000
Schooling index 0.280 0.540 0.840 0.900 0.860
HDI index 0.717 0.923 0.955 0.957 0.970
GDP per capita rank minus HDI 
rank 10 5 -6 -4 8
(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
Table-13: HDI ranking, comparing 1990 with 1992: Selected European Countries












Country 1992 1990 1992 1990 1992 1990 1992 1990
Turkiye 0.792 0.717 66 73 65 83 -1 10
Spain 0.930 0.923 9 23 29 28 20 5
Denmark 0.920 0.955 16 13 12 7 -4 -6
Germany 0.921 0.957 15 12 6 8 -9 -4
Netherlands 0.936 0.970 4 9 20 17 16 8
(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
Table-14: Lower Average Wage for Women: Selected European Countries
Country
women’s non agricultural 






(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
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T a b le -1 5 : Population by Literacy, Education Level and Sex: Turkiye
Male Female
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Literate 70.3 79.9 88.8 41.3 54.6 72.0
Literate without diploma 24.5 18.4 16.3 16.6 14.6 15.6
Primary school (6-11 years old) 36.1 44.2 49.1 20.7 31.4 43.1
Junior high school (12-14 years old) 4.9 7.6 9.6 2.2 3.7 5.4
High school (15-18 years old) 3.4 6.4 9.5 1.8 3.7 6.0
Higher education 1.3 3.3 4.2 0.6 1.2 1.8
(Source: OECD Economic Survey on Turkiye, 1994
Table-16: Percentage of Female at all Levels of Education: Selected European Countries 
Percentage of Female, at preceding the first level (I), the First level (II), Second level (III),
the Third level, Universities and equivalent institutions (IV)
C o u n try Y e a r I II III IV
1980 45 45 26
Turkiye 1985 48 47 28 34
1991 47 47 35 37
1980 50 49 46 43
Spain 1985 49 48 51 50
1991 — 48(1989) 51 (1988) 51 (1989)
1980 49 49 41 43
Denmark 1985 49 49 43 44
1990 49 49 44 51
1980 49 49 49 42
Germany 1985 48 49 44 43
1991 49 43 42
1980 49 49 41 31
Netherlands 1985 49 49 42 37
1990 49 50 43 41 (1988)
(Source: Statistical Yearbook, United Nations 1992)
Table-17: Income Distribution: Selected European Countries
Percentage of income received by .
rie rest
poorest 20 % 5 % 10%
Country mid 1970s-a 1985-b mid 1970s-a 1985-b
Turkiye 3.0 3.5 32.0 41.5
Spain 6.0 6.9 20.0 24.5
Denmark 4.0 — 22.0 24.0
Germany 5.0 6.0 35.7 24.0
Netherlands 3.1 7.1 22.0 23.9
(Source: a= S tatistical Abstract of the Workl,
b= The New Book of World Ranking, 1991)
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Table-18: Income Distribution in Percentage: Turkiye 
As a percentage of total monthly income, 1987_________
i
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percentage 2.1 3.4 4.0 5.6 6.3 7.6 9.4 11.7 15.9 34.0
(i- Indicative minimum wage, twice legal minimum wage) 
(Source: OECD Economic Survey on Turkiye, 1994)
Table-19: Central Government: Total Revenue : Selected European Countries
Country 1983 1985 1987 1990
Turkiye 20.02 17.55 17.89 19.43
Spain 25.92 27.19 30.23 30.59
Denmark 36.75 40.13 41.65 39.31
Germany 29.42 30.24 29.58 28.82
Netherlands 52.52 51.05 50.90 47.07
(Source: IMF - Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994:90-91)
Table-20: Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP: Selected European Countries
Country 1980 1984 1986 1994
Turkiye 19.02 14.43 22.7 22.2
Spain 24.11 28.39 30.4 35.8
Denmark 45.48 48.02 50.6 51.6
Germany 39.00 37.73 37.5 39.3
Netherlands 45.82 45.54 45.5 45.9
OECD in Figures n-158; OECD in Figures n-206)
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Table-23: State Borrowing Requirement: Spain
(Cash basis, pesetas billion)
1990 1991 1992 1993
Borrowing requirement -1,986 -2,144 -2,608 -4,638
Short- term debt 1,116 -749 181 202
Medium and long term debt 587 2,038 1,119 6,298
Bank of Spain -130 9 -114 -2,237
other 413 847 1,423 376
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Spain 1994)
Table-24: Budget Deficit by Government Levels: Spain
1982 1985 1991
Central 4.9 6.3 3.4
Per cent of Regional 0.2 0.4 1.4
GDP Local 0.5 0.3 0.1
Total 5.6 7.0 4.9
Share in Central 88.5 90.7 67.7
total Regional 3.2 5.5 29.2
deficit Local 8.3 3.8 3.0
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain 1993)
Table-25: Regional Structure of GDP, %: Spain
Agriculture Industry Construction Service



































































































































































(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain, 1993)
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T a b le -2 6 : Regional structure of Employment, %: Spain
Agriculture Industry | Construction Service
Regions 1980 1991 1980 1991 1980 1991 1980 1991
Andalucia 24.9 14.9 16.7 15.6 9.9 11.4 48.4 58.1
Canary Islands 18.7 7.6 11.5 9.4 11.3 9.9 58.4 73.2
Catalonia 6.9 3.7 39.4 33.3 8.7 9.3 45.0 53.8
Valencia 14.7 8.4 34.6 27.7 8.0 9.6 42.6 54.3
Galicia 43.3 30.2 16.9 15.6 9.7 10.3 30.1 43.9
Aragon 22.0 11.6 29.1 25.5 7.6 9.5 41.3 53.3
Asturias 27.7 15.2 28.9 22.9 7.2 11.0 36.6 51.0
Balearic Islands 14.1 3.7 19.9 15.9 11.6 13.2 54.3 67.2
Cantabria 26.4 12.2 27.2 23.2 7.5 9.7 38.8 54.8
Castilla - Leon 32.9 18.3 20.1 19.9 9.0 10.4 37.8 51.5
Castilla - La - Mancha 30.9 16.3 22.4 22.7 10.6 14.2 36.0 46.8
Extremadura 36.4 21.7 10.6 10.8 9.6 14.2 43.2 53.3
Madrid 1.6 1.0 26.7 19.9 9.3 8.8 62.3 70.3
Murcia 23.3 14.4 23.6 214 9.5 10.3 43.6 53.9
La Rioja 2.6 12.0 36.4 32.1 7.9 8.8 32.2 47.0
Navarra 14.5 7.2 36.8 32.2 7.9 8.9 40.8 51.7
Basque Country 7.1 2.9 44.0 34.3 6.5 7.5 42.4 55.3
Spain 19.3 10.7 26.9 22.9 9.0 10.1 44.7 56.3
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain, 1993)
Table-27: Relative Per Capita Income Levels: Spain (Spain = 100)
Regions
Real per capita GDP
1985 1990
Extremadura 67.9 69.4
Poor Regions Andalucia 74.8 75.1
Galicia 80.2 76.8
Castilla - La - Mancha 78.5 88.4
Balearic Islands 121.6 121.9
Basque Country 121.0 112.0
Rich Regions Navarra 117.6 122.5
Madrid 111.4 121.3
Catalonia 110.2 112.7




Others Cantabria 97.6 96.5
Castilla - Leon 96.6 91.0
Murcia 91.7 98.2
La Rioja 121.3 107.3
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain, 1993)
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Table-28: Number and Average Size of Farm Holding: Turkiye
Average size of farm
Size of farm 
holdings 
(hectares) Number








0.1 - 1.9 1,010,649 28 0.9 4
2.0 - 4.9 1,164,742 33 3.1 16
5.0 - 9.9 738,376 21 6.6 21
1980 10.0 - 19.9 412,523 12 12.9 23
20.0 - 49.9 194,186 5 27.7 24
50.0 + 29,439 1 92.9 12
Total 3,558,815 100 6.4 100
0.1 - 1.9 1,385,129 35 0.9 6
2.0 - 4.9 1,274,609 32 3.0 17
5.0 - 9.9 713,149 18 6.6 19
1990 10.0 - 19.9 383,323 10 12.8 21
20.0 - 49.9 173,774 4 26.7 20
50.0 + 36,838 10 109.0 17
Total 3,966,822 100 5.9 100
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Turkey 1994)












(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
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